What relationship does Jainism have to capitalism? What does it mean to raise this question, and why are we raising it? Why not Dravidians and capitalism, or brahmins and capitalism? Weberian versions of this argument can be split into two separate but interrelated arguments: originators of capitalism, or compatibility with capitalism; both tend to be triumphalist and erase Weber’s own ambivalence about capitalism. If we put aside these triumphalist accounts, what are we left with?
There are two dominant views on this subject. The first associates Jains with capitalism because Jains are a long-standing merchant minority. This view assumes no difference between capitalism and commerce, accepting the basic assumptions of neo-classical economics. In this view, “truck, barter, [and] exchange” are natural proclivities that undergird all social relations and not, as anthropology has overwhelmingly demonstrated, practices particular to certain social orders, even if widespread. Within the field of Jewish studies, Samuel Hayim Brody (2020) has labeled this position “methodological liberalism,” which projects the formal economic structures of the modern world, along with assumptions about rational choice and utility, into the deep past. Brody argues that this has hobbled Jewish Studies’ ability to grasp historical transformation—in this paper I argue that Jain Studies may similarly benefit through an expanded theoretical lens.
The second view on this subject posits the connection between Jainism and capitalism as solely negative, that is, a viewpoint which characterizes Jains as not-capitalist. This narrative, propounded by some prominent historians in the wake of partition and independence, contends that Jains (along with other Indian commercial groups) did not to transition to a robust capitalist system due to a failure of industrialists to effectively reinvest their capital, confining it instead to the realm of circulation. Such an account of the delayed transition of Jains to a modern capitalist outlook shares its normative framing with Weber, who himself maintained that Jains “failed to create an industrial organization,” and “remained confined to commercial capitalism.” My objection to this framework is that it operates with a weak conception of commercial capitalism, primarily defining commercial capitalism as the “not yet” of a capitalism abstracted from the historical experiences of a few western European nations.
In other words, one view holds that capitalism is simply “truck barter exchange” at scale, and therefore capitalism represents nothing new; the other holds that “truck barter exchange,” is a necessary component of capitalism, but not capitalism proper. Jairus Banaji has spent the better part of the last half century arguing against this view, and arguing for the centrality of commercial capital in shaping the modern world. Rather than simply adhering to the seemingly eternal practice of traders and merchants to “buy cheap and sell dear,” Banaji argues commercial capital directly intervened in the process of production, determining what is made, how it is made, and eventually, by selling it, how it will be consumed. This is different from a conception of merchants as simply representing a conduit for demand, triggering corresponding changes in supply. This paper draws on Banaji’s insights and economic history to argue that an expanded sense of commercial capitalism is necessary for understanding the connection between Jains and capitalism.
Drawing on archival research undertaken in London, Delhi, Sirohi, and Bikaner, this talk outlines a theory of how commercial capitalists began to control production in the kingdom of Sirohi at the beginning of the 20th century. Through public private partnerships, reforms in taxation policies, and investment in infrastructure, agricultural producers came to be dependent on commercial castes at every level of their household. I argue that this change reflects a substantive transformation in the structure of society, both economically and socially. This change was indexed culturally and religiously by an anti-Jain group that identifies the Jains as _baniyas_, their regional caste designation. The influential subaltern studies scholar David Hardiman glosses this term as “usurer.” For members of this anti-Jain religious organization, the _baniyas_ dominate every facet of society; they control all the world’s governments, they control the world economy, and even the forces of nature. During my ethnographic research, informants regularly told me that the Jains control the world through both secret and open means: indrajaal, or rakshasvidya (demonic magic), and their economic system, punjivad (capitalism). I argue that this theory corresponds to a conception of Jains not simply as merchants involved in the circulation of goods, nor moneylenders charging high rates of interest, as the term usurer would imply, but as capitalists. Understanding the nature of rural commercial capitalism, I argue, allows us to begin to understand why the Jainism-capitalism association persists.
This paper argues for the centrality of an expanded concept of “commercial capitalism” for understanding both the economic practices of Jains in the early 20th century, as well as why this association persists to this day. Following the historian Jairus Banaji, I argue that capitalism is neither simply commercial activity (Adam Smith’s famous “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”) nor reducible simply to heavy industry. Drawing on archival data from Sirohi, a small independent Rajput kingdom, in the late colonial period, this paper puts forward a theory of how commercial capitalists, mostly Jain, came to dominate agrarian production. I then argue, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in modern Rajasthan and Gujarat, that contemporary perceptions of Jains are still primarily structured by this form of capitalism.