Many Reformers replaced traditional virtue ethics with a view that emphasizes Christian freedom and individual consience. While this development connected Christianity with the emerging European modernity, Catholic-minded scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre or Brad Gregory have argued that Protestant individualism can no longer support the understanding of the church as communio, an institution in which the virtues are preserved so that a flourishing community can emerge.
Based on my recent work in ecumenical theology and Reformation history, I argue that the Lutheran doctrine of Christian freedom continues the Scotist and late medieval understanding of justice as a pursuit of another’s good (bonum alienum). This understanding is community-oriented rather than individualistic. While it provides an alternative to Thomist virtue ethics, it also regards virtues and communitarian needs as primary. An ecclesiology built on Christian freedom may highlight individual rights but it also builds on a strong concept of reciprocity and service.
The Protestant view of justice as freedom can be characterized as follows: Late medieval scholasticism and early Protestantism are alternative ways of thinking about justice or righteousness. The Protestant idea of divine imputation, a relation of “counting as”, does not prima facie sound fascinating compared to personal virtue, which can be cultivated towards excellence. However, God’s imputation of righteousness is a generous calculation that offers salvation and personal recognition to different classes of people. It has appeal as democratic and emancipatory idea.
Likewise, Luther’s ‘passive righteousness’ does not sound fascinating compared to the active pursuit of justice. However, this relation may also have some psychological appeal. With such relational justice, I may practice neighbourly love, believing that it need not be based on my excellence but on Christ, who sustains my relations. This appeal is linked with the biblical and Anselmian trajectory arguing that justice and mercy do not oppose one another. In helping the poor and rescuing the oppressed. God promotes a kind of social justice which Christians can re-enact in their negighbourly love.
There is also an appeal which is rooted in Scotist philosophy. The world is complex, and there may not be one order for all. “Now this is just and now that”, as Duns Scotus formulates. When Luther claims that Christian service can also be free and manifold and my agency need not depend on my virtue, this claim provides a constructive and communitarian alternative to virtue ethics. Christian service is tailored to meet the needs of others in situational plurality. God can combine the human acts in creation so that God’s first justice remains operative.
An ecclesiology built on these features of justice and freedom proceeds from the view that my neighbour's needs are primary in developing and pursuing my own social and ethical life. While this ecclesiology of freedom is not designed to promote individualism, it does leave room for different lifestyles and ways of helping one another. It does embrace plurality and avoids moralist uniformity. Given these emancipatory ideas, Christian freedom nevertheless values education and the formation of character. The ecclesiological appeal of Christian freedom can be seen in this ability to promote education and moral conscience in the pluralistic world.
In arguing that Luther's ecclesiology of freedom follows early Franciscan Scotism, my approach locates this thinking between Scholasticism and modernity. This may be too modern for true Thomists and too medieval for true Protestants. My approach nevertheless looks this option as an ecumenical option, offering an ecclesiology which can embrace both Catholic and Protestant core convictions.
Many Reformers replaced traditional virtue ethics with a view that emphasizes Christian freedom and individual consience. While this development connected Christianity with the emerging European modernity, Catholic-minded scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre or Brad Gregory have argued that Protestant individualism can no longer support the understanding of the church as communio, an institution in which the virtues are preserved so that a flourishing community can emerge.
Based on my recent work in ecumenical theology and Reformation history, I argue that the Lutheran doctrine of Christian freedom continues the Scotist and late medieval understanding of justice as a pursuit of another’s good (bonum alienum). This understanding is community-oriented rather than individualistic. While it provides an alternative to Thomist virtue ethics, it also regards virtues and communitarian needs as primary. An ecclesiology built on Christian freedom may highlight individual rights but it also builds on a strong concept of reciprocity and service.