Thomas Berry famously proclaimed the universe to be “a communion of subjects rather than a collection of objects” (Swimme and Berry, 1994, 243). And yet a robust case for pan-animal communion—in the sense of a community of unique individuals pursuing, in freedom, an emancipatory love for self and other—has yet to be made. Certainly, Dillard-Wright’s argument that a capacity for animacy implies at least some degree of existential freedom provides secular ethics with one promising point of departure (2009). And yet the exceptionally developed ethical systems articulated by Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) and Willett (2014) struggle to preserve that freedom. Consequently, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s treatment of the wild animal, as well as Willett’s system broadly considered, revert to the merely transactional (and so more-or-less coerced) relation. This problem lies in a failure to specify some metaphysical context in which animals’ progression toward authentic communion might make sense. While I will assume communion’s natural basis in the animal as a Husserlian and interactive subject, I will locate such a context in the theological voluntarism of turn-of-the-14th century Franciscan John Duns Scotus.
In contrast to Aquinas’s elevation, a few decades prior, of the faculty of intellect, Scotus accords primacy to the agent’s capacity for uncoerced moral choice, or “will.” Indeed, he constructs an entire “order of freedom” on the basis of the inexhaustible emancipatory love which circulates among the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (Ingham 2017). As such a sharing of love, termed “subsistence,” God’s being is both the root and measure of goodness itself (Ingham 2012). And because this collective act of gerundive love-ing organizes God’s self from within, God is free (Duns Scotus et al. 1997). Correspondingly, the wholeness of any creature is proportionate to its potential for the sort of self-possession which would enable it to both give of itself and to receive another as gift.
Indeed, God’s communication of divine goodness pivots on this sort of creative freedom. God as Creator loves each creature into being for its own sake and accords it a potential for God’s own ontological independence (Ingham 2017). Scotus understands this potential, referred to as an individuating haecceity (“thisness”) which resides in the creature’s haec, to be its truest essence (Duns Scotus and Spade ed. 1994). The precise nature and content of each creature’s haecceity surpasses the understanding or intervention of anyone save God. By virtue of its haecceity, the creature holds the potential to respond to God’s invitation to enact its own progressively fuller subsistence. God then supports—through the “inside-out” movement of grace—the realization of that potential (Ingham 2017).
God’s choice to found the creature on a fundamental independence secures its freedom from the transactional relations which characterize the temporal sphere. While that sphere is defined by creatures' vulnerability to external force, the faculty of will is, sui generis, defined by its power for determinative choice (Duns Scotus et al. 1998). It operates by balancing its tendency to love those goods which appear self-beneficial with those which—because they appear to be good in an objective sense—are also “just.” While these two tendencies are best understood to complement rather than oppose each other, a given self realizes its freedom to the degree that its desire for what is objectively good succeeds in governing its desire for that which is merely good-for-me (Duns Scotus et al. 1997). The fullest such freedom honors the Triune God as that good which, because it encompasses the whole of being, is “highest” (Ingham 2017)
Accordingly, moral action aims toward a self-gifting which fosters mutuality and commitment. In this way, the Scotist self realizes itself via a centrifugal movement outward. Indeed, this self pursues friendship understood as a lateral relation which anticipates and cultivates the other’s own agency (Duns Scotus and Spade ed. 1994). Whenever possible, the Scotist self intends its extension of friendship to engage the other at the ultimate—the deepest, if you will—level of the haec (Ingham 2017).
When synthesized with a contemporary understanding of animals as Husselian subjects, a Scotist order of freedom suggests that each animal—regardless of its relative capacity to achieve a rational equilibrium between the good-for-me and the good-in-itself—holds the possibility of electing a friendship relation that is itself more- or less-full. Correspondingly, subjective interactivity, as pan-animal in scope, holds the potential to attain to the sort of communion that would mirror God’s own subsistent character.
In sum, when applied to subjectivist conceptions of animal being, a Scotist metaphysics understands the singular animal to be capable of at least a minimal degree of self-organization, and to be able, on the basis of that independence, to transcend the transactional character of the temporal milieu. This synthesis generates many implications which appear plausible. For one, it understands the human’s relatively greater capacity to recognize the good-in-itself as entailing a proportionately greater responsibility to extend friendship to its fellow creatures. Nevertheless, this synthesis would also acknowledge some animals’ capacity to demonstrate a proto-justice that might include recognition of another’s value-essence or an asymmetrical care for the other’s good. Perhaps most importantly, Scotus’s choice to understand ontological capacity not in terms of an animal’s “intellect,” but rather in terms of its relative responsibility to practice God’s own mode of being, honors the diverse capabilities which pertain among animal species and individuals. Indeed, this synthesis would support Donaldson and Kymlicka’s argument for many animals’ capacity for a greater social responsibility—including their potential to participate, with human assistance, in democratic governance. As is true within human society, such a pan-animal democracy would aim to foster the conditions underneath members’ rational freedom so as to promote individual flourishing within a context of universal fulfillment.
Although Thomas Berry proclaimed the universe to be “a communion of subjects rather than a collection of objects,” a robust case for pan-animal communion has yet to be made. While we can recognize a natural basis for communion in animals’ subjective interactivity, a merely transactional logic governs the temporal milieu. We can incorporate the existential freedom which underlies communion, however, by reference to the medieval theological voluntarism of John Duns Scotus. Scotus’s Triune God is a self-organizing—and so free—circulation of love. Correspondingly, God founds each creature on its own existential freedom. In this way, God accords it the possibility of gifting its own self in a friendship relation which cultivates some other’s own agency. In light of Scotus, then, a pan-animal subjective interactivity does indeed hold the potential to progress toward communion: A community of unique individuals pursuing, in freedom, an emancipatory love for self and other.