Iris Murdoch’s practical mysticism

Central to Iris Murdoch’s moral-aesthetic philosophy is her conception of prayer, which she derives largely from Simone Weil’s theory of attention, and from Plato’s Eros. In both philosophers she finds a model for moral perfectionism as the turning away from fantasy towards reality and the good. She locates among the most seductive of fantasies the unified image of a personal God, and thus, I argue, seeks to theorize a “demythologized” form of prayer without God, or a practical mysticism of the Good. This position hews close to Weil’s mystical “attention,” but Murdoch trades Weil’s God for Plato’s Good, and diverges from both thinkers in placing greater emphasis on the imaginative practice afforded by art, especially the reading of tragic literature. This paper considers how her practical mysticism poses a modest resolution to “the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” initiated by Plato, who professed a grave mistrust of literature.