In July 2001, an essay titled “Finding a Refuge Place for Endangered Ancient Chinese Culture: On Establishing Confucian Cultural Conservation Zones 给中国古代濒危文化一个避难所:成立儒家文化保护区的建议” appeared in Modern Education News 现代教育报, a magazine published in China. The short piece called for the creation of small autonomous intentional communities with independent political, social, economic, and education systems based on the traditional beliefs, values, and practices of Confucianism. Located in the countryside, these self-sufficient communities would provide an alternative to modern mainstream society, thereby serving as a place of refuge from the fast-paced urban lifestyle of 21st century China.
The author, Zhang Xianglong 张祥龙 (1949-2022), was a professor at Peking University and one of China’s most renowned scholars of Western philosophy. Born only a few weeks before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Zhang was raised in Beijing and experienced firsthand the tumultuous years under the rule of Chairman Mao. In 1977, he joined the first generation of students who were allowed to study abroad, and he earned graduate degrees in philosophy from the University of Ohio in Toledo and SUNY Buffalo. Upon his return to China in 1992, Zhang began teaching comparative philosophy at Peking University, but he gradually shifted his interests to classical Confucian thought and became one of the leading voices in the post-Mao Confucian revival. As an active public intellectual, Zhang was mostly known for his media campaign to erect a statue of Confucius on the Peking University campus, as well as for designing a modern Confucian ritual for his son’s wedding ceremony in 2010.
Despite Zhang’s academic credentials and prominent standing in the Chinese intellectual scene, his proposal to establish Special Districts for Confucian Culture 儒家文化保护特区 (henceforth referred to as SDC) received criticism from both sides of the political spectrum and was largely dismissed as a “utopian fantasy.” In the media, SDC were caricatured as primitive enclaves inhabited by poor peasants living in straw huts, cut off from the benefits of modern life. Public policy experts questioned the economic feasibility of the SDC and argued that the government should use its resources to alleviate poverty and develop infrastructure instead of squandering taxpayers’ money to fund frivolous “social fossils.” Meanwhile, Zhang’s colleagues in academia criticized the modest aspirations of his vision. Chen Ming 陈明, a professor of philosophy at Capital Normal University in Beijing and one of the most outspoken of China’s New Confucians, labeled the SDC as an “affront to Confucianism” and argued that they would encounter the same ill fate as the Native American Reservations in the US, ultimately leading to the marginalization of Confucianism.
Faced with such persistent criticism, Zhang did not give up. Instead, he spent the last two decades of his life publicly defending his proposal. Until his death in 2022, Zhang continued to develop and expand his blueprint for SDC communities and stress their importance for the survival of Confucianism. Over the last century, he argued, Confucianism, as well as other expressions of traditional Chinese culture, have been under persistent attack. Late Qing reformers, liberal-minded intellectual during the Republican Era, and then members of the Chinese Communist Party have singled out Confucianism as the main cause of China’s woes. The death of Mao Zedong brought a marked shift. The late 1980s saw the emergence of what has been dubbed “culture fever,” a nostalgic yearning for traditional ideas, values, and practices to fill in the spiritual void left by Mao and his personality cult.
Buddhism and Daoism, China’s two main organized religions, which were also nearly eradicated during the Cultural Revolution, enjoyed a substantial revival. Temples and monasteries began to be rebuilt, and priests regained a modicum of authority and influence in Chinese society. The Confucian revival, however, was not as swift. Zhang identified several reasons for this disparity. In addition to the lack of unified governing like the Buddhist Association of China 中国佛教协会 or the Chinese Daoist Association 中国道教协会, Confucianism also suffered from a lack of distinct sacred spaces to practice its core beliefs and values. While Temples of Confucius 孔庙 were also reopened, they did not provide a space to practice Confucianism as a lived tradition on a daily basis. For this reason, Zhang advocated the creation of the SDC as an expression of cultural conservation. When the populations of pandas and Siberian tigers in China were under threat, argued Zhang, humans established artificial natural reserves designed to protect them. The same can be applied to struggling cultural traditions such as Confucianism.
Zhang’s unique brand of Confucian utopianism is informed by classical Chinese descriptions of ideal society, from the Great Unity 大同 community described in The Records of Rites to the isolated paradise featured in Tao Yuanming’s Peach Blossom Spring 桃花源. In addition, Zhang’s vision is also influenced by Western utopianism. Having been exposed to Amish communities during his studies in the US, Zhang became convinced that these intentional communities, which were dedicated to the preservation of a traditional lifestyle, could be used as a template for saving Confucianism from extinction.
Drawing on previous studies on the relationship between secularization and sacralization in contemporary Chinese society, this paper will argue that Zhang drew inspiration from recent attempts to sacralize the state and its relationship with its citizens to produce a utopian vision that sacralizes Confucianism and its traditional beliefs, values, and sacrifices. It will argue that the SDC provide revivalists with a sacred space, separate from profane society, to practice Confucianism as a lived tradition and ensure its survival. While not as far-reaching and comprehensive as the major utopian visions outlined in the Records of Rites or Mao Zedong’s attempts to restructure Chinese society and build a Communist paradise, Zhang’s mode of “minor utopianism” and his idea to establish physical sacred spaces for practicing Confucians inspire other contemporary Chinese utopian thinkers and are thus worthy of further study.
Mainland Chinese society is often characterized as highly secularized. Organized religion has been the subject of continuous criticism by the state and its expressions are tightly controlled. Yet, scholars also agree that secularization has been accompanied by a parallel process of sacralization – a growing drive to depict the nation-state, its institutions, and its leaders as sacred. This paper will build on this argument to shed new light on the sacralization of tradition in contemporary Confucian utopianism. Focusing on the writings of Zhang Xianglong (1949-2022), it will demonstrate that his proposal to establish “Special Districts for Confucian Culture,” small autonomous intentional communities designed to preserve Confucian values and practices, is driven by a desire to designate traditional culture as sacred in order to save it from extinction in an increasingly profane society. Zhang’s utopian vision offers us a new insight into the revival of Confucian religiosity in contemporary Chinese society.