Justice, (In)humanity, and Moral Reasoning in Technological Enhancement

This paper is concerned with moral bio-enhancements (MBE) and parsing out what we might reasonably expect from such a technology—and where we might remain skeptical. To this end, I take up Jason Eberl’s argument regarding the role of prudence in moral enhancement, demonstrating how, from a distinctively Thomistic perspective, bio-enhancements may offer us a real possibility for moral improvement, including in ways Eberl himself discounts. Yet, despite these possibilities for moral enhancement, there remains constraints for what MBE can provide. By noting similarities between Eberl’s account and American philosopher Cora Diamond’s analysis of moral reasoning concerning race and slavery, I suggest that the limitations we encounter in MBE should temper our hopes for substantial moral progress. Diamond demonstrates to us that the ability to reason more rigorously concerning moral questions—to exercise our prudence—cannot guarantee even the most basic level of moral agreement necessary for a healthy society.