The central doctrines of Advaita Vedānta are often said to be expressed in the maxim, “Brahman is real, the world is false, the soul is none other than Brahman.” The first claim would appear to be the least controversial of the three: after all, the idea that there exists a single, divine, highest reality, referred to in the Upaniṣads as “Brahman,” is accepted even by rival schools of Vedānta. In this paper I will argue, however, that the notion of Brahman as “real” or “existent” is far more problematic—and philosophically more interesting—than it might appear.
Unlike rival schools of Vedānta, Advaitins are committed to the claim that Brahman is ultimately “without qualities” or “without specifying properties” (nirguṇa, nirviśeṣa). Nonetheless, they do commonly attribute existence (astitva) to Brahman. Likewise, they often identify “being” or “reality” (sat), alongside “consciousness” (cit) and “bliss” (ānanda), as an essential characteristic (svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) of Brahman. Advaitins thus face a paradox shared by other apophatic theological traditions: on the one hand, Brahman is beyond all words and concepts (cf. Tattirīya Up. 2.4.1); on the other hand, Advaitins still want to affirm that Brahman exists. Insofar as “existence” (or “being” or “reality”) is itself a word and a concept, how can Brahman be described as existent?
In this brief paper, which is intended as a prelude to comparative discussion rather than as an exhaustive treatment of Vedāntic ontology, I will consider two Advaitin attempts to address the paradox, drawing attention along the way to internal diversity and historical developments within the tradition. Ultimately I will suggest Brahman’s “existence” and the “existence” of the world are equivocal terms. Advaitins themselves prefer to attribute existence to Brahman and to deny existence to the world, which they came to identify as “indefinable as either existent or nonexistent” (sad-asad-anirvacanīya); but I will argue that this position is not so different, in the final analysis, from attributing existence to the world and denying “existence” to Brahman.
The first of the two Advaitin attempts to address the paradox is the move to define existence negatively, either (a) as “not non-existence” or (b) as “absence of sublation” (abādhitatva) at any time. With respect to this strategy, I will point out that (a) following the logic of the Brḥadāraṇyakopaniṣad’s well-known assertion that Brahman is “not this, not this” (neti neti), if Brahman is “not non-existence,” Brahman is equally “not existence”; and that (b) the definition of existence as absence of sublation at any time does not apply, as Advaitins themselves admit, to worldly existence.
The second of the two Advaitin attempts to address the paradox is an appeal to levels or degrees of reality. Here I will draw attention to shifting understandings of this framework within the history of Advaita Vedānta. Śaṅkara, who is often identified as the tradition’s founder, refers to two levels of reality (the ultimate and the conventional); later thinkers commonly refer to three levels (ultimate, conventional, and illusory); Advaitins who uphold the doctrine of “subjective idealism” (dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda) reject conventional reality, arguing that there are only two levels (the ultimate and the illusory); and the eighteenth-century commentator Upaniṣad Brahmayogin, developing the idea of Brahman as absolutely “without counterpart” (niṣpratiyogika), argues that the very notion of levels of reality is misleading. For Brahmayogin (whose commentaries on 108 Upaniṣads are regarded as authoritative by many Advaita Vedāntins to this day), the absoluteness of Brahman means that not even existence can be predicated of it.
Advaita Vedāntins face a paradox shared by other apophatic theological traditions. On the one hand, the Upaniṣads speak of Brahman as beyond all words and concepts; on the other hand, they affirm that Brahman exists. Insofar as “existence” (or “being” or “reality,” sat) is itself a word and a concept, how can Brahman be described as existent? In this paper I will consider two Advaitin attempts to address the paradox, drawing attention along the way to internal diversity and historical developments within the tradition. Ultimately I will suggest that Brahman’s “existence” and the “existence” of the world are equivocal terms. Advaitins themselves prefer to attribute existence to Brahman and to deny existence to the world, but I will argue that this position is not so different, in the final analysis, from attributing existence to the world and denying “existence” to Brahman.