"New Orientations to Time, Futurity, and Utopia" includes papers that revisit and critically re-construct themes that are central to religion, politics, and social transformation. The first paper critically responds to Luke Bretherton's suspicion toward structural analyses of capital by reading Alasdair MacIntrye against the grain and by introducing Frederic Jameson's utopian thought. The second paper reads Paul Ricoeur's interpretation of Hegel's "absolute knowing" as a practice of hope and forgiveness. The third paper draws on decolonial thought to show how secularism colonizes time and forecloses alternative temporalities.
Papers
This paper explores the possibility of resisting capitalism given capitalism’s seemingly totalizing effects on our formation as subjects. I address this problem by exploring the work of two scholars whose work in ethics take it quite seriously: Luke Bretherton and Alasdair MacIntyre. Exploring the tensions in Luke Bretherton’s use of Alasdair MacIntyre’s thought for his ethics and political theology, I argue that they differ in their assessments of the possibilities of and limits to systematic ethical critiques of capitalism – and structural analysis in general. This is in part due to their respective frameworks for social analysis: Augustinian cosmology for Bretherton and Aristotelian ethics for MacIntyre. After investigating these frameworks and MacIntyre’s post-Marxist trajectory, I use Fredric Jameson’s concept of utopia to re-read Bretherton’s Augustinian eschatology and MacIntyre’s practices within institutions in a way that opens both to the possibility of emancipatory politics and social transformation.
This presentation explores Ricoeur’s “endless” interpretation of Hegel’s hermeneutic of religion. I complicate Ricoeur’s reading of Hegelian “absolute knowing” as a (purely) epistemological goal, showing instead that the “reciprocal recognition that is absolute spirit” accomplished at the end of Hegel’s dialectic of morality is a practice (of forgiveness), as is the self-expressive “utterance” of the forgiving community that Hegel studies in his chapter on religion. Given this practical orientation in Hegel's text, we have reason to interpret “absolute knowing”—which Ricoeur summarizes as “the conceptual light within which each cultural context, and finally each religious representation, thinks itself”—likewise in practical terms. Thinking, then, does not dissolve our (religious) hopes in an open future in conceptual recapitulation; rather, it is the practice of “giving a reason for the hope that is within us” in the context of interreligious dialogue.
This paper argues that the secularization thesis, as a hermeneutical framework for interpreting modern temporality, performs a double reduction: it reduces time to abstract representations and religion to disembodied doctrine. This double reduction is not just descriptively inadequate: by classifying non-modern temporalities as "religious" or "pre-modern," the secular/religious distinction functions as a mechanism of political deactivation that forecloses the critical potential of temporalities that subvert the coloniality of time. Drawing on post-secular critique and decolonial theory—including Quijano, Maldonado-Torres, Wynter, and An Yountae—the paper shows that these traditions, despite their convergence, have not fully elaborated how the coloniality of time operates through a systematic and practical redeployment of the sacred. A practice-based framework, informed by Bourdieu and Vallega's account of the coloniality of time as an aisthetic disposition, reveals how this operation occurs. To identify how time is decolonized, I argue, we must decolonize the frameworks through which we read it.
