Communist Public Theology? How Early CCP Revolutionaries Appropriated and then Condemned Christianity for National Salvation

In *The Religious Question in Modern China *, Goossaert and Palmer weave together the tumultuous history of religion in 20th-century China, framing it as a quest to reforge the “ordering center of gravity: the religio-political state” amidst the collapse of the Qing dynasty. This framework illuminates the endeavors of early twentieth-century reformist groups to meld their pursuits with a sense of religiosity, despite relentless modernist and statist attacks on religion. Building on this foundation, this paper proposes a religious interpretation of the early Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) history. It posits that, in its nascent stages, prominent party leaders embraced religious elements to instill a sense of the sacred, thereby providing a transcendental impetus for moral and social transformation. Christianity, initially a paradigm for imitation, eventually became a foil for denunciation as Communism emerged as a rival sacred narrative in the quest for national salvation.

This hypothesis is explored through the lives and ideas of two early CCP leaders, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) and Yun Daiying (1895–1931). Chen, a May Fourth Movement radical who became the CCP’s general secretary, illustrated the fusion of evolutionary and revolutionary thought. Initially dismissive of religion as regressive, Chen’s imprisonment during the May Fourth Movement prompted a reevaluation of his views, particularly towards Christianity, which he began to see as a vital source of sacred values essential for China’s salvation. Similarly, Yun’s journey encapsulates the quest for a sacred anchor within reformist ambitions. He found the spiritual and liturgical aspects of Christianity, particularly through his engagement with the YMCA, as fulfilling this need by providing a direct link to the transcendent, aiming for national salvation.

Given this pragmatic approach to the sacred, when Communism began to assert itself as a superior sacred model, both Chen and Yun shifted their allegiance. They were attracted by its promises of social restructuring and higher efficiency in organizational cohesion than Christianity could offer. This transition is marked by their critique of Christianity on the grounds of historical materialism (i.e., Christianity as unscientific) and nationalism (i.e., Christianity as cultural imperialism), highlighting Communism’s demand for exclusive loyalty as the new sacred center.

The narrative is further enriched by examining the responses of other early CCP leaders like Qu Qiubai (1899–1935) and Li Dazhao (1889–1927) to Christianity. Qu initially engaged with a May Fourth journal founded by the Beijing YMCA, whose Social Gospel message likely appealed to him. After a trip to Soviet Russia, however, he embraced Leninism, rejecting Christianity as cultural imperialism. Li also changed from a more fluid stance, orchestrating the Anti-Christian Movement in the 1920s, as confirmed by recent scholarship on Soviet and Comintern sources. Their flaming rhetoric and activism underscore the Communists’ resolution to claim exclusive spiritual authority over China’s future.

This proposal aims to elucidate how early CCP leaders navigated the complex interplay between religious faith and political ideology, ultimately embracing Communism as the sacred cornerstone for China’s national salvation. Through this lens, the paper seeks to contribute a nuanced understanding of the dynamic between nationalism, religion, and political ideology in shaping modern China’s landscape.