The Need for Moral Enhancement and the Possibility of “Going Off the Rails”

This paper is concerned with moral bio-enhancements (MBE) and parsing out what we might reasonably expect from such a technology—and where we might remain skeptical. To this end, I take up Jason T. Eberl’s argument regarding the role of prudence in moral enhancement, demonstrating how, from a distinctively Thomistic perspective, bio-enhancements may offer us a real possibility for moral improvement, including in ways Eberl himself discounts. Yet, despite these possibilities for moral enhancement, there remains constraints for what MBE can provide. By noting similarities between Eberl’s account and American philosopher Cora Diamond’s analysis of moral reasoning concerning race and slavery, I suggest that the limitations we encounter in MBE should temper our hopes for substantial moral progress. 

Throughout history, there have been many strategies for moral improvement. Most of these, falling under the umbrella of moral education, are familiar practices, like enacting policies and legislation, undergoing spiritual disciplines, and infusing children with familial values. Yet some have argued that something more radical is needed: using technology for moral enhancement. Because people are too short sighted on their own, religion is not working fast enough, and democratic governments are inept, we must look to science to address the cataclysmic issues facing our world. Thus in order to produce a more moral citizenry, we should adopt something like pharmaceuticals or brain implants that can help us become more ethical. In this way of thinking, moral enhancement technology that aims at cognitive and emotive enhancement—technology that could affect certain dispositions like altruism, fairness, or temperance—may be our best option for slowing climate change, ending racial conflict, or brining about global peace.

Taking seriously this call for moral enhancement, Jason Eberl argues that MBE may be able to help us align our first-order desires with our second-order desires—that is, that technology may provide us the motivation necessary to overcome our “moral weakness of will.” To this end, MBE must work in accordance with our prudence, the central virtue by which we shape our desires and transform desires into volition. Within a Thomistic framework that sees the body’s instrumental role in developing virtue, prudence is open to enhancement though environmental and physiological change—most clearly through enhancement of our memory and perception. Yet even as he recognizes the possibility for improvement, Eberl maintains that, in order to maintain our moral autonomy, MBE should only rightfully be used to align our will with our second-order desires and not to simply override those second-order desires. Thus, our moral telos is left to us, and the possibility remains that our ethical framework may be fundamentally misguided.

Eberl’s argument I take to be generally helpful, though I want to note two small criticisms  which have implications for the effectiveness of MBE before turning to a larger concern. First, Eberl asserts an Aristotelian framework for moral action in which virtues exist in moderation between extremes. For this reason, he rejects enhancements that would intensify any particular disposition—yet if we can cast doubt on an Aristotelian framework for virtue, conceivably certain dispositions could be unidirectionally tied to consistent ethical action. Second, he is concerned primarily with the enhancement of prudence, seeing intellectual self-determination as the benchmark for authentic virtue, but this ignores the importance of first-order desires for legitimate moral growth. In both of these criticisms, I aim to broaden the application of MBE for developing personal, authentic virtue. 

Even still, there is a major limitation to this kind of technology, specifically its inability to provide us with the right telos for our moral action. Eberl, for his part, acknowledged this shortcoming, but he does not seem to register how significant this limitation is. Noting parallels between his project and the moral reflection of Cora Diamond (who is also indirectly reliant on Aristotle), we see that our moral reasoning can be carried out in more or less rigorous ways—with better or worse prudence. And yet, such moral reasoning counts for very little if it is not oriented in the right direction. Diamond draws this out in her analysis of moral relativism and historical debates between anti- and pro-slavery individuals. What she shows is that even people clearly in the wrong can reason in legitimate ways, that they can do so even if their moral reasoning is completely “off the rails.” Recognizing the potential to exist in completely different moral worlds and recognizing the serious matters in which this is most common should give us pause when pondering what we might actually gain from MBE.

While Eberl’s Thomistic perspective suggests that technology could genuinely contribute to moral improvement, particularly in aligning desires, I hope in my analysis to introduce a number of nuances—recognizing both promising potentials and profound limitations. By considering the broader application of MBE for personal virtue and highlighting the technology’s inability to prescribe a moral telos, I caution against unwarranted optimism. Cora Diamond’s insights on moral reasoning underscore the significance of moral direction, urging careful consideration of enhancement technology’s capacity to truly guide us toward meaningful moral progress.