The past several years have witnessed renewed interest in participatory metaphysics, a key conceptual element of the Platonic tradition. Participation has been employed in different ways to conceptualize the relationship between God and creation, transcendence and immanence, and the One in the many. In this context Augustine, and numerous figures influenced by his thought, have made important and innovative contributions to this tradition. As such, it represents a theological and philosophical conversation that has continued across centuries. This panel invites papers that consider participatory metaphysics that examine either Augustine and Augustine-influenced thinkers, as well as papers that consider participation in the wider Platonic tradition.
In Confessions 9.10.23-25, Augustine and Monica experience God at Ostia. This experience represents a significant departure from Platonic conceptions of divine visions in two ways. First, Augustine and Monica's experience is shared. Second, both Augustine and Monica are epistemic peers. These points stand in marked contrast to how Plato and other Neoplatonists, particularly Plotinus, conceive visions of the Good. For the Platonist, such experiences are fundamentally individual cognitive achievements. They cannot be shared. Furthermore, they can only be achieved within the context of a master-pupil relationship, i.e., an epistemically asymmetrical relationship. We argue these differences in the Augustinian and Platonist accounts stem from how each conceptualizes the nature of the Good. For the Platonists, the Good is a passive object of contemplation. For Augustine, God is an active cause of divine experiences. We argue that this difference has significant implications throughout Augustine’s early epistemology and theory of divine experiences.
One of the main shifts that is detectable in Augustine’s thinking involves a network of ideas connecting the nature and origin of evil, the nature of the human person, and the ultimate hope for humanity. These areas are tied together for Augustine and are particularly prominent in the writings pertaining to Manichaeanism. It has become clear in recent years that in relation to these areas of Augustine’s thought, it is important to consider the influence of Neo-Platonists like Plotinus and especially Porphyry. As I will explain, the analysis of certain critiques Augustine makes against the Manichaeans will enable us to gain a clearer sense of Porphyry’s influence on Augustine, as well as a better understanding of the ultimate position Augustine took on the several important metaphysical and soteriological issues.
In this paper, I recover platonic and Christian sources on divine immensity and argue that immensity is crucial to any resolutely theistic participatory metaphysics. The paper involves three movements. First, I outline a version of immensity drawn from key sources of classical theism, including Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, and Frances Turretin. On this view, immensity describes, not merely the limitless presence of effective divine power, but properly the reality of divine presence as the essence that surrounds and undergirds the essences of all actual and possible creatures. Second, I argue that such a view of immensity guards against the deistic impulse, on the one hand, and the pantheistic/panentheistic impulse on the other hand - and yet allows for a sufficiently robust account of divine presence for a participatory metaphysics. Finally, I conclude by addressing philosophical objections to divine presence as outlined in the doctrine of immensity.
In this paper, I map the summit of Augustine of Hippo’s schema of human perceptual experience as laid out in his De Quantitate Animae (Lt. On the Magnitude of the Soul). As I analyse, Augustine uses Neoplatonist participatory metaphysics in his construction of the seventh gradus of the (human) soul. The gradus are degrees of functionalities the soul possesses. I go on to trace Augustine’s schema of the summit of human perceptual experience as the mansio (seventh gradus) to Thomas Aquinas’ schema as the habitatio. I argue that Aquinas’ schema of the summit of perceptual experience is also shaped by metaphysics of participation via his use of Augustinian theology. Whilst Augustine’s mansio takes us beyond this life into eternity, Aquinas’ habitatio is the summit of joy during one’s earthly life. Both Augustine’s ‘mansio’ and Aquinas’ 'habitatio' connote the concept ‘home.’ A concept which, I argue, is from Neoplatonist participatory metaphysics.