Is Religious Experience Epistemologically Reliable? An Embodied Cognitive Approach

Is religious experience epistemologically reliable? The gap between Perennialism and Constructivism on this question remains unresolved.

1. Perennialism posits that religious experiences across various traditions reveal a shared underlying reality. Robert K. C. Forman argues that these experiences share a common trait where consciousness is “wakeful though contentless,” a state he terms Pure Consciousness Event (PCE). In this experience, the boundary between subject and object dissolves, leading to a non-intentional, immersive state of awareness. Forman suggests that PCEs are non-sensory and introvertive, indicating a form of consciousness detached from conceptual thought or external stimuli. Mark B. Woodhouse supports this view by claiming that PCEs reveal the nature of an ultimate reality characterized as “timeless, spaceless, and unthinkable.”

Building on this, Richard Swinburne introduces the Principle of Credulity, arguing that religious experiences should be regarded as trustworthy sources of knowledge about God unless proven otherwise. Swinburne likens religious experiences to perceptual experiences, suggesting that just as sensory perception provides knowledge about the physical world, religious experiences offer insights into transcendent realities. He categorizes religious experiences into public and private perceptions, with private experiences further divided into sensory-based visions or dreams, non-sensory encounters with the divine, and experiences of nothingness or darkness as reported in mystical traditions.

Among these categories, Swinburne and other scholars such as Forman and William P. Alston focus on non-sensory, introvertive experiences as the most epistemologically reliable. Alston, for instance, characterizes religious experiences as Direct Perceptions of God, where individuals intuitively perceive divine attributes like goodness and power. He maintains that these experiences, while non-sensory, provide a direct, intuitive understanding of the divine. Alston argues that religious experiences should be granted prima facie justification, meaning they are considered reliable unless contradicted by evidence, much like ordinary sensory perceptions.

However, Perennialism faces significant criticisms. One key objection is the diversity of religious experiences across traditions. If religious experiences indeed reveal the same ultimate reality, why do interpretations vary so widely among different cultures and religions? Perennialists respond by distinguishing between the ineffable experience itself and its cultural interpretation, arguing that while the core experience is universal, the descriptions are shaped by cultural contexts. Yet, this explanation is seen by some as insufficient to account for the deep doctrinal and experiential differences between religious traditions.

Another major criticism comes from naturalistic explanations, which argue that religious experiences can be fully explained through psychological, sociological, or neurological processes, thus eliminating the need to posit a transcendent reality. Additionally, Perennialism is criticized for its epistemological inconsistency. Proponents equate religious experiences with sensory perceptions to defend their reliability but then claim they are fundamentally different to shield them from empirical scrutiny, leading to accusations of epistemic inconsistency.

A particularly pointed critique is aimed at Forman’s concept of PCE, which describes the experience as contentless and non-intentional. Critics, including Matthew C. Bagger, question how such an experience can be remembered or interpreted if it truly lacks all content. Others argue that if PCEs are entirely contentless, they are indistinguishable from states of dreamless sleep, thus undermining their epistemological significance.

2. In contrast to Perennialism, Constructivism asserts that all experiences, including religious ones, are mediated by the subject’s prior beliefs, language, and cultural background. Steven T. Katz famously argued that no experience is truly “pure” or “unmediated,” as all experiences are processed through complex epistemological frameworks. According to Katz, religious experiences are constructed based on the individual’s social, cultural, and religious contexts. He supports this by pointing out the absence of certain mystical experiences, such as self-annihilation, in Jewish mystical traditions, arguing that such experiences are shaped by theological and cultural influences.

Matthew C. Bagger extends this argument by emphasizing that experiences are actively constructed through the subject’s cognitive processes, influenced by their past experiences and cultural schemas. He claims that perception and cognition are inseparable, and experiences are interpreted through the individual’s conceptual frameworks. Consequently, Constructivism challenges the notion that religious experiences provide direct, unmediated access to transcendent realities.

Despite its compelling argument, Constructivism also faces criticisms. One major issue is its potential slide into epistemological solipsism. If all experiences are constructed by the subject’s mental frameworks, it becomes difficult to account for shared experiences or the perception of external reality. Constructivism also risks reductionism by interpreting religious experiences solely as psychological or sociocultural constructs, potentially overlooking the transformative, existential impact that practitioners report. Additionally, by focusing solely on epistemological mediation, Constructivism may neglect the phenomenological immediacy or the direct, affective impact of religious experiences.

3. To bridge the gap between Perennialism and Constructivism, Carlos Miguel Rincon proposes an alternative approach, that is, embodied cognitive approach that draws from Heidegger’s concept of understanding and William James’s pragmatism. He suggests that religious experiences should be understood not as cognitive events revealing metaphysical truths but as lived experiences that provide practical guidance and transformative power. Rincon argues that religious experiences inspire courage, purpose, and meaning, acting as existential responses to life’s challenges.

Rincon’s embodied cognitive approach emphasizes the transformative and existential dimensions of religious experiences, framing them as sources of resilience and transcendence rather than as epistemological claims about ultimate reality. This perspective shifts the focus from metaphysical knowledge to existential impact, offering a middle ground that acknowledges the culturally mediated nature of experiences while preserving their spiritual and transformative significance.

This balanced approach suggests that religious experiences can be reliable as existential truths without requiring them to provide objective knowledge about metaphysical realities. It respects the subjective, affective power of religious experiences while situating them within cultural and historical contexts, thus opening new avenues for dialogue between Perennialism and Constructivism.