The notoriously vague concept of “sinification” of Buddhism has been subject to numerous interpretations and criticisms. Applying this term to the tradition of yinming因明 – the Buddhist “science of reasons” – may seem particularly problematic. While not exactly “science” in the modern sense, yinming is rooted in the Indian theory of reasoning and argumentation that aims to provide universal criteria for assessing the validity of arguments and claims. Describing its development in China in terms of “sinification” might appear to be a generous euphemism for what some scholars have previously dismissed as a flawed transmission, or plain misunderstanding, of these intricate Indian theories. However, in my talk I would like to provide some arguments for reconsidering the fate of “science of reasons” in China, not as a failed attempt at reproducing the original Indian system, but rather as a case of its “domestication” within a new intellectual and cultural context.
My study will focus on the Chinese interpretations of the theory of pramāṇas (“means” of valid cognition) that were current in the late Ming period (i.e., late 16th and early 17th centuries). I will argue that these interpretations reveal two key processes. First, Chinese authors reconstructed the meaning of the key concepts of Indian epistemology based on their Chinese translations, with limited awareness of their original Sanskrit etymologies and philosophical contexts. Second, they applied these concepts within the framework of Chinese Buddhist thought, which incorporated elements of Yogācāra theory of consciousness, Sinified ideas about Buddha-Nature, and the rhetoric of Chan. As these examples illustrate, while late-Ming authors construed the fundamental ideas of the “science of reasons” in ways that diverged from their original Indian meanings, this divergence was neither arbitrary nor conceptually confused. Rather, it reflects Chinese monks’ attempts to make sense of this tradition in light of their own concerns: theories of self-cultivation, exegesis and apologetics. For this reason, late-Ming references to yinming cannot be disentangled from the specific intellectual and religious landscape of late imperial China.
While not exactly “science” in the modern sense, the Buddhist “science of reasons” (yinming 因明) aims to provide universal criteria for assessing the validity of arguments and claims. Describing the development of this discipline in China in terms of “sinification” might, therefore, appear to be a generous euphemism for what some scholars have previously dismissed as a flawed transmission, or plain misunderstanding, of these intricate Indian theories. However, in my talk I would like to provide some arguments for reconsidering the fate of “science of reasons” in China, not as a failed attempt at reproducing the original Indian system, but rather as a case of its “domestication” within a new intellectual and cultural context. I will focus on Chinese interpretations of pramāṇas (“means” of valid cognition) in the late-Ming period, demonstrating how these Indian epistemological concepts became reconstructed and recontextualized within a distinctly Chinese intellectual framework.