On the Mental Consciousness Simultaneous with Five Sensory Consciousnesses

This paper focuses on the notion of “mental consciousness simultaneous with five sensory consciousnesses” (wu ju yishi 五俱意識; henceforth abbreviated as MSF) preserved in the Chinese Yogācāra sources. The MSF made its first appearance in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra. As suggested by its name, it refers to the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with one or more sensory consciousness(es) and is responsible for the omnipresent mental concomitants (mahābhūmika caitta) that are associated with that/those sensory consciousness(es). For example, a visual consciousness arises at t1, and at the same moment t1, omnipresent mental concomitants such as feeling (vedanā), ideation (saṃjñā) and volition (cetanā), etc. also arise. Since those mental concomitants represent more complex cognitive functions than sense perception, it must be the mental consciousness, rather than the sensory consciousness, that is responsible for the arising of those mental concomitants. I argue that this notion was crucial for better understanding Dignāga’s epistemology but it was totally forgotten by Dharmakīrti’s time.

I have previously argued that Dignāga’s mysterious notion of mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa), of which even Dharmakīrti could not quite make sense, can be made sense if we take MSF into consideration. Regarding mental perception, the basic conundrum we face is: If mental perception is the same as sensory perception, then it cannot be considered a means of cognition (pramāṇa) because it does not provide any new information; but if mental perception is different from sensory perception, then it should be modified, i.e., conceptualized, then it cannot be considered a perception (pratyakṣa) because perception is non-conceptualized. Faced with this dilemma, the solution provided by Dharmakīrti, according to Hattori, is as follows:

(1) What is perceived by means of mental perception is the object in the moment that immediately follows the moment of sense perception. Therefore mental perception is held to be anadhigatārtha-gantṛ. (2) Mental perception is conditioned by the immediately preceding sense perception as its samanantara-pratyaya. Accordingly, blind and deaf persons who have no sense perception are unable to have mental perception. (Hattori 1968, 93)

In my view, Dharmakīrti’s solution under Hattori’s interpretation hardly makes sense because the above (1) and (2) are incompatible. Given that every object is momentary, if, following (2), mental perception has no content that has not already been perceived by the sense perception at the previous moment, then given that the content of sense perception at t2 is about obj.1 (the object at t1), then the mental perception at t3 cannot cognize obj.2 (the object at t2), which has notbeen perceived by sense perception at t2. Hence, the content of mental perception at t3, if anything at all, must be about obj.1, either being exactly the same as the content of sense perception or a modification of it. The same criticism can be voiced against the interpretation of Jinendrabuddhi (8th century CE), which is the same as Dharmakīrti’s view.

Drawing clues from the Chinese Yogācāra sources, I propose that mental perception refers to the function of MSF or, more specifically, the mental concomitant of ideation (saṃjñā), which cognizes the shape (saṃsthāna) of an object. When one cognizes an object, both the color and the shape of that object are cognized at the same time. But the problem is that, for Dignāga, shapes are not substantially real (dravyasat) and hence cannot be cognized by sensory consciousness that cognizes substantially real entities such as color. For this reason, Dignāga introduced the notion of mental perception in order to explain how the cognition of colors and shapes can take place at the same time. Although shapes are not substantially real, they are nevertheless particulars (svalakṣaṇa), and this is why the cognition of shapes is still considered direct perception (pratyakṣa).

Further, I suggest that MSF is closely related to the notion of mental construction by the nature [of the five sensory consciousness] (svabhāva-vikalpa) in the Abhidharma tradition. In his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu states that there are three kinds of vikalpa, and among them the svabhāva-vikalpa is associated with the five sensory consciousnesses. This is puzzling because sensory consciousness is supposed to be without vikalpa under Dignāga’s epistemology. A clue to solving this puzzle is Vasubandhu’s statement that the nature of svabhāva-vikalpa is vitarka(gross investigation), which includes the discernment of shapes. Drawing inspiration from the case of mental perception mentioned above, I suggest that this particular function of vitarka is ascribed to mental perception by Dignāga, a move that leaves sensory consciousnesses to be without vikalpa. In short, the same function of vitarka is ascribed to sensory consciousness by Vasubandhu, but it is ascribed to the mental consciousness under the name of mental perception by Dignāga. The reason behind this is that shapes are considered substantially real according to Vasubandhu but merely nominally real (prajñaptisat) by Dignāga.

Finally, I show how MSF could help shed light on Dignāga’s notion of self-cognition (svasaṃvedana). In his Pramāṇasamuccaya I.6, Dignāga states that regarding greed, etc. (rāgādi), there is self-cognition such as desirable or undesirable (iṣṭa vā aniṣṭa). I suggest that this also refers to the function of SMF because self-cognition—in the form of being desirable or undesirable—refers to feeling (vedanā) as an omnipresent mental concomitant. Later in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga further states that self-cognition is the result of the means of cognition (pramāṇa-phala) and that the three factors of cognition—what is cognized (prameya), the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and the result of the means of cognition—are inseparable. This further suggests that there is a close relation between cognition and self-cognition, an idea that supports my interpretation that self-cognition refers to the mental concomitant of feeling.

In conclusion, the importance of studying pramāṇa in the Chinese sources is that the Chinese sources preserve the relevant context before and around the time of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmapāla. By carefully studying the Chinese pramāṇa sources, we see the continuity between Dignāga and his Abhidharma and Yogācāra predecessors, a trace that disappeared by Dharmakīrti.

Bibliography

Hattori, M. 1968. Dignāga, On Perception: Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions, Translated and Annotated. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.