A Yogācāra Buddhist Critical Phenomenology of Joy

We often speak of joy in connection with happiness, which probably explains why the Oxford English Dictionary (2000) defines joy as “a vivid emotion of pleasure arising from a sense of well-being or satisfaction.” Indeed, joy is not only an emotion qua a strong feeling of delight but also related to well-being and life satisfaction. In her study, critical phenomenologist Sara Ahmed coins the term “the happiness turn” to capture an ongoing development, most notably from 2005 onwards, that “therapeutic cultures and discourses of self-help” have garnered growing popularity in academic studies of happiness, in the commercial sectors, and in public policy (Ahmed 2010, 3). Unsurprisingly, the popular discourse of happiness mirrors the two aforementioned senses of joy. Being joyful is crucial for being happy. Once people internalize the viewpoint that happiness is the perfect end of human flourishing, business institutions mobilize their services to market it as a desirable product, which leads to the booming industry of happiness (Ahmed 2010, 7). As observed by Ahmed, Buddhism has a strong presence in the happiness industry (Ahmed 2010, 226). But does Buddhism endorse the popular definition of being happy and joyful?

Joy is clearly a chief concern for Xuanzang (c. 602–664) and his fellow Yogācāra Buddhists. Xuanzang clarifies that the doctrine of consciousness-only promotes the “benefit and joy of sentient beings” (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 1a8).  As elaborated by his disciple Kuiji, this remark encapsulates the Bodhisattva ideal in Yogācāra terms, considering how the doctrine of consciousness-only establishes the true teaching of wisdom, while the care for others’ benefit (parārtha) and joy (sukha) bespeaks compassion (T no.1830, vol. 43, 233c7–9).

Joy as le (楽, sukha) is first and foremost a type of vedanā (shou受, vedenā), and vedanā pertains to the category of caitta (xinsuo心所) as the mental factors that are always associated with the mind (citta as the system of eight consciousnesses) and thus contribute to a given mental event. To illustrate the interplay of citta and caitta, Xuanzang speaks of our lived experience as a scroll of painting that is finalized through the joint effort of citta and caitta, given that the mind sketches the basic outline on the drawing paper and the mental factors supply the sketch with colors to make it into a coherent painting (T no. 1585, vol. 31, 26c18). As such, lifeworlds are constituted by consciousness and cohered by mental factors. By the mind, a sentient being reaches out to the perceptual field to make it into a meaningful lifeworld dwelled in and navigated by sentient beings. Moreover, one sentient being’s mind also extends its reach to other minds to constitute a larger shared lifeworld at the interpersonal level. Although these lifeworlds are primarily constituted by minds, the associated mental factors, like joy, help to make these worlds coherent. Following this definition, I contend that Xuanzang and Kuiji propose a contextualist approach to feeling that can be epitomized by the two contrasting pictures of how joy is experienced.

For those who are ignorant of the impermanent nature of things, they experience joy as an affirmative embracing of an agreeable phenomenon that elicits their desire and prompts egocentric actions. Joy thus coheres the lifeworld of ignorance, which obstructs the eradication of attachments and entraps sentient beings in endless suffering. Moreover, such egocentric joy exacerbates exclusion. As detailed by Ahmed, once people internalize the utilitarian sense of happiness as the perfect end of life, they also turn happiness into a discourse that marginalizes the unhappy others in society (Ahmed 2010, 48). Indeed, the discourse of happiness can yield oppression since the unhappy others, feminist killjoys, for instance, are often being blamed for not trying hard enough to make their life flourish (Ahmed 2010, 65).

In contrast, for those who see things as empty, their joy is no longer inwardly looking at an ego. Rather they cultivate their joy as a contemplative performance of affirmatively embracing any manifested phenomenon at the intersubjective, interpersonal level. Now that these wise ones understand how all minds are experientially and epistemically interconnected, they are determined to help their fellow sentient beings break through their old horizon. In Buddhist terms, these wise sentient beings become the Bodhisattvas, who compassionately vow not to leave anyone behind. In Bodhisattvas’ engagement with others, joy as the cultivated contemplative performance becomes the Bodhisattvas’ resilience. Thus, joy coheres Bodhisattvas’ lifeworld of wisdom and compassion.

More importantly, joyful Bodhisattvas work with their target audience to open a new window in the lifeworld of ignorance to shed light on the possibility of purifying ignorance into wisdom. The story of the joyful Devī in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra evinces that sentient beings can work together to recontextualize joy for inclusion and emancipation when they approach joy as a contextualized feeling without any inherent quality. This joyful Devī serves as an inspiration for navigating a feminist life by embodying a killjoy as a skillful means to concurrently criticize ignorance and embrace joy as a resilient attitude to transform ignorance. This is where the Bodhisattvas’ path and the feminist path can converge: through constant critiques of reducing interdependently constituted things to static essences, sentient beings like us collaborate with one another to transform lifeworld(s), recontextualize joy, and evolve joy into happiness for ending suffering.

To facilitate the following discussion, I preserve the concept of happiness (anle安楽sukha), specifically for the evolved form of joy that entails liberation from suffering on universal awakening, while reserving the term joy more generally for the vedanā-related emotional life that can be experienced by sentient beings in the context of their lifeworlds. In unpacking this contextualist approach, I first provide an analysis of feeling and then detail two contrasting pictures of joy depicted by Xuanzang and Kuiji. To end the discussion, I illustrate the Bodhisattvas’ joy with the story of a happy Devī in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. In this manner, I hope to add another perspective on joy from a feminist standpoint.