Attached Paper In-person November Annual Meeting 2025

The Colonial Context of The Sufi Theodicy of Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī (d. 1883)

Description for Program Unit Review (maximum 1000 words)

The life and thought of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī (1808–1883) stand at the intersection of anti-colonial resistance, theological erudition, and mystical contemplation. A charismatic and multifaceted personality, ʿAbd al-Qādir earned a global reputation as a freedom fighter, holy man, scholar, and passionate advocate of religious tolerance and human rights. His humane treatment of French prisoners of wars and protection of thousands of Syrian Christians in the riots of 1860 turned him into a global icon. His commitment to the ideals of the Islamic faith and betterment of humanity are invoked in countless studies and humanitarian initiatives striving to revive his legacy. 

This paper explores an understudied facet of ʿAbd al-Qādir’s thought, namely, his Sufi philosophical theodicy—the compatibility of evil with divine goodness—as articulated in his magnum opus, Kitab al-Mawāqif (“The Book of Mystical Halting Stations”). My investigation is framed within the broader discussion of theodicy as it features in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas rejects the ‘metaphysical rationalization of suffering and advocates instead an experiential ethical response to the experience of suffering.  ʿAbd al-Qādir’s theodicy, however, goes beyond ethical altruism. He conception of evil is embedded in Sufi Islamic ontology. In his lifetime, the problem of evil and suffering gained momentum for Muslims living under colonial rule. The atrocities of colonial Europe forced Muslim thinkers to reexamine their assumptions about good and evil. For figures like ʿAbd al-Qādir, the violence and moral contradictions of colonial modernity intensified the need to address how a just and omnipotent God could permit such suffering. This context prompted a revival and reimagining of classical Islamic theodicies, as thinkers like ʿAbd al-Qādir drew on Sufi metaphysics and classical theological frameworks to articulate a meaningful interpretation of providential wisdom in the face of suffering. 

ʿAbd al-Qādir’s reflections on this topic are meditated through his commentary on Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī's (d. 1111) proclamation: “There is nothing in existence more perfect than what already is” (laysa fi'l imkān abdaʿ mimā kān). He offers a robust defense of the Ghazalian thesis, arguing that God created the most optimal world possible – what is also known as the theory of “the best possible world.” ʿAbd al-Qādir conceived of this intrinsic perfection of the world in the providential actualization of the inherent predisposition (istiʿdād) of all beings. Drawing on the metaphysical teachings of the medieval Sufi philosopher, Ibn ʿArabī (d.1240), ʿAbd al-Qādir reconceptualizes the Ghazalian doctrine as the providential actualization of what the entity itself demand (ṭālib li-dhālik). As he envisages it, the Ghazalian doctrine hinges on “the secret of providence” (sirr al-qadar).He argues that God never withholds from any entity in existence what it is inherently receptive to.  There is therefore no deprivation or deficiency in the world whatsoever. 

I attempt in this segment to unpack ʿAbd al-Qādir’s line of reasoning, particularly how he grapples with the motif of evil within what considers the best possible world. I reconsider his stance in light of the Islamic conceptions of moral agency. If acts of evil are providential actualizations of inherent predispositions, how can actors be held morally accountable before God? The fatalistic overtones of his theodicy challenges normative assumptions about human free will and accountability. I further explore how ʿAbd al-Qādir's theodicy engages with questions of moral relativism and ethical absolutism. The final section considers how Abd al-Qādir may address the objections that Levinas raises against metaphysical theodicy, particularly his criticism of moral determinism. I end with a reconsideration of  ‘Abd al-Qādir’s core argument in defense of the Ghazalian theodicy, namely, that the best possible world consists of the providential actualization of the predispositions of all entities. 

Abstract for Online Program Book (maximum 150 words)

This paper examines the Sufi theodicy of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī (1808–1883), figure whose life and thought intertwine anti-colonial resistance, theological inquiry, and mystical philosophy. Focusing on his magnum opus, Kitāb al-Mawāqif ("The Book of Mystical Halting Stations"), this paper explores ʿAbd al-Qādir’s mystical theodicy – the  the problem of evil and divine benevolence. I frame his reflections on this topic within the context of Emmanuel Levinas’ critiques of its metaphysical assumptions. The arguments of ʿAbd al-Qādir will be examined in light of his commentary on Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) assertion that "there is nothing in existence more perfect than what already is." Following al-Ghazālī’s lead, ʿAbd al-Qādir defends the view according to which God creates the most optimal world. This perspective is embedded in his Sufi ontology of inherent predisposition (istiʿdād) . What defines his perspective is the view that an optimal world is an order of existence where the predispositions of all beings are providentially actualized.