The Freedom of a Christian: A Rewind to Step Forward

I answer the call for papers by historically interrogating the variety of meanings that the term “freedom” has carried throughout the history of Reformed theology, attending to ways in which these different meanings have played off each other. I capture this history in four snapshots. With each snapshot, I express that the “freedom” belonging to those in Christ frees them from something and frees them to do something. In the process, each snapshot defines freedom in a way that proves of lasting significance while leaving other important questions unaddressed that without further clarification prove historically problematic.

In the first snapshot, I turn to Luther’s A Freedom of a Christian (1520) in which he famously argued that those in Christ as free from the burden of the law found in earning merit for right standing before God. Freed from this burden, the Christian is freed to love her neighbor with sincerity for her neighbor’s sake. This instigates initiatives to pare away ecclesial systems of merit that had turned abusive. As powerful of a picture Luther offers, he does not have in mind questions of political freedom or offer clear ways of demarking the state’s role as separate from that of the church.

In the second snapshot, I turn to Calvin’s deployment of the “regulative principle,” which freed Christians from human traditions impressing demands upon them not grounded in scripture (Institutes I.xi.4). This in turn freed Christians to discern for themselves how to live before God. Calvin’s shift in emphasis was not a denial of Luther’s depiction of freedom, but rather a re-narration of it within his own synthesis that further depicted growth in the Christian life demanded by the teachings of scripture. In some ways, Calvin removed demands Luther left open in receptivity to tradition and in other ways Calvin laid greater emphasis on the demands found in scripture.

Accompanying the commitment to the “regulative principle,” came a greater independence for the church’s authority over against the state than found in Luther, since the state could not impose demands for elements of the life of the church not already commanded by scripture (Tuininga, Calvin’s Political Theology, 2017). This was further refined by Presbyterian jus divinum theologians like George Gillespie to require that authority over all “internal actions” controlling sacraments, teaching, and discipline belong solely to the church and not to the state (Gillespie, Aaron’s Rod of Blossoming, 1646). 

In the third snapshot, I turn to Virginia in the late eighteenth century in which Presbyterians from Hanover worked alongside Baptists to petition for the disestablishment of the church during a rise of ecclesial activity that would eventually merge with the Second Great Awakening (Henry Foote, Sketches of Virginia, 1856; Ernest Trice Thomspon, Presbyterians of the South, 1963; David VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 2009). An interpretation of Christian freedom would crystalize in the wake of this activity that would call for freedom from undue demands of the state on the church that could be made via financial and legal backing for any or all Christian confessions. By separating herself from these ties, the church was freed to share the gospel without needing to be beholden to the wishes of the state. Likewise, individual Christians were freed to be socially engaged in accord with their “freedom of conscience” in light of their Christian convictions not determined by the state. This understanding of Christian freedom further deepened the independence of the church from the state and granted greater latitude for individual Christians to morally question the latter. It, however, also had the effect of relegating topics beyond what scripture addressed and left to the freedom for individual Christians to decide for themselves.

The insufficiency of the third definition of freedom comes to the fore in the fourth snapshot—also found in Virginia in the early nineteenth century—the trial of George Bourne. Bourne had defended an abolitionist position and had advocated that the PCUSA act accordingly. He was brought before synod, defrocked, and lost out to figures like John Holt Rice, who saw questions of slavery belonging to the state rather than the church—and best left to individuals to consider for themselves, even if he would have morally preferred the end of the institution (George Bourne, The Book and Slavery Irreconcilable, 1816 & other texts; Henry Foote, Sketches of Virginia, 1856; Ryan McIlhenny, To Preach Deliverance, 2020). Bourne’s legacy would prove seminal for William Lloyd Garrison who did a lot to coordinate with nineteenth century abolitionist voices across the United States, including African American presbyterian James W.C. Pennington who would narrate his own story of escaping slavery to freedom (Pennington, The Fugitive Blacksmith, 1849). For Bourne and Pennington, the “freedom of the Christian” entailed freedom from bondage and freedom to love of neighbor in meeting and advocating for their rights. The critical spirit towards the state found in the third definition of freedom was given proper depth.

By offering this history, I aim to offer clarity on the term “freedom” which has often been deployed as a rallying cry that equivocates across its various historical meanings—invoking meanings found in one century on behalf of those of another. Furthermore, I suggest that each of these meanings of the “freedom of a Christian” can be held collectively together—each correcting blind spots found elsewhere. One can be freed from the burden of sin before the law (Luther), free from false traditions (Calvin), free from undue claims of the state on one’s religious faith (Virginia), for the sake of loving and advocating for one’s neighbor (Bourne, Pennington).