1. The Ongoing Challenge in Interpreting Apoha
Dharmakīrti (7th century CE) developed apoha (exclusion) theory as a Buddhist response to the problem of universals. Unlike Nyāya philosophers, who argue that words refer to shared essential properties (sāmānya), Dharmakīrti maintains that words function by excluding what differs (anyāpoha). Instead of recognizing a universal like pot-ness, Buddhists apply the word “pot” by negating everything that is not a pot.
Most modern scholars interpret apoha nominalistically: as a theory of meaning that replaces real universals with linguistic convention. But such a theory faces difficulties. According to this theory, how do ‘cow’ and ‘not non-cow’ differ in content? How do we recognize the ‘not-all’ category (asarva)? How do we mean ‘non-cow’ without knowing ‘cow’—avoiding circularity? How do we explain the meaning of linguistic parts of speech? These are some of the classical objections raised against the apoha theory and challenges that any interpreter of the theory must address. Buddhist logicians have attempted to answer some of these problems, and there are modern scholars who have attempted to reconstruct these arguments also. However, it is not clear that apoha must be interpreted nominalistically.
Indeed, the nominalist reading does not entirely fit apoha theory [1], since by reducing meaning to patterns of word-use, the nominalist reading cannot explain how, according to apoha, there is a necessity to seeing a particular object as an F , or understanding that a implies b.
2. Apoha as a Process of Constitution
To address these challenges, I propose that apoha is not only a theory, i.e., a theory of meaning, but also a process, viz., a process of constitution. Apoha is a structuring mechanism that actively determines how objects and inferential relations are experienced and recognized.
By ‘constitution’ I use a term of Edmund Husserl's. For Husserl, objects do not exist independently as fully formed entities but are constituted through conscious acts that structure their intelligibility. As Moran and Cohen summarize Husserl’s view:
objects do not exist simply on their own but receive their particular intelligible structure from the activity of the conscious subject apprehending them... Everything experienced is constituted in some specific way.[2]
Dharmakīrti’s apoha, I argue, works in a structurally similar way but through negation rather than positive meaning-construction. Meaning is not derived from recognizing similarity across objects but from a process of exclusion that necessitates recognition.
3. How Apoha Constitutes Singular Objects and Relations
(i) Singular Objects
When I recognize a particular object—a pot, for example—I do not compare it to all other pots and find a common similarity. Instead, I immediately exclude ‘non-pot’ as applying in my given situation (or lifeworld), forming a solidified image (kalpanā) by a series of conscious-acts called appearances (ābhāsa).
However, this process does not simply negate everything else imaginatively. In perception, I exclude twice-over: in identifying this pot before me, I exclude non-pots as well as other pots. Every time consciousness processes (in Husserl's term, ‘synthesizes’) different appearances, it solidifies one image through exclusion.
Crucially, this solidification is not recognition of similarity but a force that compels recognition. I have no option except to call this particular thing a pot. Or, in the classical format, “This is indeed a pot, nothing else” (ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ eva, nānyaḥ). This necessity is what makes apoha constitutive; apoha is not merely about meaning but rather the structure of recognition itself.
(ii) Relations (e.g., Fire-Smoke Inference)
A similar necessity applies to inferential relations. When we infer fire from smoke, we do not rely on a habitual memory of past co-occurrences (as a nominalist might argue). Instead, apoha excludes all possibilities that the smoke could have originated from something other than fire.
This exclusion process makes inference certain, because this smoke is not just any smoke—it is necessarily from fire. Further, there is no way this relation could be otherwise. Just as apoha forces us to recognize a singular object, it also forces us to recognize a necessary relation.
The problem of induction arises whenever inference is based only on past regularity. But apoha does not let this problem arise. It secures certainty by excluding all alternatives in the present lived experience.
4. Why This Matters: Apoha Beyond Nominalism
Apoha, in this interpretation, is not just a linguistic tool but a cognitive and epistemic structuring process. It does not rely on universals or similarity, yet it forces recognition with necessity. It does not group objects merely by convention but excludes all alternative possibilities such that a singular object or entailment-relation is recognized. As such, Dharmakīrti’s tadutpatti and tādātmya can be understood in terms of the Husserlian constitution: just as Husserl sees causal and natural relations as constituted, Dharmakīrti sees inferential relations as necessarily structured by exclusion.
Thus, rather than interpreting apoha narrowly as a theory of meaning, I suggest that it be explored as a constitutive process that explains both singular objects and inferential necessity. This approach offers a way forward in apoha studies by addressing the failures of nominalist interpretations while avoiding a return to realist universals.
However, this paper does not claim to present a final resolution to the apoha debate. Instead, it takes an exploratory step toward rethinking apoha phenomenologically. It asks whether its function is better understood as a constitutive process rather than a purely linguistic convention. Yet if apoha secures both object recognition and inferential certainty through exclusion, then it seems to be more than a semantic theory—it is a process that structures our lived experience of meaning and necessity.
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[1] Prabal Kumar Sen, “The Apoha Theory of Meaning,” in Apoha: Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, by Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, and Arindam Chakrabarti (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 192, 200.
[2] Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen, “Constitution,” in The Husserl Dictionary, Continuum Philosophy Dictionaries (London/New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 71.
Apoha (exclusion) theory, developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, has been widely interpreted as a nominalist solution to the problem of universals. However, scholars increasingly recognize that purely nominalist readings struggle to provide a fully satisfactory account of meaning and inference. As Prabala Kumar Sen notes, for instance, apoha requires an alternative explanation that avoids both the defects of nominalism and the pitfalls of realist universals. In this paper, I explore whether a phenomenological approach to apoha, particularly through the lens of the constitution, can provide a more coherent account. In Husserlian terms, objects and relations do not merely exist but are structured through acts of consciousness. I argue that apoha functions similarly—constituting objects and inferential relations through exclusion rather than positive construction. This reinterpretation clarifies how apoha secures the necessity of meaning and inference, not through implicit similarity but by eliminating all alternative possibilities in lived experience.