Joseph Massad’s Desiring Arabs, published in 2007, sparked huge controversy, particularly with its third chapter “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” (Massad 2007, 160-90). While groundbreaking in its extension of Edward Said’s study of orientalism by integrating the dimension of sexuality from the perspective of an Arab diasporic intellectual, the book is perhaps less satisfying from a feminist and queer perspective. Massad’s emphasis on postcolonial interpretations, especially his view of queer identities as Western constructions and forms of epistemological colonization, risks turning his critique as a broader rejection of indigenous queer individuals, thereby resulting in the dual oppression of Arab queers. Postcolonial theory is often considered as a foundation for creating new possibilities in the Global South, yet in Desiring Arabs, it appears to serve as both the starting and end point of Massad’s analysis. The work showcases the dilemma in queering the postcolonial theory and decolonizing queer theory, particularly the challenge of balancing the rejection of Western orientalist hegemonic discourses with the need to avoid local nationalist frameworks that reinforce homophobic ideologies.
Queerness exists as a delicate balance, wherein any disruption results in the imposition of choices, specifically, the forced selection between religion and queerness, and by extension, between two cultural identities (Chaer and Mirzazadeh 2022; Gordon 2021, 66). This imposition reduces the complexity of individual identities to binary oppositions. I view Islamic feminism as an example that countering Massad’s critique, it is a thought of being both simultaneously, challenging the essentialist approach of both the West as well as states and religious leaders in the Middle East when it comes to women’s issues. Islamic feminism is not “a contradictory term” (Mojab 2001, 130-31), its very existence challenges dichotomous demarcations and Eurocentric taxonomies. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World defines Islamic feminism as the intellectual endeavor of Muslim women to challenge patriarchal hegemony and advocate for more equitable gender systems (Esposito 1995, 19-23). I argue that Islamic feminism has already embodied strong globality, and it is a postcolonial transition towards a global feminism that transcends religious differences, not through secularization, but by seeking common ground while preserving diversity.
Islamic feminism is hyper contentious, because it touches on both Islam and women, and “few issues grab more headlines than gender, and none is more important as a lens through which many non-Muslims and Muslims alike see and judge Islam” (Esposito 2010, 118). Valentine Moghadam offers a comprehensive overview of the debates between secular feminism and Islamic feminism, acknowledging the contributions of Islamic feminism while also identifying its limitations, but she generally believes that Islamic feminism’s attempts to distinguish itself from other feminisms are futile (Moghadam 2002, 1165). Similarly, Haideh Moghissi, Bronwyn Winter, and Shahrzad Mojab are primarily critical of Islamic feminism (Moghissi 1999; Winter 2001, 33; Mojab 2001, 124-146; Mojab 2005). Since these critiques were first articulated more than two decades ago, Islamic feminism has seen notable developments, making it necessary to reevaluate these criticisms in light of recent progress. I summarize these criticisms into the following seven categories.
Firstly, one major critique emphasizes that Islam is not a personal choice, but an ideology deeply rooted in legal and political systems through contextualizing Islam in Iran, especially after the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Moghadam 2002, 1148). Secondly, the central approach of Islamic feminism which focuses on reinterpreting the Quran has been criticized for neglecting the contributions of female socialists, democrats, and secularists (Moghadam 2002, 1149). Thirdly, Islamic feminism has been accused of framing veiling as a matter of individual choice without sufficiently addressing its broader sociopolitical implications (Moghadam 2002, 1150). Fourthly, Islamic feminism is criticized for its inability to bring “real change and real democratization” (Moghadam 2002, 1151). Fifthly, by concentrating predominantly on theological debates, Islamic feminism risks overlooking the political and economic dimensions of inequality (Moghadam 2002, 1158). Sixthly, the advocacy for Islamic human rights distinct from universal human rights has raised concerns about legitimizing human rights violations from Islamic theocracy under the guise of cultural or religious exceptionalism (Moghadam 2002, 1160). Last but not least, Islamic feminism has faced criticism for its limited impact on legal systems (Mojab 2001, 131-35).
In this article, I will try to respond to the first six points by analyzing recent developments of Islamic feminism that happened over the past two decades, demonstrating how these critiques have been overcome. However, I acknowledge that the seventh point rightfully showcases the insufficient achievements regarding law change. Mojab’s critique regarding judicial appointments is valid and highlights an area where Islamic feminism still requires significant development, but fortunately, we have already witnessed a growing literature on the legal system from Islamic feminists (Mir-Hosseini 1993; Mir-Hosseini 1999; Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić 2010; Mir-Hosseini et al. 2013; Mir-Hosseini et al. 2015; Mir-Hosseini 2022; Mir-Hosseini et al. 2022; Afsaruddin 2023, 155-200; Haqqani 2024) alongside with the accomplishments of the Malaysian NGO Sisters in Islam (Othman 2006, 350). It is essential to clarify that while I defend Islamic feminism, my intention is not to romanticize or mythologize it as the ultimate solution or the very way of realizing gender equality in the Middle East. Rather, my aim is to highlight the value of Islamic feminism as a transitional phase, which holds potential possibilities for reaching global feminism.
As a framework that bridges the classical and the contemporary, tradition and modernity, Eastern and Western, Islamic feminism holds significant potential to evolve into global feminism. In summary, this article aims to reveal the value and potential of Islamic feminism by analyzing the historical background of Islamic feminism and responding to major criticisms in academia. Islamic feminism must not be discursively disenfranchised simply because it risks being hijacked by theocratic discourse. With its global consciousness, it can be recognized as a postcolonial transitional stage and an intermediate step towards global feminism.
While Joseph Massad’s Desiring Arabs extends Edward Said’s study of Orientalism by incorporating a sexual dimension, it is less satisfying from a feminist and queer perspective. It struggles to reject Western Orientalist discourses while avoiding local nationalist frameworks that reinforce misogyny and homophobia. Islamic feminism challenges Massad’s critique by resisting both Western essentialism and patriarchal structures in the Middle East. Far from being contradictory, its existence defies binary classifications and Eurocentric taxonomies. I argue that Islamic feminism already embodies strong globality, positioning itself as a postcolonial transition toward a global feminism that transcends religious differences, not through secularization but by fostering shared ground while preserving diversity. This article reviews research on Islamic feminism over the past twenty-five years and addresses key criticisms, including religious belief and personal choice, its relationship with secular feminisms, veiling, theological debates, political and economic critiques, queerness, and Islam’s intersection with human rights.