Mereological Anti-Realism in Sinitic Madhyamaka Buddhism

This paper investigates the heretofore unstudied arguments marshalled by the Sui-Dynasty Sino-Parthian Madhyamika master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 C.E.) to shore up the doctrine of mereological anti-realism – the position that nothing ever instantiates mereological properties or relations – for the Sinitic Madhyamaka or Sanlun 三論 tradition in which he is embedded. In his argumentation in support of mereological anti-realism, Jizang denies the intrinsic reality of mereological sums, the composites (Skt.: avayavin; Chi.: youfen有分), posited by rival Brāhmaṇical metaphysical theories, but also rejects the mereological reductionist doctrine – upheld by the earlier Abhidharma traditions of mainstream Buddhism – which postulates the fundamental reality of ontologically-simple parts upon which composites are conceptually constructed. An examination of Jizang’s Madhyamaka-oriented critique of Vaiśeṣika realism concerning composite substances brings to light the coherence of Madhyamaka Buddhist global anti-realism denying both the intrinsic reality of wholes and the parts upon which they are built.