This panel explores sciences and practices of attention as they developed over pre- and early modern Europe, spanning late Medieval, Rationalist, Enlightenment, and Romantic sources. It considers attention’s changing role in religious experience, science’s empirical observation of observation, and the way philosophers of religion adopted and adapted these modes of attending. Consulting the early science and psychology of attention, philosophers of religion negotiated this equivocal faculty, determining its proper use, quality, and objects for religious experience. How did they incorporate religious modes of attending in their own contemplative practices? To what extent were they willing to risk forms of idolatrous fixation? And what aesthetic reveries did they come to promote? The panel includes papers on a Franciscan friar’s poetry of attention, the status of wonder in Descartes and Spinoza, Kant’s attempts to mitigate pathologies of attention, and Schleiermacher’s aesthetics of cosmic absorption.
This paper examines an Epiphanic theory of attentio from late medieval England, exemplified in a sermon of fourteenth-century Franciscan friar-poet William Herebert. Because, Herebert suggests, 1) attentio enables one to serve God, and 2) “no one can come to the Father except through [Jesus],” 3) attentio is a contemplative mediator, immanently Christological. Herebert tracks the verbal logic of his thema to the virtues Augustine ascribes to good teachers—attention, good will, and docility: to come is a sign of docility, to adore is a sign of good will, to see is a sign of attentio. This makes attentio a sign of the Epiphanic object, just as the Epiphanic object is a sign of the incarnate Word. Collapsing the middle terms, Herebert finds that attentio is a sign of Christ. Eucharistically, attending to the sign transforms it into the signified. I apply this theory of attention to Herebert’s extant devotional lyrics.
This paper examines the status of wonder (admiratio) in the seventeenth-century psychological writings of René Descartes and Benedictus de Spinoza. Wonder was an affective state that could be newly explained by a scientific psychology on the model of medicine and physics, but it also had an epistemological function, explaining how it is that our attention focuses on this rather than that, and an ethical function, guiding a person to right attention. Descartes treats wonder as the first of all passions, a precondition for all other feeling, but Spinoza declines to count it as an affect at all, not even as the last. This paper reads their divergence on wonder as evidence of their differing views on causal explanation and respective departures from scholastic epistemology. It illustrates one way in which theological and ethical arguments on causation, will, and self-development were involved in early modern attempts to ground natural science.
Immanuel Kant diagnoses both himself and Emanuel Swedenborg with diseases of attention. Kant’s hypochondria led him to attend to his body’s obscure affective forces for signs of lifeforce and longevity, while Swedenborg’s enthusiasm involved attending to his visions as souls or signs of the afterlife. This paper examines Kant’s epistemological account of attention, important, I argue, for his philosophy of religion. I consult Kant’s medical sources on attentional pathologies, which illuminate the role of affective and attentive experience in Kant’s critical philosophy, aligning his thought with earlier diagnoses and therapies of idolatrous fixation. By foregrounding the medicine of attention, this paper also draws connections to earlier scholastic and mystical sources, challenging the common assumption that Kant’s critique of enthusiasm marks an irrevocable break from these traditions. At least on the question of attention, Kant struggled to “look away.”
This paper situates Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 1799 speeches On Religion within the aesthetic framework of Romantic universal poetry. While Schleiermacher’s definition of religion as “intuition and feeling” of the universe has typically been read as a critique of Fichtean intellectual intuition, these affects also play an important role in late Enlightenment and early Romantic art criticism, where they become associated with problems of attention and imagination. In On Religion, Schleiermacher transforms two key problems of attention that emerge at this time: 1) a Pygmalion-like attentive overinvestment, which seeks to animate, even copulate with the work of art, and 2) the Romantic problem of a distracted, excessive imagination that ignores the artwork. For Schleiermacher, both excessive attention and distraction – paired together – become positive means of ascent toward an experience of religious-erotic cosmic absorption that has no specific object because it participates in the universe’s endlessly proliferative process of self-representation.