How does Buddhism conceptualize human agency and subjecthood? Buddhist ontology critiques the notion of a permanent self (ātman), advocating instead for the doctrine of non-self (anātman). At the same time, it upholds karma as the governing force behind human actions and conventional phenomena. This dual commitment raises a critical question: How can anātman be reconciled with the soteriological goal of liberating all sentient beings—a task seemingly requiring a volitional, compassionate agent? To address this, it is essential to examine karma's role in shaping conventional phenomena, including the very possibility of subjecthood. A prominent metaphor in Buddhist sūtra literature—the mechanical wooden figure (jiguan muren 機關木人, Skt. vetāla-yantra)—symbolizes the constructed nature of human existence and dependent origination.
Two conceptual metaphors emerge in a karmic worldview: 1) subjecthood is an illusion, and 2) living is performing. These metaphors underscore karmic force and the limitations of human autonomy; however, in the reception and circulation of this metaphor, the understanding of what drives, formulates and sustains the “mechanoid” conventional actions remains ambivalent. By analyzing this metaphor in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, and Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, alongside Chinese commentarial traditions and later Chan discourses, this paper argues that its interpretive diversity reflects ongoing efforts to reconcile the deterministic nature of karma with the conditions necessary for a subjecthood for compassion. This discourse gained prominence during the late imperial period as Buddhists increasingly engaged with the phenomenological aspects of reality and the intersubjective nature of the mind. By engaging with conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) (Johnson & Lakoff, 1980), the study offers a novel perspective on how Mahāyānists conceptualize human autonomy within the framework of karma.
Existing scholarship on Buddhist metaphor has largely focused on exegetical traditions and its rhetorical function. Jonathan Silk and Roy Tzohar (2018) examined pan-metaphorical language (upacāra) in Yogācāra, while Richard Gombrich (2006, 2009) and Joanna Jurewicz (2000) explored Vedic similes in early Buddhism. Applying CMT, David McMahan (2002) analyzed the metaphor “knowing is seeing” across Buddhist traditions, while Amy Langenberg (2017) examined “suffering is birth” in Buddhist perspectives on organic life. However, the role of metaphor as a defining feature of Buddhist narrative traditions, particularly in the transmission of doctrines from Indic cultural contexts to China, remains underexplored. Furthermore, the ways in which the metaphor of the mechanical wooden figure became codified as both a literary and intellectual trope—serving to concretize the mechanism of Buddhist karma and to embody a representative vision of Buddhist conceptions of humanity—remain largely unexamined.
Buddhism’s spread depended on the acceptability and comprehensibility and cultural resonance of its content; metaphor played a crucial role in translating doctrines across linguistic and cultural boundaries. Therefore, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on metaphors in Buddhism by offering a new transcultural perspective on how the interpretive flexibility of metaphor mediates tensions in the reception of Buddhist doctrines in foreign contexts. It further examines how reconciliation occurs within a karmically governed worldview, as represented by a specific metaphor—one that, in turn, underscores the moral and spiritual significance of sentience, mind, and feelings in Buddhist conceptualization of agency.
This paper addresses two central questions regarding Buddhist conceptualizations of personhood and agency. First, what are the doctrinal implications of likening human beings to mechanoid, and why is this metaphor necessary? Second, how does this metaphor become contextualized within the Chinese literary tradition, both within and beyond Buddhist commentarial discourses? What do these shifts reveal about the efficacy and limitations of metaphoricity in Buddhist sūtras? More specifically, how does the multivalence of metaphor shape evolving understandings of anātman and karma?
To address these questions, the paper will analyze sūtra texts in Sanskrit and Chinese alongside late imperial commentaries, focusing on doctrinal significance and metaphorical meaning. It will also examine Chan discourses invoking this metaphor, with particular focus on its role in the Zhengdaoge (證道歌). A key point of contention in these discussions is the interpretation of jiguan (機關, “spring” or “mechanism”)—the force animating the mechanical figure. Ouyi Zhixu 蕅益智旭 (1599–1655) interprets jiguan as qing (情, sentience or emotional attachment) in his Laṅka commentary. He conceptualizes sentience as the driving force behind bodily constituents and sensory faculties, governing human action and mental phenomena. While recognizing qing’s defiling nature, Zhixu acknowledges its fundamental role in constituting living beings. However, he ultimately argues that sentient beings, like wooden automata, lack true subjectivity; their movements are conditioned by attachment, devoid of inherent agency. Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 (1546–1623), by contrast, emphasizes the primacy of mind (xin 心) as jiguan, suggesting that phenomenal reality, including the human body, is an illusion constructed by the mind. While human activities are illusory, the mind itself remains real. Zeng Fengyi 曾鳳儀 (1551–?) further nuances this debate by identifying ignorance (avidyā), karma, and emotional attachment as jiguan—the forces perpetuate the continuity of saṃsāra and the proliferation of suffering. This interpretation underscores the illusory nature of the body and reality while highlighting the causal mechanisms sustaining cyclic existence. While these interpretations affirm the emptiness of selfhood, they also raise critical questions about what constitutes the essence of human existence within a karmically governed reality. If sentient beings are mere automata, what fundamentally reifies reality? Additionally, while Zhengdaoge and its commentaries broadly reject an inherent self, they underscore the necessity of mind and wisdom for enlightenment, as the mechanoid’s lack of mind ultimately undermines the full realization of the non-existence of arising and cessation. This tension between rejecting a substantial agent and requiring a cognitive subject for realization reveals an unresolved paradox in Buddhist discourse on agency.
By exploring evolving interpretations of the mechanical figure metaphor, this study makes the following contributions. First, it deepens understanding of internal tensions in Buddhist doctrinal thought, particularly reconciling an agentive mind with karma's governing force. Second, through CMT, it sheds light on complexities in Buddhist knowledge production, transmission, and reception. Third, by examining the metaphor’s transformation across cultural contexts, it contributes to broader discussions on agency and determinism, offering a critical, non-Eurocentric perspective on negotiating autonomy within a karmically governed worldview.
How does Buddhism conceptualize human agency and subjecthood? Buddhist ontology critiques the notion of a permanent self (ātman), advocating instead the doctrine of non-self (anātman). It upholds karma as the governing force behind human actions and conventional phenomena. This raises a critical question: How can anātman be reconciled with the soteriological goal of liberating all sentient beings—a task requiring a volitional, compassionate agent? A metaphor in Buddhist sūtra—mechanical wooden figure (jiguanmuren 機關木人, Skt. vetāla-yantra)—symbolizes the constructed nature of human existence and dependent origination in a karmic reality. By analyzing this metaphor in Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, alongside Chinese commentaries, this paper argues that its interpretive diversity reflects ongoing efforts to reconcile the deterministic nature of karma with the conditions necessary for a subjecthood for compassion. This discourse gained prominence during the late imperial period as Buddhists increasingly engaged with the phenomenological aspects of reality and the intersubjective nature of mind.