It is often suggested that modernity is premised on a rejection of the notion of a scala naturae— a Great Chain of Being. However, this interpretation can be challenged. In this paper, I propose that this traditional Western idea, particularly in its Aristotelian form, resonates strongly with two significant strands of modern thought: Darwinian evolution and phenomenology/philosophical anthropology. Against this backdrop, I want to argue—significant criticism notwithstanding—that something like a chain of being remains critical for ethical deliberation and moral responsibility.
I shall begin by briefly laying out the idea of the scala naturae in its more modest Aristotelian form, which serves as a framework for understanding the hierarchical organization of living beings (De Anima; De Historia Animalium). I shall then argue that a major strand of Darwinian thought—what Michael Ruse identifies as its dominant interpretation—conceptualizes evolution as a kind of scala naturae unfolding over evolutionary time. It is thus quite possible to understand evolution as a historicized Aristotelian scala naturae, with a hierarchical structure reflected in language about ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ animals. Presenting this interpretation, I shall also take note of its sharp detractors, the late Stephen Jay Gould chief among them.
Next, I turn to twentieth-century European thought, examining discussions both in phenomenology (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Jonas) and in German philosophische Anthropologie (e.g., Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen). I aim to show that these thinkers and traditions attempted to take Darwinian evolution fully into account, while still finding ways of affirming human distinctiveness. Although their approaches differ, they can be seen as variations on an Aristotelian theme, ultimately retrieving modes of thought closely aligned with the scala naturae—even when they explicitly distance themselves from this lineage.
Thus, far from being obsolete, the scala naturae persists within core strands of modern thought, and demonstrating this continuity is the central aim of the paper's first section.
However, major concerns remain:does this hierarchical view of life reinforce a ruthlessly anthropocentric ethic that has been devastating for other life forms and has contributed to the ecological crisis? In Martha Nussbaum’s recent Justice for Animals, for example, this point is central to the argument. In light of such criticism, I argue in the second part of the paper that instead of jettisoning the idea as such, we need to think more critically about the ethical implications of the scala naturae. To that end, I shall make the following points:
First, belonging together in a great chain of being necessarily implies some sort of continuity and kinship. It is strangely one-sided to read this tradition as nothing but a pernicious subordination of all non-human living things to human needs or desires, when it could equally be read as suggesting a valuation of all living things by belonging together. Hans Jonas makes this very point in his discussion of the philosophical implications of Darwinism in The Phenomenon of Life: It chastened human (modern?) hubris by placing us in the order of nature, even as it brought a new dignity to animals in demonstrating our kinship.
Second, it is worth asking what the alternative to this vision would be. Many moral philosophers and eco-theologians would point to a non-hierarchical model of belonging, where animal forms are not ranked as ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ but simply different—one species has moral deliberation and responsibility, another has echolocation, still another has canine teeth; humans may be distinct, but only in in so far as every species is distinct in its way. While this perspective highlights each species’ uniqueness, there are problems with such a levelling of living kinds:
Moral deliberation and action require a framework for ranking values. But if such a ranking is not grounded in something real, how can it escape being arbitrary? And if rank ordering is merely an outcome of arbitrary human valuation, does this not make it even more anthropocentric than a system that recognizes value within the natural order itself?
Moreover, without a scala naturae modern moral philosophy—particularly in its liberal forms—tends to slide into a ‘functional Cartesianism’. In this view, to be truly human and moral, we must sever ourselves from nature, which is presumed to lack any inherent moral direction. This sentiment is encapsulated in Richard Dawkins' claim in The Selfish Gene: if one wishes to build a humane society, one should ‘expect no help from nature.’ Without some notion of a scala naturae human beings simply find it very hard to fit in, leading to a tension: either we embrace a radical separation from nature (functional Cartesianism), or we risk veering toward an illiberal ‘morality of the fittest’ in the vein of Nietzsche. By contrast, a structured hierarchy allows us understand nature as reaching a new level of meaning and morality in the phenomenon of humanity—we belong not merely as another animal but as distinctively human.
In making these arguments, I should like to suggest that the idea of a scala naturae responds to a longstanding tension between humanism and ecology: On the one hand, we seek to affirm human uniqueness; on the other, we recognize our embeddedness within the ecological web of life. Might the scala naturae offer a classical model for engaging with this tension in a more constructive way?
This paper challenges the common assumption that modernity has entirely rejected the idea of a scala naturae, or Great Chain of Being. Instead, I argue that this hierarchical concept, particularly in its Aristotelian form, remains deeply embedded in two major strands of modern thought: Darwinian evolution and phenomenology/philosophical anthropology. While a dominant interpretation of Darwinism historicizes the scala naturae, twentieth-century European thinkers retrieve aspects of the ancient Greek framework to affirm both evolution and human distinctiveness.
Despite concerns that such a hierarchy among species reinforces anthropocentrism, I propose that the scala naturae can instead foster an ethical vision grounded in continuity and kinship among living beings. Rejecting hierarchy altogether risks moral arbitrariness and a functional Cartesianism that ends up alienating humanity from nature. By reconsidering the scala naturae, we may find a constructive framework for mediating the longstanding tension between human exceptionalism and ecological belonging.