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In this paper, I examine challenges to the Buddha's purported omniscience using the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika framework. I focus on their accepted pramāṇas: perception and inference. I further argue that the Buddha’s omniscience can be understood phenomenologically, rather than epistemically. This will be done in several parts, which I have summarized below. Part I
Examining omniscience's feasibility requires understanding historical applications of "omniscience" (sarvajña) in Indian philosophy. Its presence in Vedas and Upaniṣads underscores claims within Indian philosophy and religion. Buddhists addressed potential issues with omniscience's scope, avoiding overreach or restriction. Buddha's omniscience seemed to be a response to Jainism's Mahāvīra, who also claimed omniscience. This positioned Buddhism's enlightenment path as equivalent or superior to other paths. Omitting omniscience would undermine Buddha's enlightenment claim and Buddhism's credibility.
Abhidharma outlines three omniscience types: (1) knowing all simultaneously; (2) knowing only the dharma; and (3) directed awareness knowledge. Mahāvīra's kevala-jñāna exemplifies type 1. Type 2 accommodates Buddhism's no-self doctrine, understanding all enlightenment-related truths. Type 3, proposed by Vasubandhu, involves knowledge of whatever one’s awareness is directed toward.
Part II
Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya delves into two ignorances: 1) kliṣṭasammoha (defiled ignorance) tied to noble truths, and 2) akliṣṭājñāna (undefiled ignorance) about worldly matters. Pratyekabuddhas and arhats conquer the former. Only pratyekabuddhas achieve the latter, attaining omniscience. Vasubandhu alludes to "cultivating its counterpart" for Buddha's insight, leaving it undefined. Yaśomitra suggests "anāsravaṃ jñānam" (knowledge without corruption) as a possibility.
Vasubandhu underscores three knowledge gaps between Buddha and śravakas: 1) eighteen special dharmas, 2) diverse aggregates in distant space, and 3) temporally remote matters. Certain examples highlight these disparities: Śāriputra's unawareness of Buddha's special dharmas, Elder Maudagalyāyana's ignorance of distant rebirth, and Śāriputra's inability to discern a distant wholesome act. Vasubandhu further asserts that the only two valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). Since omniscience is a state of knowledge, then the only way the Buddha could achieve omniscience is through these means. Thus, we should explore whether the Buddha’s omniscience is consistent with these pramāṇas.. Part III
In this section I summarize the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perception model, focusing on direct perception and the quasi-eternalism of dharmas. They posit dharmas existing in past, present, and future, only having causal efficacy in the present.
Vasubandhu provides three reasons: First, past and future matter for decisions and aspirations. Second, cognition requires existing objects; denying this yields absurdities. Third, karma needs the past for present effects.
Saṅghabhadra adds that only present dharmas are causally efficacious, past/future dharmas are causally capable. This underlies the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perception theory. They propose
immediate sensory perception without bridging representations. When relating this theory of perception to omniscience, tensions arise. Sarvāstivādins claim present causal efficacy, yet their perception theory supports past/future perception. This contradiction prompts exploration.
Part IV
If the Buddha used his senses and directed his omniscient awareness to past/future dharmas, since they lack causal efficacy, his direct perception would be hindered. Even if the Buddha used his mind, as Sarvāstivādins say, such dharmas possess only causal efficacy in their times, leading to no perception. If my argument holds that perceiving past/future entails indirect perception, Buddha wouldn't truly "directly" perceive these events. Sarvāstivādins' theory of perception seems to lack support for the Buddha's omniscience. They might argue Buddha's perception doesn't grasp past/future dharmas directly. Instead, it comprehends present dharmas and their causal interrelations, allowing inferential knowledge about the future. However, inferential knowledge involves doubt due to its lack of direct experience. Even with direct perception, inference can't ensure omniscience due to its doubt-inducing nature. The Sarvāstivādins might argue Buddha, free from ignorance, can perform perfect inferences without doubt. Nevertheless, this doesn't amount to direct perception and contradicts the claim of Buddha's direct perception of all things. Vasubandhu counters that the Buddha's omniscience isn't from inference but his lack of akliṣṭājñāna and profound insight. However, this still doesn't constitute direct perception of future events. Vasubandhu asserts the Buddha's immediate and volitional knowledge transcends inference or divination, akin to having access to all knowledge beyond ordinary human understanding.
Part V
I argue that the Buddha’s omniscience can be understood through a phenomenological shift, i.e. his experience of the world fundamentally changes. Due to his phenomenological difference from ordinary persons, omniscience may not be best understood through epistemic and intellectual analysis.
Abstract for Online Program Book (maximum 150 words)
This paper argues that the Buddha’s purported omniscience through direct perception is a phenomenological shift in his experience, which is difficult to account for based on the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika conception of omniscience (sarvajña), and two of their accepted means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception and inference.
First, the paper discusses the scope of the Buddha’s omniscience in Abhidharma Buddhism. Second, it discusses the path toward omniscience according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika school. Third, it briefly summarizes the Sarvāstivādin theory of perception, showing that the Buddha cannot be omniscient through perception under the Sarvāstivāda model due to their metaphysical commitments. Following this, the paper considers whether the Buddha can be omniscient through inference and show that inference does not rescue the Sarvāstivādin view of omniscience by appealing to both Vasubandhu and Dhammapāla. Last, it posits that the Buddha’s omniscience is a phenomenological shift in his experience due to prajñā and not fully comprehensible through pramāṇa theory.