Prajñākaragupta On What Exists

In this roundtable, we propose to discuss Prajñākaragupta’s (8th–9th century CE) commentary Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (PVA) on two verses in Dharmakīrti’s (7th century CE) influential Pramāṇavārttika (PV): verses 3 and 4 in the chapter on perception. In those two verses, Dharmakīrti seems to initially endorse the standard Sautrāntika and Yogācāra view that causal efficacy is the mark of ultimate existence. But then he responds ambivalently to a Mādhyamika opponent who rejects the claim that ultimately existent objects can stand in causal relations. But, unlike Dharmakīrti and his earlier commentators like Devendrabuddhi (7th century CE), Prajñākara adopts a revisionary view: he accepts the Mādhyamika view that causal efficacy cannot be a mark of ultimate existence. However, this doesn’t mean that all hope is lost for the Yogācāras. Prajñākara also shows that this Mādhyamika view does not conclusively undermine the core of the Yogācāra view: the thesis that consciousness--or conscious mental occurrences--are ultimately existent.

Prajñākara’s commentary on these two verses is significant both historically and philosophically. First, in accepting the Mādhyamika critique of the standard Sautrāntika and Yogācāra view, Prajñākara jettisons the view that causal efficacy is the only way of distinguishing between conventional existence and ultimate existence. In doing so, Prajñākara paves the way for a new form of Yogācāra that is later defended by Jñānaśrīmitra (10th-11th century CE) and Ratnakīrti (11th century CE). On this view, the mark of ultimate existence is mere manifestation or appearance (prakāśamātra): whatever is manifested or directly appears through non-conceptual awareness ultimately exists. Since phenomenally conscious mental occurrences are able to manifest themselves through reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana), they can be ultimately existent. But standard Yogācāra arguments show that mind-independent material particulars cannot manifest themselves through any state of awareness at all. So, they can at best be conventionally existent. From this, it follows that conscious mental occurrences alone can be ultimately existent. While this much is a conclusion that earlier Yogācāra thinkers would accept, these later thinkers deny the earlier Yogācāra explanation of what makes conscious mental occurrences ultimately existent: it is not their causal efficacy, but just their manifestation or appearance. This, in turn, has significant consequences for their understanding of the relationship between the two kinds of existence. Thus, studying Prajñākara’s discussion of the Mādhyamika critique is useful for historically understanding this moment of rupture in the history of Yogācāra Buddhism.

Second, Prajñākara’s explanation of the Mādhyamika view is a powerful expression of causal scepticism, the view that we cannot know that causal relations hold between ultimately existent objects. Typically, modern discussions of the Mādhyamika arguments against causation emphasize their metaphysical flavour. They are portrayed as arguments which show that, given certain background assumptions like the doctrine of momentariness (that is, the view that ultimately existent objects don’t persist through time), no causal relations can hold between ultimately existent objects. By contrast, the arguments that Prajñākara considers are novel insofar as they are epistemological. They show that, given the epistemological framework that Dharmakīrti himself puts forward, there can be no source of knowledge that gives us epistemic access to facts about what causes what. While arguments of this sort were certainly discussed by Mādhyamika authors like Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita (both active in the 8th century CE), Prajñākara presents what we take to be the most extensive and persuasive treatment of such arguments. The arguments reveal a hitherto unexplored tension between presentism (i.e., the view that only present objects ultimately exist) and the possibility of gaining knowledge about fundamental causal truths. Prajñākara shows us that it is difficult—if not impossible—for the presentist to resist a kind of scepticism about causation at the fundamental level of reality. But, unlike some contemporary presentists, he would welcome this conclusion, because—like his Mādhyamika comrades—he thinks that causal relations only hold between conventionally existent objects.

The chance to present this work as a Yogācāra Studies Unit text-panel would be especially exciting to us at this stage in our research. The panelists have been working collaboratively for some years on this passage of Prajñākara’s PVA. We have a book that is a translation, edition, and philosophical analysis of these passages currently under contract with Oxford University Press. The feedback we receive from this panel would be directly reflected in the final manuscript. We also hope to contribute toward the development of a consensus among scholars about the best practices for translating philosophical Sanskrit terms and arguments.

We will provide an edited version of the Sanskrit text, along with our translation, for the general audience. One panelist will set up the historical background for this section of PVA; one will reconstruct the arguments in the text; and one will talk about the reception of these arguments in later Yogācāra. On the model of last year’s text panel, each of these presentations will be brief to leave time for breakout groups and extensive audience feedback.