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Toward a Double-layer Model for the Buddha’s Mind

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How does the Buddha's mind work? Does the Buddha even possess a mind? If the Buddha does not have a mind, then how is he supposed to possess omniscience and save sentient beings? However, if he does have a mind, then why wouldn't he be burdened by conceptual and emotional attachments, just like us? To address these questions, this paper begins by clarifying that there are actually two distinct inquiries that are often conflated. Firstly, does the Buddha perceive any objects within his mind? Secondly, does the Buddha engage in any deliberation regarding how to interact with the sentient beings he is supposed to liberate from saṃsāra? Often, these two issues are conflated because it's assumed that one implies the other. To illustrate, in arguing that the Buddha teaches sentient beings spontaneously, Mark Siderits insists that the Buddha possesses no mind whatsoever, rejecting the possibility that the Buddha can have any cognitive objects.

This paper argues that the former issue does not necessarily imply the latter according to the Yogācāra tradition. Namely, the Buddha cognizes objects but does not engage in deliberations. Concerning the first question, the answer provided by the Yogācāra tradition underwent a transformation. In earlier Yogācāra thought, for instance, the Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV) states that when there is no attainment of objects, there is no attainment of the subject. (MAV I.6) This suggests that the total function of the mind must be eradicated. In terms of the three natures, the MAV's position would imply that the perfected nature at liberation involves the complete elimination of both the imagined and the dependent natures. However, a tension arises in the theory of three natures as presented in Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses. Here, Vasubandhu claims that the separation (rahitatā) of the imagined nature from the dependent nature constitutes the perfected nature (Thirty Verses, verse 21cd). By this assertion, he suggests that the dependent nature can manifest in two modes: one that is superimposed upon by the imagined nature and one that is not. Now, if it is the imagined nature that leads to conceptual and emotional attachments, then once the dependent nature is devoid of the imagined nature, cognition (encompassing both the knowing aspect and the aspect of what is to be known), which corresponds to the dependent nature, appears to be no more unwholesome and thus can exist in the Buddha’s mind. In other words, the Buddha can possess a mind that cognizes objects.

The significant shift in characterizing the Buddha’s mind, as demonstrated, is intricately linked to the evolving understanding of the dependent nature. In his Thirty Verses, Vasubandhu does not fully elaborate on the concept of the “pure dependent nature” because he still maintains that the dependent nature, represented by the function of the storehouse consciousness, must be eradicated at the stage of the Arhat (Thirty Verses, verse 5a). Further research is necessary to identify the precise text where the notion of the pure dependent nature originated. However, at least in the Cheng weishi lun (A Treatise Proving Consciousness-only) compiled by Xuanzang (602-664), it is explicitly stated that when the storehouse consciousness is eliminated, the eighth consciousness persists (T31, no. 1585, p. 13c5-6). Moreover, it clarifies that the undefiled consciousness (wugou shi 無垢識; *amala-vijñāna?), which is associated with mirror cognition (ādarśa-jñāna), exists in Buddhahood.

The content of the Buddha’s mind is a subject of inquiry. The Fodi jing lun (A Commentary on the Scripture of the Buddha-land) asserts that the Buddha’s mind is associated with mirror cognition, which comprehends both emptiness and the specific characteristics of all phenomena. This affirmation confirms the presence of mental function within the Buddha’s mind.

Regarding the second question, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha of Asaṅga asserts that from the eighth Bodhisattva-stage onward, an advanced bodhisattva begins to act effortlessly (anābhoga) (T31, no. 1594, p. 146, a25-b2). This concept of “effortlessness” is pivotal because it suggests that the Buddha acts without any deliberation. But how is this possible? How can the Buddha know how to interact with sentient beings without engaging in thought? To address this query, we must differentiate among the three bodies of the Buddha: the dharma-body, the enjoyment-body, and the transformation-body. Among these, the dharma-body is permanent and therefore does not engage in interactions with sentient beings. The other two bodies are capable of interacting with sentient beings because they are the outcomes of extensive Bodhisattva practice, a crucial aspect of which involves engaging with sentient beings to liberate them from saṃsāra. In essence, throughout the lengthy journey toward Buddhahood, a bodhisattva encounters countless sentient beings and learns the most effective ways to engage with each type of being. These skills are assimilated and ingrained within the mental continuum of the two bodies of the Buddha, enabling them to spontaneously interact with sentient beings.

Returning to the dharma-body of the Buddha, if it does not engage in interactions with sentient beings, what is its function? Primarily, since the dharma-body is permanent, it does not produce any effects. Consequently, it remains inert in terms of action. However, I propose that this does not imply that the dharma-body lacks all content. Instead, I contend that the dharma-body should be understood as the Buddha’s permanent cognition. As previously mentioned, the mirror cognition comprehends both emptiness and the specific characteristics of all phenomena. Given that its content remains constant, the mirror cognition remains unchanged and enduring.

Hence, the Buddha’s mind comprises two layers. The first layer, known as the permanent dharma-body, encompasses the mirror cognition or the undefiled consciousness, which perpetually perceives both emptiness and the specific characteristics of all phenomena. The second layer, corresponding to the impermanent enjoyment-body and the transformation-body, engages with sentient beings spontaneously. Nonetheless, even when the two bodies interact with sentient beings, they never impact the dharma-body. In this manner, the Buddha's mind resembles that of a person deeply immersed in perpetual meditation on the same content, fortified with an armor that effortlessly deflects any external disturbances.

Abstract for Online Program Book (maximum 150 words)

Does the Buddha possess a mind? Does the notion that the Buddha acts spontaneously imply that the Buddha lacks a mind? This paper posits that the Buddha can maintain cognitive faculties while interacting with sentient beings without the need for deliberation. This is attributed to the Buddha's mind consisting of two layers. At the foundational layer of the dharma-body, anchored by mirror cognition, the Buddha continuously perceives both emptiness and the specific characteristics of all phenomena. At the upper layer of the enjoyment-body and the transformation-body, the Buddha engages with sentient beings without deliberate thought because, along the path of cultivation, a bodhisattva has mastered and internalized all the essential skills for interacting with sentient beings. Thus, the Buddha's mind resembles that of a person deeply immersed in perpetual meditation on the same content, fortified with an armor that effortlessly deflects any external disturbances.

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