Religious issues have been at the forefront of the recent political debates. In the same way as the public opinion has been polarized, religious leaders and denomination members are divided (Dillon, 2018; Gagnon, 2020). Depending on local circumstances, this phenomenon affects diversely the entire hemisphere. In this paper, we plan to present some of the most salient results of an ongoing research on religion and politics in Peru. We shall delve on the new alliances woven between political and religious actors. Combinations of tactical alliances are formed between religious actors belonging to the Catholic Church, (neo)Pentecostal churches and politicians in search of visibility and legitimacy.
According to its constitution, in 1980, Peru ceased to be a confessional State. Norms of cooperation with the recognized religious institutions have been established (Lecaros, Taussig, 2023). A Concordat was signed with the Catholic Church in 1980. Based on a law recognizing the social contribution of non-Catholic denominations (Law of Religious Freedom) voted by the parliament in 2010, protocols of collaboration have been elaborated between the State and non-Catholic denominations. This law marks the end of the struggle for alms that confronted the Catholic Church with the growing presence of the Pentecostal churches (Lecaros, 2021). Although officially the Peruvian State is laic, the persistent presence of religious symbols on the public scenery and the much-mediatized relations between religious peoples and politicians reveal that religious agents still play a relevant role in the nation life (Romero, 2014; Piccone, Lecaros, 2024).
According to the last poll on religious belonging (IEP, March 2024), Peruvian society is marked by the still predominant, although declining, presence of the Catholic Church (64%), a consequent minority of (neo)Pentecostals (22%), a small minority of people from other religions (3%) and a growing minority of no-religion (12%). The relevance of religion is shown by the place it occupies in people’s life. 85% of the population consider that religion is (very)important for them. This proportion is stable and appears in diverse polls (WV, 2020; Pew, 2014). Churches are highly esteemed institutions with a persistent rating of over 50% (Latinobarometro). In contrast, politicians have lost most credibility. President Boluarte keeps a popularity below 5 %. Additionally, the Peruvian political field is highly polarized and fragmented. Peru, with 40 recognized political parties, can boast more political parties than any other country in the region.
In the religious field, the liberal protestant churches are barely present. The Pentecostal and Charismatic churches, the most numerous and fastest growing denominations, are connected in diverse ways with the conservative, evangelical North American trends. On the Catholic side, the clergy is highly polarized (Casey, 2022). Under John Paul II and Benedict XVI, conservative nominations had reduced the influence of Liberation Theology and reshaped the composition of clerics. The first Opus Dei cardinal was archbishop of Lima for 20 years (1999-2019), Mons. Juan Luis Cipriani, who was recently publicly accused of abusing an adolescent. With Pope Frances, bishops close to progressive trends are back: the current archbishop of Lima, Cardinal Carlos Castillo was Gustavo Gutierrez’s disciple. Tensions are high and often mediatized between the remnant of conservative bishops and Francisco’s new cohort.
Revisited moral agenda. In terms of sexual rights, Peru is one of the most conservative country in the hemisphere, together with Guyana, Paraguay, Surinam, Venezuela and Central American countries (except Costa Rica). Abortion, transsexuality, egalitarian marriage/ civil union and adoption by homosexuals are not legally recognized. An issue related to sexual education mobilized masses from the 2017onwards (Barrera, 2017, Melendez, Quiñón, 2024, Lecaros, Piccone, 2025). The movement, called Do Not Mess With My Children, was created to fight against a so-called governmental conspiration to “homosexualize” children (Neologism created in 2017). Hence, in Peru, the moral agenda focuses on protecting the population from homosexuality and on defending the legal Status Quo. The perceived threat of a possible expansion of homosexuality reflects macho cultural norms coupled and justified by a literal reading of the bible, in particular the Sodom and Gomorra story interpreted as a punishment for homosexual cravings.
Moral agenda and politicians. Liberal trends do not enjoy a wide popular basis, although young, educated and urban dwellers (a growing category) would be more permissive about sexual morality. In 2021, the then candidate to the presidency Pedro Castillo, belonging to a Marxist-Leninist party, organized a mediatized meeting with Pentecostal pastors, to show his adherence to the moral agenda. On the conservative, rightist pole, the moral agenda is the norm. To compensate their lack of popularity and in an attempt to legitimate their position, government authorities and candidates for elections mediatize their religious practices and their closeness to clerics and pastors (Blancarte, 2016). They thus try to clean their public image and appear as ethical referents. Moreover, a new phenomenon of alliances between Catholics and Charismatics has emerged. It illustrates Olivier Roy’s concept of formatting: Catholics are adopting (neo)Pentecostal behaviors. Certain ambiguities of recent Catholic movements enable their members to imitate the Charismatic pastors and to enter politics as Catholic leaders. Rafael Lopez-Aliaga, founder of the party Renovación Popular, is both an Opus Dei numerary and a thriving businessman. He boasts publicly about his practices of penances and about his financial successes. He thus combines ideals of Catholic piety and Pentecostal faith with popular aspirations expressed in the Prosperity Theology. Moreover, his party gathers preeminent Charismatic pastors and outspoken Catholic believers. With nuances, this phenomenon may be observed in other countries of the region.
Abuses in Catholic environments. In 2024, 2025, scandals of abuses have surfaced. Conservative movements are targeted with the papal dissolution of the Sodalitium and the accusation of sexual abuses by Mons. Cipriani. The impact is still difficult to measure. The Church and its allies are confronted with an evolving crisis in its first stages.
This paper presents some of the most salient results of an ongoing research on religion and politics in Peru, focusing primarily on conservative trends. We delve on the new alliances woven between political and religious actors.
Three salient features may be identified: 1 Revisited moral agenda. In terms of sexual rights, Peru is one of the most conservative country in the hemisphere. The moral agenda focuses on protecting the population from homosexuality and on defending the conservative legal Status Quo. 2 Moral agenda and politicians. To compensate their lack of popularity and in an attempt to legitimate their position, politicians mediatize their religious practices and their closeness to clerics and pastors. Additionally, outspoken Catholics belonging to new movements and Charismatics pastors unite to create political parties. 3 Abuses in Catholic environments. The Church and its allies are confronted with an evolving crisis in its first stages.