Moral Responsibility: Velleity and Vocation

This paper argues that there is a limit to the responsibility an individual has towards acts of evil--a limit that comes not out of indifference or lack of compassion, but out of human finitude. Moral agents often occupy a position of wanting to thoroughly invest and respond to the ever-growing lists of evils they encounter, while being limited in their time, resources, and capacities. Drawing on Thomas Aquinas’ idea of complete and incomplete acts of will (velleity) and a concept of ethical division of labor (vocation), this paper contends that moral agents can fail to respond to an evil in external action while not being guilty of indifference. The hope in making this argument is not to give individuals a carte blanche when it pertains to issues of injustice, but to provide relief for the individual who suffers guilt from their inability to respond to every act of evil.