Neuroscience provides insights into how the brain operates, but also challenges our traditional understanding of human freedom and agency. Free will, the belief that we can make genuinely autonomous choices, has long been foundational in Western philosophy and Christian theology. Yet, recent advances in neuroscience suggest that free will could be an illusion, or at least underlying unconscious processes precede our conscious feeling of freely choosing.
Benjamin Libet’s 1983 research demonstrated that the brain initiates the will to move and consciously makes voluntary movements long before we are even consciously aware of that will. The research identified a specific electrical change in the brain known as the ‘readiness potential’ that fires before a freely voluntary act, while human subjects become aware of the intention to act after RP starts. What we experience as a conscious decision might actually be the endpoint of an unconscious neural process, rather than its starting point.
Subsequent studies reinforced Libet’s findings. Soon et al., using fMRI, show that neural activities in the frontopolar and parietal cortex predict a motor decision available in 7-10 seconds with approximately 60% accuracy before the decision is consciously made. Similarly, Itzhak Fried et al. implanted microelectrodes in the medial frontal lobe and medial temporal lobe regions of epilepsy patients to examine the underlying neuronal mechanisms of self-initiated movement. Their results indicate that volitional processes are not triggered instantaneously at the point of conscious awareness. Instead, there is a preconsciousness neuronal build-up period within milliseconds or even seconds before the urge is reported. Furthermore, a particular combination of a few hundred neuronal activities can predict a decision about 700 milliseconds before the subject consciously feels that they have made a decision with more than 80% accuracy.
These empirical findings suggest that free will may be an illusion. If neural processes are already undergoing before we are consciously aware, our choice is a less important factor to causally influence the decision. If this is correct, what extent of freedom is left for us?
According to philosopher Hillary Bok, if all our actions are fully determined by prior physical events, in principle, a sufficiently powerful observer with access to all the underlying data could predict everything we will do (external prediction possibility). While an external entity might be able to predict your behavior, you as the free agent, however, cannot predict your own actions in the same way. From your own practical point of view, your actions remain uncertain until you deliberate and decide, even in a world in which everything is determined (internal indeterminacy).
To illustrate this point, Bok suggests the pocket oracle thought experiment. Suppose a device that perfectly predicts everything about you. However, as long as this pocket oracle’s predictions remain hidden, it does not affect your decision-making process; you continue to deliberately choose without any foreknowledge of your future actions. Although our everyday choices are influenced by unconscious processes, there remains an inner reflective capacity that does not always comply with unconscious, deterministic operations.
Even if you had access to this device, it would not rule out our free choice. You might feel compelled either to conform to the prediction, or to deliberately choose against it. Either way, the fact that the pocket oracle’s prediction alters your decision invalidates the prediction itself. Even if we accept a deterministic interpretation posed by neuroscience, it does not necessarily constrain one’s internal, lived experience of deliberation and freedom.
Libet further argues that we still have the capacity to choose within a “veto” period. This temporal gap between the neuronal process and conscious awareness leaves room for free will; even if our decisions initiate with unconscious neuronal processes, we still execute reflective intervention to alter the final decision.
This reflective capacity, or metacognition, is crucial for preserving our freedom. Unlike a hypothetical pocket oracle, we are aware of and actively rely on our reflective capacity before making final decisions. Metacognition does not reveal our future choices but enables us to deliberate, evaluate, and override unconscious neural processes.
Christian perspective can further expand Bok and Libet’s argument by highlighting that our self-reflective capacity is a divine gift necessary for securing freedom and authentic agency. Along with humans as rational and moral entity, imago Dei also includes our capacity for self-reflection. Augustine, in his seminal work On Free Choice of the Will, addresses how God’s foreknowledge and human freedom co-exist. While God’s omniscience encompasses all events, human free will remains because of our internal deliberate self-reflection and moral judgment, due to our reason. Furthermore, the self-examination or reflective capacity enables us to recognize our shortcomings and seek God’s grace while aligning our decisions with God’s will.
Thomas Aquinas extends the idea that self-reflection is the core of achieving freedom. Summa Theologica explains that human free will is a part of God’s plan that allows humans to pursue the good. Human will, which is guided by reason and capable of deliberate choice, is the capacity to choose between possible options. Despite human nature's vulnerability to being influenced by external and internal causes, our rational capacities as a divine gift guide us towards higher good and moral actions according to God’s plan.
In conclusion, while contemporary neuroscience highlights that our decisions begin in unconscious neural processes, a “veto” period, thanks to our internal indeterminacy, still provides room for conscious deliberation toward our free choice. Theological reflections can further highlight the importance of self-reflective capacity is a divine gift, which allows freedom and agency. These interdisciplinary insights open practical avenues for future technologies. Invasive procedures like brain-machine interfaces, for instance, should be designed to respect personal autonomy and responsibility, ensuring that any neural intervention respects the individual’s capacity for reflective choice. Similarly, pastoral care can incorporate an awareness of preconscious influences on behavior, offering support to the individual's neurological and spiritual dimensions. In this interplay between unconscious neural initiation and conscious choice, reflective intervention enables us to remain free and responsible moral agents, resonating with the Christian understanding of humanity created in God’s image.
This project examines how neuroscience challenges traditional notions of free will and human agency. Several research, beginning with Libet’s 1983 study and subsequent experiments, demonstrate that unconscious neural processes initiate actions that precede our conscious decisions; what we perceive as conscious choice may be an endpoint of a complex preconscious build-up process. Philosopher Hillary Bok offers a compelling counterargument: although external prediction is determined, our internal deliberative processes remain uncertain until we actively choose. Bok’s argument resonates with Libet’s “veto” moment – a temporal gap in which individuals can consciously self-reflect to override a preconscious process. Christian perspective enriches this debate by highlighting self-reflection as a divine gift essential to authentic freedom, as presented by Augustine and Aquinas. These interdisciplinary insights can extend to practical applications, such as designing brain-machine interfaces that protect user autonomy and pastoral care to address unconscious and conscious dimensions of decision-making.