In this paper, I will re-examine two key passages from Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1635) Īqāẓ al-nā’imīn by comparing them with Gadādhara’s (d. ca 1660) remarks on causation in his Kāraṇatāvāda. My aim is to shed new light on how Islamic and Nyāya philosophers approach the nature of cause and effect, and to show how Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea of “considerations of being” (i‘tibārāt al-wujūd) might be juxtaposed with Gadādhara’s concepts of delimiter (avacchedaka) and delimited (avacchedya).
Mullā Ṣadrā, a prominent philosopher of Safavid Iran, is best known for his theory of the “primacy of existence” (aṣālat al-wujūd). According to this doctrine, existence (wujūd) is the fundamental reality, while all things—God, angels, trees, or rocks—exist as distinct modes and degrees of this single reality. Although these entities share the same ontological ground, God occupies the highest level of intensity in being, while other entities participate in existence to a lesser extent. This perspective emerged partly from two central debates in Islamic philosophy: one on the nature of “absolute existence” (wujūd muṭlaq), and another on the possibility that existence itself admits of gradation.
Taftāzānī (d. 1390), in Sharḥ al-maqāṣid, argued that identifying God with absolute existence would reduce the Divine to a mere mental abstraction, which he saw as unacceptable. Moreover, Sufi figures such as ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah Simnānī (d. 1336) also rejected equating God’s essence with absolute existence, insisting instead that “absolute existence” refers more accurately to God’s creative act. These controversies encouraged Islamic thinkers to distinguish between the concept of existence and the reality of existence: while we can form an abstract notion of “existence,” the true reality of being surpasses any mere mental category. Mullā Ṣadrā embraced this distinction to reinforce his own contention that being, in its full reality, underlies all things.
In response to Simnānī’s objection, Mullā Ṣadrā made use of the framework of “considerations of being” (iʿtibārāt al-wujūd). This theory states that although being is ultimately one, we can view it under various aspects, each associated with different properties. In Īqāẓ al-nā’imīn, he makes two significant claims: first, that the Divine is “creator” only under a certain consideration of being rather than at the level of being as such; second, that when God creates, the cause (God) and the effect (creation) share the same existence on the level of manifestation.
Turning to Gadādhara, we find a complementary but distinct viewpoint in the context of the Navya Nyāya tradition. In his Kāraṇatāvāda, Gadādhara advances a series of arguments to establish 'causation' (kāraṇatva) as a distinct category (padārtha). Central to his position is the claim that the property of being a cause (kāraṇatā) is not identical with the essence of any given entity. This assertion carries two significant implications. First, any discourse on causation must necessarily involve an act of delimitation, specifying the precise scope of the causal relation. For instance, when one asserts that "blue fire causes heat in the room," it is necessary to clarify that it is the fire, and not its blueness, that is causally efficacious. In other words, causation does not pertain to fire per se but rather to fire under a particular mode. Second, cause and effect must remain ontologically distinct; otherwise, the relation of delimiter (avacchedaka) and delimited (avacchedya) between them would collapse.
The question I wish to address is how Gadādhara’s delimiter-delimited framework might illuminate—or challenge—Mullā Ṣadrā’s claims about the identity of cause and effect. At first glance, Mullā Ṣadrā’s suggestion that the cause and effect share the same existence appears incompatible with Gadādhara’s insistence on preserving a firm distinction between the two. Yet I argue there is no contradiction here for what Ṣadrā real means is that the effect’s existence is not an autonomous reality but one wholly dependent on the cause. From another angle, God and the world are indeed distinct in their roles as creator and creation. In this sense, the “identity” Mullā Ṣadrā describes is not absolute sameness but rather an ontological dependence, in which the effect receives its very being from its cause.
I will conclude by reflecting on how these insights expand our understanding of causality in both Nyāya and Islamic thought, highlighting the importance of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue. Finally, I turn to eighteenth-century India and the writings of Kundan Lāl Ashkī to show how Hindu thinkers historically compared Avicennan and Naiyāyika perspectives on causation, demonstrating the broader implications of such comparisons for intellectual history in South Asia.
In this paper, I revisit two key passages from Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1635) Īqāẓ al-nā’imīn through the lens of Gadādhara’s (d. ca 1660) remarks on causation in his Kāraṇatāvāda. Mullā Ṣadrā maintains that the Divine is “creator” only within a specific mode of being, adding that God and creation share the same existence at the level of manifestation. At first glance, this seems to conflict with Gadādhara’s emphasis on a firm distinction between cause and effect. I argue that there is no real contradiction, because Mullā Ṣadrā’s claim of shared existence highlights the effect’s total dependence on the cause rather than denying its distinct identity. Finally, I turn to eighteenth-century India and the writings of Kundan Lāl Ashkī to show how Hindu thinkers historically compared Avicennan and Naiyāyika perspectives on causation, demonstrating the implications of such comparisons for understanding intellectual history in South Asia.