This paper seeks to argue that the 1950 movie Harvey, directed by Henry Koster and based on the play by Mary Chase, provides an insightful reflection on the challenges facing the philosophy of religion. It also helps to clarify what I feel is a less than clearly explained part of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy on the conflicts we face in interpreting religious experiences. Specifically, Ricoeur argues that we have two ways of interpreting religious experiences; to treat them with suspicion or with charity. Harvey can help to show the differences between these two interpretational approaches.
When it comes to the relationship between philosophy and religion, few thinkers have had as significant a contribution as Paul Ricoeur. Paul Ricoeur’s works cover a broad range of subjects concerning both philosophy and religion, but few thinkers have been able to synthesise the two disciplines in the way that he has. However despite the volumnity of Ricoeur’s writings one of the most famous parts of Paul Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of religion” remains obscure; the conflict that arises between the different interpretational approaches that are available.
In Harvey we are presented with an eccentric drunk by the name of Elwood P. Dowd (Played by Kimmy Stewart). Elwood is loved by his friends and family, however Elwood’s behaviors are the cause for a great deal of concern. Elwood claims to be friends with a 6 foot (6 ft 3 and a half inches to be specific) white rabbit named Harvey. Harvey, we are told, is a Pooka; a celtic mythical creature, who, for the most part can only be seen by Elwood. The movie begins with Elwood’s family growing increasingly exacerbated by his constant disruption of their plans to marry his niece, and the embarrassment his relationship with Harvey causes them. As the movie continues, his friends and family are asked to choose whether Harvey is real or just the delusional fantasy of a madman. Elwood’s language, his behaviors , all seem to point to there truly being an object of which he is experiencing. However, we the viewer are unable to see Harvey for ourselves.
The film parallels the philosophy of religion insofar as philosophers struggle with the very same problem that those surrounding Elwood face. The philosopher of religion is presented with a similar problem; there are those who claim to have witnessed miracles, others have claimed to have had divine experiences, and the experiences of prayer and meditation that others have is the subject of investigation. As with Harvey, the observer is unable to witness these experiences for themselves.
In terms of how this applies to Elwood and those undergoing religious experiences; there is never any doubt that Elwood does believe that he is seeing a six foot white rabbit. Those who have witness miracles or have had divine experiences, indeed, believe that they have had these experiences. But do we really want to accept that there are six foot invisible white rabbits hanging out on street corners?
For Ricoeur, we are presented two conflicting modes of interpretation; the hermeneutics of suspicion and the hermeneutics of charity.
The hermeneutics of charity seeks to decipher linguistic expressions in view of trying to restore the original meaning and experiences that the speaker is expressing. This is close to the phenomenological approaches of thinkers like Eliade who want to assume the truth of what the believe states and then tries to understand what it is that the believer is experiencing and how it manifests to them.
The other side of the conflict is the hermeneutics of suspicion. The champions of such suspicion are Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. For Ricoeur, all three thinkers were radical in that they revealed the possibility of false consciousness. Under Descartes we can be certain that we are undergoing the mental experiences that we experience. Whether my experience actually matches any kind of object reality is secondary to the primacy of my own private experiences. But what the three ‘masters of suspicion’ show is that our own private mental experiences can be wrong. For Freud, i am wrong if I believe that I am in control of my life and that my choices are my own. For Marx I may believe that I am not alienated or not being exploited or being deceived by the capitalists. And for Nietzsche I may well believe that my christian values come from a place of good and holy motivations, without realizing that my values are fueled by resentment and ill-will.
While the hermeneutics of suspicion is quite clearly defined, it is not so clear just what exactly defines the hermeneutics of charity, including its method and goal. This is where Harvey can be useful.
First of all, Harvey does well to clarify that a hermeneutics of charity does not simply give credit to an individuals beliefs. E.g. it is not merely the recognition that someone has had experiences and believes them to be true.
Where the hermeneutics of charity does appear is when those who come to know and respect Elwood come to believe, themselves, that Harvey is real. This is best exemplified in the fact that Elwood’s sister Vita claims to have seen Harvey herself. Towards the end of the film, Dr Sanderson himself is able to see Harvey and is even offered the opportunity, by Elwood, to have Harvey as his companion.
For Ricoeur, it is necessary to have both modes of interpretation; to purge the idols of belief; to rid ourselves of those false beliefs that might be damaging to ourselves or others. First and foremost with any form of mental illness, religious experience, or even strong politic beliefs, there is a risk of danger, deception, even violence. We should always be on the guard for that.
But it is also necessary to have a hermeneutics of charity. While we can certainly continue to be suspicious and reductive in our approaches, we run the risk that we are unable to witness those things around us which might be truly magical or good.
This paper seeks to argue that the 1950 movie Harvey, which focuses on the friendly but rather idiosyncratic Elwood P. Elwood and his best friend, an invisible white rabbit named Harvey, provides an insightful example that can be applied to the philosophy of religion. This paper will argue that the challenge that arises from trying to make sense of Harvey’s existence is analogous to one of the central methodological problems within the philosophy of religion; namely how to interpret private, inner religious experiences. In this respect Harvey prevents us with a ‘conflict of interpretations’ of the sort discussed by Paul Ricoeur in Freud and Philosophy. As such, this paper seeks to show that an analysis of these interpretations and their conflict can provide an insight into Ricoeur’s philosophy of religion and some of the wider issues discussed in the philosophy of religion.