Against the background of the unsuccessful “emergency” military decree (비상계엄 緊急戒嚴) by South Korean President Yoon, Suk Yeol December 3, 2024 this paper focuses on a theo-political exploration how popular culture social protests by college-age Koreans has developed and transitioned from the 1980’s formats of demonstrations against the authoritarian martial law dictatorships. The 2024-2025 protests saw newer formats of collective resistance and response using many of the dynamics popularized by K-Pop and K-Drama.
Having lived, studied and taught in both of these periods in two top-tier Korean Universities with Christian origins Sogang University (Catholic) and Yonsei University (Presbyterian) the author was able to witness first-hand social activist University students who saw themselves as representing the civil conscience of the nation. In the 1980’s student demos protesting the sequential military dictatorships often took the form of a sort of multi-stage morality play, and employed the traditional folk genres of the Korean Talchum (탈춤, Masked Dance), Minsok-Dan (민속단民俗團Folk instruments group) combined with a sort of large-group collective performance Dae-dong-nol-li (대동놀이大同玩 “No discrimination play”). The purposes of these activities was to gather and then energize students collectively to confront somewhat ritualistically the soldiers massed at the school gates to repel students from escaping to go downtown to demand the overthrow of the military government.
As student protests toppled the Syngman Rhee dictatorship in 1960 subsequent military governments were particularly leery of collective off-campus student protests. These student centered protests, often joined by key Catholic and Protestant clergy, were both constant and strong throughout the succession of military presidencies until greater democratization evolved in the 1990s with the successful presidential elections of former political opposition leaders Kim Young-Sam (Protestant) and Kim Dae-Jung (Catholic).
While the ensuing decades of presidents had any number of unsettling moments (including two impeachments), martial law had never been re-imposed since the early 1980’s of the Chun, Doo-Hwan administration in the aftermath of the May 1980 student-centered Gwangju Uprising Democratization Movement brutally repressed by Korea’s authoritarian military dictatorship which led to the successful coup which installed General Chun, Doo-Hwan (1980-1988).
The decisive 2024 Deja-vu moment occurred the evening of December 3rd when the unpopular President Yoon, Suk Yeol attempted to shore up his diminishing political power by suddenly declaring “emergency” martial law and sent troops to the National Assembly Building to try and prevent the legislative branch from convening to overturn this decree. Yoon’s efforts also failed and the Assembly members who were able to get into the building voted unanimously 150-0 to overturn Yoon’s decree. Subsequently Yoon strenuously defended his actions using both arguments and rhetoric quite similar to that employed by Donald Trump in 2020-21.
Large-scale popular demonstrations that quickly gathered at the National Assembly Building and elsewhere exhibited strong resolve and popular support for the Assembly’s action, and Yoon was forced to retract his Decree just a few hours later.
Supported by the popular demonstrations, which incorporated many of the elements and spirit of a large-scale K-Pop concert, Yoon was fairly quickly impeached (and at this moment we await the Supreme Court’s decision to confirm the impeachment or to reinstate Yoon). Both in his justification for his still-born decree and his “defense” in his subsequent impeachment proceedings Yoon adopted a stance and vocabulary that many observers likened to both the rhetoric and political activities of Donald Trump. As one Sogang University professor observed: “We’ve gone from K-Pop to K-Trump.”
While all this background is critical to understand the recent and remote context for Yoon’s impeachment, this paper centers on the methods used in the popular demonstrations against him as well as the critical responses from the Catholic clergy and Protestant ministers. We see especially in the crowds of the anti-Yoon protesters strong evidence of collective conscience emerged again. However, this time the newer “performance” elements superseded the traditional “folk elements” of the earlier generation protesting the authoritarian regimes of presidents Rhee, Park, Chun, and Roh. The “soft power” associated with the Hallyu (“Korean cultural wave of K-Pop and K-Drama0 now fused with political messaging accompanied by fandom light-sticks recreated the Dae-dong-nol-li atmosphere in the successful call for Yoon’s impeachment.
This presentation begins with a brief summary of the backgrounds of the Korean political protests in the 1980’s and in 2024-2025 . Next each genre type of protest demonstrations is outlined, highlighting both common elements, and performative differences, while lifting up key common denominators such as is the strong sense of collectivity found in K-Pop and K-Drama. These will be illustrated by short video clips. The paper concludes with a theological interpretation in line with the Convention theme of Freedom.
Against the background of the unsuccessful “emergency” military decree by South Korean President Yoon, Suk Yeol December 3, 2024 this paper explores how popular culture social protests by college-age Koreans has developed from the 1980’s anti-authoritarian demonstrations against martial law dictatorships. The 2024-2025 protests saw newer formats of collective resistance and response using many of the dynamics popularized by the “soft power” associated with the Hallyu (“Korean cultural wave of K-Pop and K-Drama K-Pop and K-Drama). This presentation begins with a brief summary of the backgrounds of the Korean political protests in the 1980’s and in 2024-2025 . Next each genre type of protest demonstrations is outlined, highlighting both common elements, and performative differences, while lifting up key common denominators such as is the strong sense of collectivity found in both genres of protests. The paper concludes with a theological interpretation in line with the Convention theme of Freedom.