Zhuangzian and Jaina Embodied Perspectivism

Scholars have argued that Zhuangzi's embodied form of epistemic perspectivism, which brings together contrary perspectives to form more inclusive “higher” perspectives (“larger knowledge” (大知). In this, the Zhuangzi shares remarkable similarities with the perspectivism (nayavāda) of Jaina philosophers, in which opposing perspectives are unified through a process of contextualization (syādvāda). However, Jaina philosophers ground this perspectivism on a realist objective standard. Unlike Zhuangzian perspectivism, this synchronizing perspectives depend on an objective standard for veridicality. However, the Zhaungzi rejects any such standard. Within the Zhuangzi, the world and ourselves are in a constant state of flux. Hence, any objective standard cannot be predetermined and cannot last. I argue that the Zhuangzi takes all perspectives to depend on one’s changing socio-physical embodiment, in which veridicality is determined by temporary usefulness, in contrast to the Jaina objective standard.