The womb is sacrosanct in the Qur’an and other formative Islamic sources. Two of the divine appellations that permeate the Qur’an, al-Raḥmān, al-Raḥīm, are derived from the root r-ḥ-m, a root that forms the word ‘womb’ (rahim); these divine names constitute the basmala, the most basic and essential Muslim prayer supplication. In addition to these two divine names that are derived from the root r-ḥ-m and that appear in the basmala, the noun raḥma, meaning compassion, mercy, or empathy, which is also constituted from the root r-ḥ-m, also appears in 114 instances in the Qur’an. This semantic link between the divine nature and the womb leaves no doubt about the womb’s inviolable status. Though these and other references communicate a fundamental esteem for the womb, the Qur’an and the reliably transmitted teachings of the Prophet Muhammad do not mandate child-bearing for individuals. [1]
Qur’anic verses do not directly address the ethical permissibility of an individual electing to terminate their pregnancy. Qur’anic verses do, however, leave no doubt that infanticide is repugnant—and particularly so when combined with sex preference. And although religious scholars often derive ethical guidance from Qur’anic verses condemning infanticide, these verses arguably do not have a direct, one-to-one application for an embryo or fetus, given that the Arabic word for “child” in verses condemning infanticide is derived from w-l-d, a root signifying “to be born.” Thus, Qur’anic verses condemning infanticide are germane to broader ethical conversations but not immediately applicable in a one-to-one sense to the unborn.
The expansive, diverse, and multifaceted Islamic tradition of jurisprudence attests to myriad approaches for determining the ethical status and legal permissibility of abortion. Early legal authorities debate the point at which human ensoulment occurs, with dominant opinions ranging from forty to 120 days of gestation. The jurisprudential tradition is not uniform, and the unique circumstances of individuals introduce degrees of nuance.[2] Although premodern scholars quite ubiquitously privileged the mother’s life on the premise that existing life takes precedence over a fetus, a more expansive definition of female health and well-being is also possible beyond the issue of maternal fatality due to birthing complications. Many reproductive-related decisions cannot be settled merely by turning to jurisprudential discourses from an age before the advent of contemporary medical technologies; new science adds nuance to medical decision-making that early classical jurists who lived a millennia ago are not always well-positioned to address.
Moreover, a person’s embodied reproductive-related experiences and processes of prayerful discernment might not be aligned with pattern-cut advice from those in authorized positions of power. Noting the inherent complexities that can be flattened, Ingrid Mattson, a historian and North American Muslim community leader, laments that a “paternalistic view of the relationship between men and women” constrains bioethical reasoning on a host of issues related to female reproductive health, in particular.[3] Likewise, when examining contemporary fatwas on reproductive ethics, Zahra Ayubi, a Dartmouth-based historian and Muslim ethicist, notes the predominance of male-centric ethical reasoning and calls for more robust attention to female bodily experiences and concerns. When examining the writings of contemporary Muslim religious authorities in the United States, Ayubi finds that fatwas regularly “show a disrespect to women’s other existential purposes other than motherhood, and/or disrespect the mutual doctor-patient relationship required in arriving at a particular contraceptive of choice.”[4] Ayubi laments how sensitive issues raised by female questioners receive pastorally tone-deaf and even condescending answers. She points to one instance wherein a male questioner received a response from a male scholar emphasizing the permissibility of abortion when a female questioner with similar circumstances received a response from that same scholar deemphasizing abortion’s permissibility. Ayubi points toward a double standard wherein the male scholar’s empathies lie with a male questioner but not a female questioner in an analogous situation.[4]
Mattson and Ayubi both highlight ways in which family members also exert coercive power over reproductive decisions. They note the multidirectional social pressures to deliver children—male children specifically — even when no such obligation is present in foundational Islamic sources. “Fatwas about reproductive health are not just about the legalities of the beginning, end, or sanctity of life,” Ayubi writes, “but about the ethics of what a woman can or cannot do with her body and reproductive system, in ways that serve to reinforce patriarchal power.”[5] Rather than approaches to reproductive ethics that center a husband’s “interests in his wife’s body as a vessel for children,” or that project female malintent as a starting place for religious guidance, Ayubi champions a patient-centered approach that values women’s specific needs “in the context of her life and knowledge of her own body.”[6] Similarly, Mattson observes: “Where Islamic legal authority is less hierarchical, state-enforced, and patriarchal, new perspectives can be put forward, debated, and eventually integrated into the range of acceptable positions within a framework of legal pluralism.”[7]
Drawing upon the Foucauldian concept of biopower, I outline just such a framework that is pastorally attuned and responsive to the experiences of the pregnant person at the center of reproductive decision-making.
[1] See Janan Delgado and Celene Ibrahim, “Children and Parents in the Qur’an and Premodern Islamic Jurisprudence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religious Perspectives on Reproductive Ethics, edited by Dena S. Davis (Oxford University Press, 2024), 172–190.
[2] For an overview of classical discourses, see Marion Homes Katz, “The Problem of Abortion in Classical Sunni Fiqh,” in Islamic Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia, ed. Jonathan Brockopp (University of South Carolina, 2003), 25–50.
[3] See Ingrid Mattson, “Gender and Sexuality in Islamic Bioethics,” in Islamic Bioethics: Current Issues and Challenges, ed. Alireza Bagheri and Khalid Abdulla Al-Ali (World Scientific, 2018), 62.
[4] Zahra Ayubi, “Authority and Epistemology in Islamic Medical Ethics of Women’s Reproductive Health,” Journal of Religious Ethics 49, no. 2 (2021), 254.
[5] Ayubi, “Authority and Epistemology”, 254.
[6] Ayubi, “Authority and Epistemology,” 265.
[7] Mattson, “Islamic Bioethics,” 79.
This paper analyzes North American Muslim religious discourses on elective abortion. With references to the Qur'an, Islamic oral traditions, jurisprudential discourses, feminist Islamic scholarship, and contemporary Muslim American social media posts, I analyze discourses that seek to limit, on one hand, or to expand on the other, a pregnant Muslim's recourse to terminating pregnancy through elective abortion. Considering various circumstantial factors and drawing upon the Foucauldian concept of biopower, I track how pregnant people may be encouraged to procreate through tactics of coercion that seek to mold pregnant bodies into docile reproductive forms in the name of religious compliance. Yet, nuances in Islamic approaches to reproductive-related decision-making create fissures in which pregnant people can maintain pious aspirations and simultaneously exercise their reproductive agency in jurisdictions where reliable reproductive care is readily accessible.