The Legacy of Eudaimonism: Egoistic Defect or Liberative Strength?

Despite the oft-lauded contributions of virtue ethics, virtue was and is a contested concept. Beyond its historical injustices, virtue ethics, and eudaimonism in particular, have been viewed as inherently egoistic and incapable of securing justice. Taking these criticisms seriously, this paper argues that virtue ethics, when attentive to its historical failures and its complicity in structural injustice, not only withstands its critiques but also is especially conducive for liberatory efforts. Virtue ethics brings to the table precisely what its critics need for their theories of justice to work: an answer to how we come to care about the right things, deliver on our obligations, and manage the complications that arise in holding institutions and one another accountable in our pursuit of a just world. In making my argument, I contend that the self-regarding nature of eudaimonism is not an egoistic defect but a liberative strength.