Subjectivity from Abhidharma to Yogācāra

One of the most common and fundamental themes in Buddhist intellectual discourses is the denial of self (anātman). The Sanskrit word ātman is mostly translated as self or soul and is best understood in the Indian philosophical discourse as referring to an entity that persists across space and time and unifies all constituents of an individual's existence synchronically and diachronically. All the physical and psychological experiences, according to the orthodox Indian thinkers, belong to me, a self that holds together all components of this particular individual at this particular moment. Without the self, all the components would just be scattered around, like unassembled parts of a car that cannot function properly or does not function at all.

The Buddhists, however, deny any realist account of self. Instead, they are reductionist. That is, according to the Buddhists, when we examine or try to find ourselves introspectively, we find nothing but constituents of our existence which can be divided exhaustively into five categories: materiality (rūpa), sensation (vedanā), ideation (saṁjñā), volition (saṁskāra), and cognition (vijñāna), known together as the five aggregates (pañcaskandha). Our bodies and all non-mental parts comprise the aggregate of materiality, our pleasant/unpleasant feeling the aggregate of sensation, mental images of objects registered through perception the aggregate of ideation, our intention or any mental function that is neither sensation nor ideation the aggregate of volition (or volitional formation), and finally the cognitive and discriminating function the aggregate of cognition. These aggregates come together through complex causal processes, interdepending on one another through being a condition for and through being conditioned by one another. The "self," therefore, is but a conceptual fabrication that try to capture this constantly changing, evolving flux of causal stream. What there really is, the Buddhists argue, is just a person, an individual that we conventionally agree to be called by a certain name and that carries him-/herself in a certain manner in this world and never beyond.

The model of the five aggregates, which, despite some differences, is universally accepted by the Buddhists as the basis of individual existence. However, it does not explain the first-personal perspective. That is, even if we reject the realist account of self, it still seems impossible to deny the sense of self, the what-it-is-like to be one's self, that our experience is experienced in a way unique to just each one of us. I went hiking last month, and so did many others in the same mountain. The sentence "I went hiking last month" remains true when said by others who were there at that time. But the content of that statement changes from one individual to another, for each individual experienced the hike from his or her own, not anybody else's, perspective. We see, we think, we dream, we remember, we fear, we rejoice, etc., from our own, and not anybody else's, perspective. This first-personal perspective so deeply innate to our mental lives does not seem to be reducible to philosophical introspections. Garfield (2022) affirms that the sense of self is there with or without (pre- and/or post-) philosophical reflections and that "the philosophical conceptions of the self arise from, rather than give rise to, the sense of self." Citing Tsongkhapa and Śāntideva on the conviction of personalistic identity, He then espouses the idea that the origin of the sense of self "is grounded not in reason or perception, but in affect." (Garfield 2022)

Garfield's speculation is supported by the Yogācāra introduction of the afflicted mentation, a mental functionality that is neither conceptual nor perceptual. The afflicted mentation does not pertain to senses, like the visual cognition and so on, nor does it invoke conceptuality which is the core function of the conceptualizing cognition. It lies beneath all of them. It is just a pure, deep, and constant rumination, a mental activity that lurks behind all others. As a cognition proper, every moment when the afflicted mentation occurs, it occurs with an object. This object of the afflicted mentation is always the ālayavijñāna, the entirety of karmic data that contributes to and in return is imprinted by an individual existence. By grasping this beginningless, constantly arising and ceasing stream of karma, the afflicted mentation mistakenly gives rise to the thought "This is I" and "This is mine," that is, the erroneous view of a self (satkāyadṛṣṭi). This view of self, according to the Yogācāra tradition, further gives rise to the identification as self (asmimāna) and the fondness for self (ātmasneha). These mental factors (caitasika), mental functions or modes associated with cognitions, denote aspects of what-it-is-like to be one's self and form the essential purpose of the afflicted mentation, that is, to explain subjectivity without a subject. However, since the afflicted mentation lies beneath perceptual and conceptual experiences, it is subliminal, given to us immediately in our existence.

This paper investigates the transition from the Abhidharmic reductionist account of self to the Yogācāra theory of the afflicted mentation. It focuses on the continuation of the two models and the modifications on the former from the Yogācāra tradition. This investigation not only delineates how subjectivity is thought of and dealt with in the Indian Buddhist world, but also clarifies the intellectual milieu in which the Yogācāra emerged as a distinct system of thought.