Vasubandhu’s Phenomenology of Understanding: Perception as an Interpretive Context

1. Introduction & Argument

When someone says, “there is a yellow umbrella,” the validity of this statement is typically judged by whether one perceives the umbrella where it is claimed to be. In this way, perception becomes a context for interpreting statements. This approach can be broadened to include coherence as a requirement: it is not sufficient that only I see the umbrella; my perception in coherence with that of others formulates shared perception as a context of interpretation. But does shared perception alone provide a reliable foundation for understanding (rtogs pa) claims about reality? Vasubandhu grapples with this question in the section on perception (mngon sum, *saṃjñā, *pratyakṣa) and the fourth chapter of The Proper Mode of Exposition (Vyākhyāyukti). Drawing on these sources, I argue that, for Vasubandhu, understanding arises from abandoning and accepting certain presuppositions about perception. In order to understand or realize something previously unknown, one must abandon privileging shared perception and assume the existence and validity of other minds whose perceptions transcend one’s scope.

2. Method & Procedure

This presentation offers a phenomenological investigation of understanding by 1) beginning with a particular experience of reading, 2) continuing to investigate the cognitive structures of perception, and 3) concluding with a transformed conception of perception as an interpretive context.

The presentation begins with a common interpretive experience in which one’s perception is contradicted or opposed (’gal ba) by a text. Vasubandhu illustrates this through an opponent’s frustrated question—when it is plainly obvious that physical things no longer present (eg., food I ate) or not yet present (eg., food I will make) do not appear to anyone in any way, why did the Buddha say that the past and future forms exist? Isn’t the dissonance between the Buddha’s claim and everyday perception an indication that one or another must be rejected as false?

The body of the presentation analyzes the Three Natures (trisvabhāva) in The Proper Mode as Vasubandhu’s response to the above questions. According to his notion of the Three Natures, perception consists of three conflicting experiences, namely 1) the mistaken perception of the imagined nature (parikalpita), 2) the conventionally valid perception of the dependent nature (paratantra), and 3) the transcendent perception of the perfected nature (niṣpanna). This model accounts for genuine perceptual dissonance by distinguishing perception into three irreducible categories. Furthermore, it destabilizes the assumption that shared perception constitutes the totality of perception. Given that one’s perception is always localized, situating others’ statements solely within one’s conceivable range of experiences overestimates the interpretive strength of one’s perception.

In the end, does Vasubandhu’s emphasis on the diversity of perceptions indicate a turn towards infinite interpretive contexts? Rather than radically affirming all diverse contexts, Vasubandhu, as I argue, is disclosing a particular presupposition necessary for constructing a good context. From an ordinary reader’s perspective, an enlightened perception that transcends the world is not realized; however, it remains as a future possibility of experience. This transcendent possibility, not yet actualized, is what a reader must presuppose when contextualizing a statement. In other words, I take the implication of Vasubandhu’s thought to be a reconfiguration of perception to transform the parameter of a valid interpretive context. For this to happen, he is instructing one to abandon the presupposition of equating shared perception to perception as a whole and to accept the presupposition of others’ transcendence. Through working with these presuppositions, one re-defines a valid interpretive context that includes and exceeds one’s localized perception. In conclusion, such a transformed context leads to understanding. 

3. Conclusion & Contribution

Vasubandhu’s phenomenology of understanding—beginning from the experience of being confronted by a text to the structure of perception—offers a compelling point of engagement with Heidegger-Gadamerian hermeneutics. This presentation seeks to be an opportunity for such an inter-traditional dialogue by highlighting areas of convergence and divergence.

Both Vasubandhu and Gadamer emphasize historicity as a necessary condition of understanding. For Gadamer, much influenced by both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s notion of “horizon,” understanding is shaped by one’s past and the traditions in which one is already embedded. This historical situatedness is projected forward as a fore-conception or hypothesis that is modified through engagement with a text, eventually to bring about an understanding. Similarly, for Vasubandhu, beginningless past experiences shape present perception and the potential for future enlightenment. Both thinkers thus conceptualize understanding as a present realization shaped by an effective past.

However, a key divergence lies in their prescriptive clarity. A common critique of phenomenology and Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” is the lack of concrete applications. While Gadamer emphasizes awareness of prejudice, how this is to be achieved remains vague, especially given that prejudices are often hidden from view. In contrast, I interpret Vasubandhu as offering a more concrete approach—a critical re-examination of which and whose perceptions should constitute a valid interpretive context.