Augustine and the Neoplatonists on the Origin of Divine Visions

In Confessions 9.10.23-25, Augustine and Monica experience God at Ostia. They begin by first discursively considering sensible things before ascending “beyond all corporeal objects” and then beyond even “their own minds” till they experience wisdom itself, that is, God. This sequence of events is unlikely to strike the modern reader as particularly strange. However, Augustine’s Neoplatonist readers would have found it unintelligible for two main reasons. First, Augustine and Monica’s experience is apparently shared. There is thus one experience in which both Augustine and Monica participate. Second, Augustine and Monica appear to be epistemic peers. [1] Neither is portrayed as possessing relevant knowledge or insight unavailable to the other, yet still they are able to help each other ascend.

Both of these points stand in stark contrast to how Plato and other Neoplatonists, particularly Plotinus, conceive of such ascents. Within this tradition, experiences of the Good can only be experienced individually and can only be aided by another in the context of a master-pupil relationship – a context with a difference in epistemic standing. We argue that these differences in how Augustine and the Platonists treat the ascent to the Good are best explained by how each conceptualizes the nature of the Good within their account. In particular, the fact that God is an active cause of the experience, while the Form of the Good is a passive object of the experience, explains why Augustine and the Platonists diverge in their treatment of this subject. We argue that this difference is reflected more broadly in their theories of education and illumination, and that examining these epistemologies reveals important features of Augustine’s theological epistemology.

In §1, we begin by examining the ascent to the good in the context of Republic VI-VII, paying close attention to how Plato conceives of rational cognition in relation to this ascent. As part of our analysis, we identify two features of the soul’s cognitive powers which have a direct bearing on how Plato conceptualizes the individual’s passage to the Good: (1) the soul’s inability to naturally grasp intelligible objects without the aid of education to purify it and (2) the soul’s ability to easily grasp these objects once properly educated. We argue that these two features entail that Platonic visions of the Good are individual cognitive achievements, aidable only within the context of a master-pupil relationship. This picture of the Platonic ascent naturally leads to a conception of dialectic in which teachers attempt to elicit particular experiences in the minds of their students, aiming at bringing them to their own vision of the Good. Many commentators on Enneads I.3 have noted that Plotinus seems to share Plato’s conception of dialectic (Harder 1956, Armstrong 1966, Yount 2017). As we argue, Plato’s conception of dialectic – along with its cognitive underpinning – does indeed reoccur within the work of Plotinus with similar results: an epistemically hierarchical conception of dialectic aimed at individual cognitive achievements. 

After establishing this result, we consider Augustine’s account of dialectic in contrast to the Platonists, using the experience at Ostia as a test case. While there have been many extensive treatments of this experience, most have either focused too little on the Platonic background (Kenny 2005, esp. part 2, Pranger 2013), claimed that Augustine does not significantly depart from the Platonists (Mandouze 1968), or argued that Augustine rejects the framework of the Platonists primarily due to his Christology (Williams 2002). We offer a different approach, identifying two key differences in Augustine’s account, namely the possibility of shared mystical experiences and of advancement with epistemic peers. We then argue, on the basis of De Magistro and De Doctrine Christiana, that these differences in Augustine’s theory stems from the fact that he envisions the Good as an active cause of our knowledge rather than as a passive recipient of it like Plato. 

As Augustine argues in De Magistro 11.36-38, God’s active illumination is the cause of our knowledge – signs merely occasion illumination. This feature of Augustinian dialectic opens up the possibility for a joint experience, caused in both subjects by God, and the possibility of dialectical ascent between two peers, since both can occasion an illumination in the other that they have not yet had themselves. We thus argue that the experience at Ostia represents a significant departure from the Platonist conception of dialectic and rational cognition and that this departure stems from how Augustine conceptualizes the object of dialectic, i.e., God. 

This has substantial implications for understanding Augustine’s early theological epistemology. First, we present an integrated account of Augustine’s relationship to the Neoplatonists as well as an explanation for where and why he departs from them. Second, we argue, Augustine’s account has several significant theoretical advantages over that of the Platonists in accounting for the mechanics of how a religious experience would actually work. Finally, we argue that Augustine’s account is integrated into the rest of his early philosophy and theology, not merely in terms of its Christology, but in terms of his broader theory of signs, education, and divine illumination. Our reading, then, further suggests the value of reading Augustine’s Confessions in light of his early epistemological dialogues and Neoplatonic context.

[1].  Whether O’Donnell (1992) is right or not that Monica has some supernatural wisdom, she behaves as Augustine’s peer: she does not lead him along like Socrates in the Meno.