We often associate religious pluralism with freedom of belief, expression, and association. But in many parts of the world, pluralism is carefully managed, strategically restricted, or serves as a tool of state control. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Arabian Gulf, where nondemocratic states have developed innovative approaches to regulating religious diversity—not necessarily to enhance freedom, but more to serve political, economic, and diplomatic interests. Rather than treating pluralism as an organic social reality, these states carefully calibrate their approaches to religious diversity based on sectarian politics, economic incentives, and geopolitical positioning.
Across the Gulf, religious pluralism does not emerge through grassroots advocacy or democratic rights but instead reflects deliberate state-engineered governance models. This paper develops a typology of models in the region: Saudi Arabia’s restrictive monoconfessionalism, Bahrain’s sectarian pluralism, Kuwait and Qatar’s pragmatic accommodation, the UAE’s branded tolerance, and Oman’s subtle inclusivity. These models illustrate how pluralism is not simply permitted or restricted but actively shaped and repurposed by state actors for their own ends.
One of the more significant innovations in Gulf religious governance has been the UAE’s strategic rebranding of religious tolerance into a form of state-managed soft power (Baycar & Rakipoglu, 2022). Unlike models of religious pluralism that arise through legal frameworks or grassroots interfaith initiatives, the UAE has engineered a highly visible, government-driven form of interfaith engagement, hosting global religious summits and constructing high-profile sites like the Abrahamic Family House. The Document on Human Fraternity, signed in 2019 by Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed el-Tayeb, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, is another instance of this model, reflecting the UAE’s broader state-driven strategy to leverage high-profile interfaith initiatives for diplomatic, economic, and geopolitical interests while maintaining strict control over religious expression and political dissent.
Saudi Arabia presents a striking contrast. While still adhering to a strict monoconfessionalism, the kingdom has introduced limited religious engagement efforts under its Vision 2030 reforms. This shift represents not an embrace of pluralism, but an innovation in controlled reform, in which interfaith dialogues and religious soft power are carefully curated by the state without challenging its overarching religious hegemony. Saudi Arabia’s changes are less about expanding religious freedom than about recalibrating its global religious image.
Bahrain has long used sectarian pluralism as a mechanism of governance, ensuring that religious diversity does not translate into political power. The ruling Sunni monarchy governs a Shia-majority population, allowing Shia Muslims to practice their faith while simultaneously marginalizing them politically. This strategy of sectarian management, where religion is permitted but tightly controlled to prevent political mobilization, has been particularly evident since the 2011 Arab Spring protests, which led to intensified crackdowns on Shia opposition groups (Gengler, 2013). While Bahrain officially permits religious diversity for expatriates, it is also home to a small but long-standing community of native Bahraini Christians who hold citizenship, who are primarily descendants of immigrants who settled in Bahrain during the early 20th century. Unlike Shia political groups, Bahraini Christians have historically faced fewer restrictions, and some have even held government positions. However, their presence remains largely apolitical, and their religious freedom, while recognized, does not challenge Bahrain’s broader sectarian governance structure.
Kuwait and Qatar adopt a pragmatic approach to religious diversity, managing pluralism primarily as a necessity rather than an ideological commitment. Both states allow non-Muslims to worship in private spaces. Kuwait has long tolerated limited political representation for its Shia minority and also includes Christians among its citizens. Qatar continues to regulate religious expression carefully, with non-Muslim worship restricted to designated compounds and public religious symbols remaining prohibited. Though it has recently begun incorporating interfaith initiatives to cultivate a more pluralistic international image (Fahy, 2018), its approach remains less performative than the UAE’s, reflecting a hybrid model that balances its global ambitions with its internal religious conservatism. Both states remain cautious about allowing religious pluralism to become a public narrative, ensuring that religious diversity does not extend into broader discussions of rights or political representation.
Oman embodies a different form of religious pluralism that is neither restrictive nor performative, but instead deeply embedded in its national history. Unlike the UAE or Qatar, which actively construct their narratives of tolerance, Oman’s approach is rooted in the Ibadi Islamic tradition, which emphasizes religious moderation and non-sectarianism (Al-Ismaili, 2018). Unlike the UAE’s highly visible pluralism, Oman does not leverage its inclusivity for diplomatic or economic gain, making it an anomaly in the Gulf. However, this raises a key question that the paper will discuss: is Oman’s model an innovation in religious governance, or is it simply a continuation of its historical and theological traditions?
These different models also highlight two key insights into the relationship between innovation and religious governance. First, religious innovation doesn’t necessarily lead to greater religious freedom. The UAE’s model demonstrates how religious tolerance can be transformed into an economic and diplomatic commodity, while Saudi Arabia’s approach showcases how controlled reform can repackage a restrictive system without fundamentally altering it. Second, innovation in religious governance can take both performative and non-performative forms. The dominant focus on state-engineered interfaith diplomacy has overlooked models where pluralism is neither a branding tool nor a site of political contestation, but rather a longstanding social reality. A comparative analysis of branded, pragmatic, and embedded pluralism in the Gulf could yield new insights into how religious governance operates in nondemocratic contexts, particularly in societies where freedom is neither assumed nor the primary objective.
References
Al-Ismaili, Ahmed. “Ethnic, Linguistic, and Religious Pluralism in Oman: The Link with Political Stability.” AlMuntaqa 1, no. 3 (2018): 58–73.
Baycar, Hamdullah, and Mehmet Rakipoglu. “The United Arab Emirates' Religious Soft Power through Ulema and Organizations.” Religions 13, no. 7 (2022): 646.
Fahy, John. “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Managing Religious Diversity in Qatar.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 4 (2019): 640–662.
Gengler, Justin. “Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf.” In Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, edited by Lawrence G. Potter, 31–66. London: Hurst, 2013.
Religious pluralism in the Arabian Gulf is not simply permitted or restricted but actively shaped by state policies that regulate, accommodate, or brand religious diversity. This paper examines five models of state-managed religious pluralism: Saudi Arabia’s restrictive monoconfessionalism, Bahrain’s sectarian pluralism, Kuwait and Qatar’s pragmatic accommodation, the UAE’s branded tolerance, and Oman’s subtle inclusivity. While the UAE has pioneered religious tolerance as a diplomatic and economic tool, Qatar is cautiously adopting similar strategies. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain manage religious diversity through controlled sectarian governance, while Oman sustains a low-profile, historically embedded pluralism. These models suggest that innovation in religious governance doesn't necessarily lead to greater freedom but often reinforces state control. By comparing these models of pluralism, this paper argues for expanding research beyond high-profile interfaith diplomacy to examine whether less visible, embedded models such as Oman’s—whether innovative or not—may offer a more durable foundation for religious pluralism.