Apoha as Constitution: Rethinking Exclusion in Buddhist Epistemology

Apoha (exclusion) theory, developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, has been widely interpreted as a nominalist solution to the problem of universals. However, scholars increasingly recognize that purely nominalist readings struggle to provide a fully satisfactory account of meaning and inference. As Prabala Kumar Sen notes, for instance, apoha requires an alternative explanation that avoids both the defects of nominalism and the pitfalls of realist universals. In this paper, I explore whether a phenomenological approach to apoha, particularly through the lens of the constitution, can provide a more coherent account. In Husserlian terms, objects and relations do not merely exist but are structured through acts of consciousness. I argue that apoha functions similarly—constituting objects and inferential relations through exclusion rather than positive construction. This reinterpretation clarifies how apoha secures the necessity of meaning and inference, not through implicit similarity but by eliminating all alternative possibilities in lived experience.