Apophatic theology is at least as old as the three monotheisms themselves. Its name derives from the Greek apophemi, meaning ‘to deny’, and accordingly an apophatic theology is a theology which denies the applicability of our words to God. Apophatic theologians are, thus, committed to the idea that God is ineffable and, as such, indescribable by means of our language.
Among the very few (analytic) philosophers who have tried to defend apophatic theology, there are the so-called ‘grammatical thomists’, and one of their main contenders is Samuel Lebens who has distinguished himself for the clarity and originality of his work. Not only does Lebens’ The Principles of Judaism show great historical sensitivity in recognizing the importance of apophatic theology in the Jewish tradition, but it also takes up one of the most difficult challenges of all, that is, delivering an account of apophaticism which is amenable to the palate of analytic philosophers.
The main locus of Lebens’ discussion of apophaticism is the first chapter of his The Principles of Judaism. Some more thoughts can be found in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5, and a cluster of other essays as well (2014, 2017, 2022, Forthcoming). Even though this contribution is mainly focused on the ideas presented in The Principles of Judaism, I will also venture into some other corners of Lebens’ philosophical universe. My jaunting around is made possible by the fact that there is a substantial continuity in Lebens’ attempt to develop a tenable account of apophaticism, and such a continuity is guaranteed by his relentless commitment to ground his apophatic theology on the following two moves:
First move. Many claims about God are false (or nonsensical). Lebens writes: “Apophatic claims are falsehoods (or nonsense)” (Lebens, 2017, p. 104. See, also, Lebens, 2020, p. 20; Lebens, 2014, p. 268).
Second move. Such false (or nonsensical) claims about God are illuminating and/or therapeutic. “You can have your apophaticism” he claims “as an illuminating and/or therapeutic falsehood [or nonsense]” (Lebens, 2017, p. 105 See, also, Lebens, 2020, p. 27)
In this paper, I will summarize Lebens’ approach to apophatic theology (Section 1), and defend it from the main criticisms to which it was subject (Section 2). I will, then, show that Lebens’ approach to apophatic theology faces a dilemma, that is, either many claims about God are false or many claims about God are nonsense (Section 3). I will also argue that, in both cases, Lebens’ account of apophaticism faces some important issues (Section 4 and Section 5). To conclude, I will show that the failure of Lebens’ apophatic theology can show some remarkable feature of grammatical thomism, and its employment of nonsense.
In this paper, I will summarize Lebens’ approach to apophatic theology (Section 1), and defend it from the main criticisms to which it was subject (Section 2). I will, then, show that Lebens’ approach to apophatic theology faces a dilemma, that is, either many claims about God are false or many claims about God are nonsense (Section 3). I will also argue that, in both cases, Lebens’ account of apophaticism faces some important issues (Section 4 and Section 5). To conclude, I will show that the failure of Lebens’ apophatic theology can show some remarkable feature of grammatical thomism, and its employment of nonsense.