The famed Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna appears to talk in contradictions, denying both that some P is the case and that it is not the case. Both ancient and contemporary interpretations fall in two camps: (1) let the contradiction stand dialethically or (2) qualify Nāgārjuna's negata to escape a contradiction. I offer a third interpretation, drawing on parallels to Brouwer's (1881-1966) intuitionism. To put it succinctly: no qualification is needed, but because Nāgārjuna is in the business of denying without assertion, he also escapes contradiction.
To build my case of interpreting Nāgārjuna in this vain, I focus on his Vigrahavyāvartanī, namely verses 28-29 and their commentary. I give a philosophical defense of my interpretation following Arend Heyting's (1898-1980) intuitionistic logic, which allows for the weak denial of both P and ~P without contradiction. I argue that both Nāgārjuna and the intuitionist advance cases where neither P nor ~P is provable.