In recent years, faith communities, religious organizations, and theological discourse have wrestled with notions of childhood advocacy, protections, and safeguarding. This interdisciplinary panel conversation explores these dimensions critically by grappling with concepts of the “child”, safeguarding measures that promote childhood flourishing, and formal policies designed to nurture and advocate for children’s wellbeing. Together, we ask: “how can our communities protect our children ethically, sustainably, and faithfully?”
When we ask “what is meant by childhood?” and “who gets protected,” there is a sub-question of to what extent we consider children human, and further, what interlocking identities might make some children considered subhuman in relation to others? It is my suggestion that the current dialogue around childhood and child protection falls into the trap of paternalism because the normative gaze has deemed only white male children as fully human. To this narrative, I suggest introducing an expanded womanist framework that draws on both Alice Walker’s Four-part definition, with specific attention to the first and second sections, and the tenets of Dr. Stacey Floyd-Thomas’s womanist framework: Radical Subjectivity and Traditional Communalism. In this cross-section, this paper illuminates how Womanism allows us to redefine who gets to be a child, our concept of innocence, and how we read the humanity of children, thereby determining whether they are (un)protectable.
This paper examines the role of Mark 9, particularly when reception becomes routine. In such contexts, interpretive escalation—characterised by increased prayer and fasting—is often perceived as an expression of faithfulness, even when it results in physical consequences for minors. Through comparative analysis of examples from the UK, Nigeria, and Kenya, I identify recurring pathways of harm, including claims of authority that exceed accountability, consent asymmetries that are spiritualized as obedience, and cycles of escalation where distress is interpreted as a sign that further intensification is required. I contend that the phrase “prayer-and-fasting” from Mark 9:29 functions as a travelling gloss with significant safeguarding implications, while the shorter version (“by prayer”) can serve as a limiting resource in practices involving children. Finally, I propose theological “red lines” for individuals under 18 and advocate for care pathways—encompassing pediatric, psychological, and safeguarding measures—as progressive alternatives to paternalistic protection models.
Many religious communities have adopted formal child protection policies in recent decades, often in response to legal and insurance pressures rather than sustained ethical reflection. Despite the proliferation of such policies, communities frequently struggle to respond well when harm occurs. Drawing on over a decade of experience as both a scholar of sexual violence in religious contexts and a practitioner advocating for survivors and consulting with faith communities, this paper examines the gap between policy adoption and meaningful safeguarding practice. It argues that dominant frameworks often position competent adults as protectors of incompetent children, allowing communities to imagine harm as external to their own moral life and implicitly setting up children's voices to be dismissed. This orientation encourages defensive responses and obscures systemic inequalities that shape harm. The paper proposes an alternative vision of safeguarding grounded in communal ethical formation, in which children are recognized as full members whose wellbeing is integral to the health and accountability of the entire community.
The contemporary debate over birthright citizenship—centered on the January 2025 executive order, the anticipated legal challenge, and the posture of religiously affiliated amici—recasts older questions about who belongs and who is protected by the state. Yet the legal and moral logic of such debates has historical antecedents. Sacramento Orphanage & Children’s Home v. Chambers stands as an early and instructive example of a court grappling with whether parental status may be used to differentiate access to public benefits for native-born children. This paper reads that decision alongside the modern dispute to illuminate how courts have, over more than a century, defended or disputed the principle that citizenship carries obligations—ones that should not be erased by parental immigration status. The paper argues for a more nuanced understanding of “birthright” that foregrounds equal protection, the public role in child welfare, and the moral claims of vulnerable children within the citizenship framework.