New Directions in Buddhist Philosophy

This paper argues that the fourfold investigation (catasraḥ paryeṣaṇāḥ) and the fourfold thorough knowledge of things as they are (catvāri yathābhūtaparijñānāni), as presented in the Tattvārthapaṭala of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, constitute a central contemplative methodology within the Yogācāra soteriological framework. Drawing on Sanskrit and Chinese sources through philological and hermeneutical approaches, the paper first identifies wisdom (prajñā) as the governing mental factor and establishes the fourfold investigation as a form of vipaśyanā, with the investigation of names as its foundation. It then analyzes the epistemic progression from investigation to thorough knowledge, showing that both things and the thing-only (vastumātra) are ineffable. Finally, the paper demonstrates that these methods correspond to the elimination of attachment of superimposition (samāropa) and diminution ( apavāda), providing the concrete contemplative mechanism for realizing the Yogācāra middle path between reification and nihilism.

This paper examines the debate over supportlessness (nirālambanatā) of cognition between Yogācāra and Kumārila. Yogācāra proposes this doctrine to express its distinctive theory of mind-only (cittamātra) from an epistemological perspective. It holds that no extramental objects exist for any states of cognition, which has aroused controversy since its transmission. One of the early opponents is Kumārila, a famous Mīmāṃsā philosopher, who provides extensive arguments against supportlessness in the Nirālambanavāda Chapter of his Ślokavārttika. As Taber (1994, 34) concludes, Kumārila primarily argues that the thesis of supportlessness undermines itself because its proof is either non-extramental, thus not objective, or extramental, thus contradicting its thesis. Through conceptual and textual analysis based on Yogācāra treatises, with particular focus on the soteriological perspective, this paper finds that Yogācāra’s thesis of supportlessness does not undermine itself, insofar as it is a pedagogical expression, and that it instrumentally serves to counter conceptualization through names. 

I present and discuss an argument to the conclusion that it is better to act wrongly and hold a right view than to hold a wrong view and act rightly. This counterintuitive conclusion derives from Āryadeva’s (ca. 3rd c. CE) Catuḥśataka and its Dasheng guang bailun shilun 大乘廣百論釋論 (T1571) commentary. After presenting the argument in its original context, I analyze it in the context of contemporary ethics of belief. I argue that the argument provides insight into the harm of purely mental action of believing or holding a view. This piece of insight is that if this action carries a risk of seriously bad consequences and damages people’s interests, then it is harmful, and this harm may outweigh the harm of acting wrongly.