Are Cognitive objects Pure or Impure? A Dispute from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra

Buddhism is most famous for its assertion regarding the abandonment of this world and the quest for liberation, where eternal peace is attained. While there were disputes regarding the portrayal of the mental state in nirvana in early Buddhism, it seems accurate that perception of any specific objects would induce agitation, thereby disrupting peace of mind. For instance, in the Abhidharma framework of meditation (dhyāna), one does not cognize any specific object after advancing to the higher four levels of meditation within the formless realm (ārūpya-dhātu).

On the other hand, it also appears to be true that the perception of cognitive objects plays a crucial role in guiding one towards liberation. According to Buddhist tradition, liberation from this world begins with the observation that cognitive objects arise and cease in dependence upon causes and conditions. The Abhidharma concept of conducting dharma analysis undoubtedly relies on the perception of cognitive objects, both external and internal. Similarly, chapters in the renowned Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna commence with titles such as “observing” (parīkṣā), indicating observation or investigation of our conventional understanding of the relationship among cognitive objects. Without cognitive objects, such observation would be impossible.

To this extent, cognitive objects serve as a double-edged sword: on one hand, they prompt cognitive and emotional attachments that hinder sentient beings from attaining liberation; on the other hand, they are essential for guiding one towards the liberating knowledge that alone serves as the key to liberation.

Was the Buddhist tradition aware of this tension, and if so, how does it address it? In this paper, I propose that this tension is evident in a dispute regarding whether the dependent nature constitutes “cognitive objects towards purification” (qingjing suoyuan 清淨所緣; rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhy-ālambana). To elucidate, cognitive objects, encompassing both external and internal phenomena, are considered part of the dependent nature. This is rooted in the Yogācāra theory of three natures (trisvabhāva-nirdeśa), which posits that cognitive objects arise and cease as mental representations (vijñapti) depending on karmic seeds in the storehouse consciousness. Specifically, I will examine two variant recensions of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (SNS). According to one recension (found in both Tibetan and Chinese translations), the dependent nature constitutes “cognitive objects towards purification,” whereas according to another (also found in both Tibetan and Chinese translations), the dependent nature is inherently defiled and thus does not constitute “cognitive objects towards purification.”

Next, I will argue that the idea that the dependent nature constitutes “cognitive objects towards purification” aligns well with the overall theme of the SNS. According to the SNS, the reason why we perceive an object that we commonly label as “a cup” is due to the presence of a karmic seed associated with the concept of “cup” in the storehouse consciousness. This process forms a cyclic pattern: a mental image resembling a cup emerges from the “cup” seed in the storehouse consciousness. When one perceives this object, there is a habitual tendency to project the label “cup” onto the mental image. This act of projection then reinforces the “cup” seed within the storehouse consciousness, thus perpetuating the cycle by giving rise to future mental images resembling cups.

Given this cyclic pattern, finding a way out presents a significant challenge. The crux of this challenge lies in the fact that cognitive objects (dependent nature) can be subject to false conceptualizations, yet they can also be detached from such misconceptions. When cognitive objects are overlaid with conceptualizations, they do not serve as “cognitive objects towards purification”; however, when they are devoid of such conceptual overlays, they do serve this purpose. This is because perceiving cognitive objects without conceptualization entails a non-conceptual mode of perception, which in turn fosters the realization that there is no inherent correspondence between objects and concepts. This realization, in turn, leads to the dissolution of our conventional belief in the existence of inherently real entities and a constant self.

Furthermore, when we perceive cognitive objects as “cognitive objects towards purification,” we refrain from imposing conceptual labels onto those objects. Consequently, our perception ceases to reinforce the permeation (vāsanā) of karmic seeds associated with concepts back into the storehouse consciousness. Ultimately, the cognitive objects that we habitually identify as “a cup” or any other conceptually labeled object cease to arise because the karmic impetus behind their manifestation, rooted in the concept of “cup” or similar concepts, becomes depleted. As cognitive objects categorized under various conceptual frameworks cease to manifest, eventually, no cognitive objects arise within my consciousness at all. This state aligns with the concept of liberation as articulated in the SNS.

In this manner, the SNS offers a resolution to the aforementioned tension. On one hand, it acknowledges that ultimately, all cognitive objects must cease to exist upon attainment of liberation. On the other hand, it illustrates how an examination of cognitive objects can result in the prevention of their continued emergence. Only through non-conceptual perception of objects can further seeds of names and concepts be avoided in the storehouse consciousness. In essence, a proper mode of perceiving cognitive objects paves the way for their elimination.

It is evident from the preceding discussion that the theory presented in the SNS relies heavily on a robust form of ontological idealism, positing that all cognitive objects are essentially manifestations originating from the storehouse consciousness. However, it remains to be investigated how the Abhidharma tradition addresses the tension between the instrumental necessity and the eventual eradication of cognitive objects within a realist ontology.