(1) Aim:
This paper aims to reflect upon the extent to which the notion of pratyakṣa (perception) is sinified—by rendering xianliang in Chinese—by examining both classical and contemporary translations of Dignāga as well as considering Dharmakīrti’s theory of the means of knowledge (Skt. pramāṇa), given that Dignāga described pratyakṣa as non-conceptual and Dharmakīrti further developed a non-deceptive feature of it in India.
(2) Background:
Xianliang has long been a common term used to translate pratyakṣa, even if it is not a literal translation existing before the time of Xuanzang (600/602–664). While xian (manifest) and liang (measurement) literally mean pratyakṣa and pramāṇa, respectively, Xuanzang used xian (Ch.現), xianjian (Ch.現見), xianzhengliang (Ch.現證量), and mostly xianliang (Ch.現量) to translate pratyakṣa. He translated both pratyakṣa and pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam as xianliang. These moves led to the later concern, such as the relationship between xian and liang, and whether it is a tatpuruṣa or karmadhāraya compound according to Sanskrit grammar. It also potentially drives an issue of adding an extra layer of determination to direct perception. The xian-liang discussion is unique in Chinese and would not be an issue in Sanskrit; hence, it could be a case of sinification, especially concerning its integration with Yogācāra in China. Yet, what makes the notion of pratyakṣa “sinified”? Is it a linguistic adaptation for the sake of translation, or does it have deeper implications for a philosophical interpretation of pramāṇa theory and Yogācāra in China?
Interestingly, the historical impact of xianliang seems to linger even in twentieth-century translations with access to Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s works derived from Tibetan. Lü Cheng (1896–1989) has a summary with a partial translation of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, while Fazun (1902–1980) translated Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, and Dharmakīrti’s Pramanavarttika based on Geluk commentaries. They both adopted the non-literal translation, xianliang, for pratyakṣa (or Tib. mngon sum) and used xian and liang separately as well.
(3) Concern, Structure, and Significance:
Given that Xuanzang, his followers, Lü Cheng, and Fazun, are rigorous translators and Buddhist scholars, rather than asking whether the non-literal translation of xianliang as pratyakṣa is right or wrong, a more interesting question is how can we understand and make sense of this preservation of a non-literal translation.
This paper suggests that there are at least three dimensions to understanding the preservation of the non-literal translation—xianliang, including 1) a reliance on the established terminology, 2) a linguistic adaptation, and 3) a hermeneutic extension of the philosophical meaning. The first dimension indicates that Lü Cheng and Fazun, just like Xuanzang, were repeating the term that previous scholars had used. The second dimension highlights that xianliang is a translation that fits into a Chinese linguistic structure. So, even if it is not literal, it becomes the main word to translate pratyakṣa. The third dimension recommends that the translation and usage of xianliang is a process of a hermeneutic exercise that broadens the meaning in a philosophical sense, enabling the unique discussion in the post-Xuanzang period in China and is evident in the articulation of the twentieth-century scholars with knowledge of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology.
Drawing from contemporary works and comparing them to classical ones, this paper will examine the three dimensions with particular attention to the third one, attempting to argue that the usage of xianliang as pratyakṣa is more than merely a reliance on established terminology. The paper will argue that it is shaped by Chinese linguistic structures while embodying a hermeneutic exercise that extends the philosophical meaning of the concept of pratyakṣa in the Chinese engagement with Buddhist epistemology. It will show the implications of subtle nuances of linguistic structure and the hermeneutic exercise that shapes Indian Buddhist epistemology in a way that conforms to a Chinese context.
This paper focuses on xianliang (現量), a Chinese translation and interpretation of an Indian Buddhist epistemic term, pratyakṣa (perception)—Dignāga described as non-conceptual while Dharmakīrti added a non-deceptive feature. Interestingly, influenced by Xuanzang’s (600/602–664) implementation of xianliang to translate both pratyakṣa and pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam, pre-modern Chinese Buddhist interpreters, who lacked sufficient sources from Dignāga and without access to Dharmakīrti, developed theories about pratyakṣa that would not occur in the Sanskrit context. The seeming impact of “sinifying” pratyakṣa lingers even in the twentieth-century translations of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s works derived from Tibetan sources. Drawing from the works of Lü Cheng (1896–1989) and Fazun (1902–1980) and examining them alongside the classical works, this paper suggests that the preservation of the non-literal translation, xianliang, is not merely a result of relying on the established terminology, but is essentially a linguistic adaptation and notably a hermeneutic extension of the philosophical meaning.