This session reflects on Karl Barth and the AAR theme of freedom. Papers consider the meaning(s) of freedom—divine and creaturely—in Barth's writings with both interpretive and constructive concerns in play.
This paper will compare two theologies of human freedom in relation to artistic creativity: Nicolas Berdyaev’s theology of creativity, which contends that human agency is characterized by freedom such that humans extend, and even eclipse, God’s creative act through their creativity as a means to their own salvation; and Karl Barth’s theological anthropology, which emphasizes that human action should be understood in relation to the freedom of the triune God, who alone is truly free and yet who graciously upholds and enables creaturely activity through Jesus Christ. Although Barth never developed a theology of artistic creativity and had deep reservations about the arts, his construal of human freedom provides not only a needed corrective to theologies of creativity, like Berdyaev’s, that overemphasize human agency but can provide a firmer foundation for humanity’s artistic activity: the freedom and grace of the triune God.
I consider the role of Mary in Barth’s theology as Mary’s acceptance of the virgin birth serves as a prime example of God’s freedom alongside human freedom to acknowledge God’s work granted through grace. How does his identification of her as the climax of God’s election of Israel relate to the particularity of her embodied experience as Theotokos? Does Barth’s treatment of Mary’s role in the incarnation discount agency over her body, especially if one accepts the logical priority of election over triunity? Does Mary’s humanity as eternally presumed for the identity of the Son give Mary any autonomy over her pregnancy? Is Barth’s treatment of Mary, especially in light of Mitzi Smith’s work on Mary as doule (slave), create a problematic surrogacy that warrants critique similar to what Dolores William’s directed toward substitutionary atonement?