An Analysis of Augustine's Porphyrian Critiques of Manichaeanism

One of the main shifts that is detectable in Augustine’s thinking involves a network of ideas connecting the nature and origin of evil, the nature of the human person, and the ultimate hope for humanity. These areas are tied together for Augustine and are particularly prominent in the writings pertaining to Manichaeanism. Augustine’s eventual turn away from Manichaeaism was rooted in his perception that it failed to explain evil properly—he came to the conclusion that viewing evil as an independent substance or nature, or identifying certain kinds of things as having evil natures is not feasible. He also detected various inconsistencies within the thinking and practices of the movement. So it had little explanatory power and it was logically problematic. He turned then to Neo-Platonism. Initially, he found their approach to a wide array of topics plausible and compelling, but he came to see the neo-platonic metaphysical system as suffering from the same fundamental problems as Manichaeanism (City of God, X.24, 28). It has become clear in recent years that in relation to these areas of Augustine’s thought, it is important to consider the influence of Neo-Platonists like Plotinus and especially Porphyry. As I will explain, the analysis of certain frequent critiques that Augustine makes against the Manichaeans will enable us to gain a clearer sense of Porphyry’s influence on Augustine, as well as a better understanding of the ultimate position Augustine took on the several important metaphysical and soteriological issues.

The influence of Porphyrian neo-Platonism is strongest and most evident in his earliest writings. In his De ordine, he seems to operate under the assumption that the chief problem in human life is a certain kind of ignorance of the self, and so what is needed above all is something akin to Porphyry’s inward turn (De ordine, 1.1.3). The result of this turn for the Neo-Platonists is the self’s “recollection,” a term which also plays an important part in Augustine’s thinking. Recollection expresses the final state of perfection and likewise it is the solution to the chief problem plaguing created beings—the move away from the center-point into a dissolute kind of existence. 

Augustine stresses these points especially in his response to the Manichaeans. He argues that their main error is their reliance upon sense and sense imagery. The Manichaeans accordingly fall into both idolatry and ignorance by relying on the input of their senses and the images their imaginations generate in order to reach conclusions concerning the highest realities. The result, as Augustine declares, is a “death of the soul” (Contra Secundinum, section 4). Here again he seems to be deeply influenced by Porphyry. 

Porphyry, much like Plotinus, lays out a metaphysical hierarchy according to which perfect, unified, and unchanging reality is at the top. Corresponding to this is an epistemic hierarchy. The senses are the lowest, followed by the imagination, which makes use of the senses to draw up images. Above this is the intellectual soul, which is inward facing unlike the imagination and senses. According to Plotinus, because unity is the highest level of reality and the principle which enables being in particular and delimited things, it follows for him that a thing “most exists not when it takes multiplicity or extension but when it holds to its own being.” Porphyry fleshes this out by asserting that the forms are manifest in bodies “imagistically” (eidolikos), a term Porphyry himself seems to have coined (Launching Points, 10). This is, as John Dillon and Lloyd Gerson explain, “the lowest level of the projection of the forms" (Ibid., 178, n.4).

The images of the imagination are also, as Porphyry explains, outward facing. The imagination, unlike the higher intellect, relies upon the input of the senses in order for it to function or to generate creative images. Because the imagination is so low on the metaphysical ladder, it is not a reliable means by which to access transcendent truths. Consequently, dependance upon the senses or even the imagination in theological reflection always comes with a heightened risk of idolatry. The higher intellect and the corresponding higher and superior human life, is the one that has turned not only the against the temptations of the senses but against any process that requires the use of the body. Likewise, those whose minds have become embedded and immersed in outward facing, bodily activities and capacities are turned away from the higher realities. Augustine’s stress on idolatry in his critique of Manichaean reliance upon the senses and the imagination seems to reflect this Porphyrian view (Confessions, VI.xvi(26)).

Augustine’s study of Neo-Platonic work also led him to conclude, with Porphyry, that a universal way for the liberation of the soul was needed but also unavailable by way of the Neo-Platonic ascent of the soul. No amount of philosophical contemplation in itself would enable a genuine, lasting union between creation and Creator. A truly universal mechanism of liberation was needed. Augustine’s encounters with Christians like Ambrose and Victorinus led him to see Christ as serving in this mediative role. Of particular importance for this facet of his thought was the Neo-Platonic notion that super-sensual realities are beyond the grasp of even the purified human mind. The solution to this problem is provided by God's mediative action. What makes Augustine’s approach to this notion distinct is that Christ’s being the singular Mediator is a function of his status as the second person of the Trinity, which is to say the ultimate metaphysical exemplar (De Trin., XIII.xvi-xvii). This decisive act of grace on God’s part, effecting a unity with humanity in the person of Christ--"seemliest semblance"-- provides humanity with a (somewhat) comprehensible encounter with the highest possible reality and Good, which is God (On Faith and the Creed, 2.2). The incarnation thus resolves the problem of our inability to perceive God. What is required of humanity, however, in order for this divine initiative to take root in the human soul, is the humility to recognize the need for divine grace and initiative. This kind of humility is exemplified above all in the person of Christ himself.