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Buddhist Epistemology and Virtue Epistemology

  1. The Coherency, Structure, and Significance of the Paper Session

This panel focuses on Buddhist intellectual virtue. It aims to articulate Buddhist epistemology and virtue epistemology through various Buddhist philosophical lenses, to construct a meaningful dialogue among different Buddhist contexts, and to engage Buddhist epistemology with its contemporary relevance. We will present four papers representing various Buddhist philosophical traditions and methodologies, all contributing to our objectives cohesively.

The first paper delves into the Abhidharma context, examining the Vaibhāṣika account of epistemic well-being. In “A Buddhist Account of Epistemic Wellbeing,” the author will explore the complex mental states of Vaibhāṣika and their role in knowing states, highlighting Buddhist virtues as epistemic and constituting a form of epistemic well-being.

The next paper explores the epistemic ideal in the work of Dignāga, an important pramāṇa theorist. In “How Dignāga’s Epistemic Ideal Transforms the Knower,” the author will describe Buddhist intellectual virtue based on epistemic ideals or high epistemic standards, which have ethically transformative effects on individuals who pursue them.

Another paper will consider the intersection of pramāṇa with tantric ethics. In “The Art of Imagination at the Intersection of Pramāṇa & Samaya: Normative Epistemology & Tantric Ethics in Early Dzogchen,” the author will expand on Buddhist epistemic virtue in the context of tantra in Tibet.

The last paper brings the Buddhist epistemic discussion into dialogue with contemporary reliabilist virtue epistemology and Buddhist moral phenomenology. In “Virtuous Vision: Navigating the Nexus of Virtue Reliabilism and Moral Phenomenology in The Treasury of Valid Knowledge and Reasoning,” the author will engage in discussing traditional Buddhist intellectual virtue in light of its contemporary relevance.

These papers, along with a foreseeably lively Q&A session, will gather key insights into intellectual virtue within various Buddhist philosophical contexts and initiate a conversation with Western epistemology without imposing it upon or colonizing traditional Buddhist theories. This methodological reflexivity is crucial in developing the field of Buddhist philosophy and fostering cross-cultural dialogue with other philosophical frameworks.

  1. The Diversity of Presenters in this Panel

It is important to emphasize the diversity among the participants of this panel. First of all, four of the five people on the panel are women involved in the field of Buddhist philosophy! Also, we are at various stages of our academic careers. This panel is a valuable opportunity for female Buddhist philosophers to showcase their perspectives.

Furthermore, this panel includes a mix of senior and junior participants. Alongside the presider, we have two Associate Professors, two Assistant Professors, and one graduate student. This panel intends to provide a platform for academic conversation among experienced and well-known scholars, proficient specialists, and graduate students who are developing their expertise.

Abstract for Online Program Book (maximum 150 words)

Buddhist epistemology directs to knowledge of reality as it is and serves as a path toward liberation from suffering. Meanwhile, how one perceives reality fundamentally influences moral conduct and decision-making. So, what is the structure of such intellectual virtue? Reflecting on this question of valid cognition upon telic knowledge or truth, this panel focuses on Buddhist epistemology and virtue epistemology. Its objectives are to explore these two areas through different Buddhist philosophical perspectives, foster dialogue across various Buddhist contexts, and engage Buddhist epistemology with its contemporary relevance.

Papers

  • Abstract

    This paper explores the Vaibhāṣika Buddhist account of knowledge. In particular, I will explore the way Vaibhāṣika trope ontology influences how the Vaibhāṣika understand complex mental states and when these states constitute knowing states. Mental states, like any complex entity in Vaibhāṣika metaphysics, are merely conventionally real, as are the agents they are commonly thought to belong. Here I will argue that despite denying the ultimate reality of epistemic agents, the Vaibhāṣika account constitutes a kind of virtue epistemology whereby a mental state counts as a knowing state only if it includes and precludes certain virtue-related tropes. Many Buddhist virtues, I argue, are importantly epistemic. Engaging in practices that inhibit the arising of certain epistemic vices and foster the occurrence of epistemic virtues is a core feature of Buddhist teachings, which constitute a path to a distinctive kind of epistemic well-being.

  • Abstract

    Buddhist ethics can be seen to hold up a certain epistemic ideal—knowledge of reality as it is—as that at which we ought to aim, if we would be free from suffering. It is thus a fundamentally epistemological and idealist ethics. Dignāga codifies the nature of this epistemic ideal in his pramāṇa-theory, which argues there are exactly two forms of valid cognition and only one of them cognises things as they are. By considering how a conception of ideal knowledge embeds certain values and virtues (but not others), I wish to set out the expected effects on character of striving for, and attaining the primary epistemic ideal of knowing reality as it is. I then shall ask what the ethical effects are, if any, of pursuing or attaining the secondary form of valid cognition, anumāṇa, in pursuit of which one is held to quite different norms and values.

  • Abstract

    Since the 19th-century reforms led by Ju Mipham, Nyingma philosophy has focused on using normative epistemological discourse (pramāṇa) to validate the tantric concept of primordial purity. This approach, attributed to the translator Rongzom (11th-12th c.), considered the pioneer of this trend in Tibet, is highlighted in Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty (nges shes rin po che sgron ma). Mipham traces the Nyingma tradition's practice of tantric pramāṇa, affirming primordial purity qua the inseparability of the two truths, as a defining feature of the Old School's philosophical Vajrayāna. Rongzom’s work, Establishing Appearance as Divine (snang ba lhar bsgrub pa), from a period when Tibetan Buddhism absorbed Vajrayāna ritual and pan-Indian epistemology, exemplifies this fusion. This paper explores Rongzom’s tantric pramāṇa within classical epistemology and Nyingma tantra, arguing that its purpose lies in authorizing an ideology behind a practical epistemology of tantric ethics (samaya) than in logically debating “right view.”

  • Abstract

    This paper explores Buddhist epistemology’s structure while considering its contemporary relevance. Specifically, it examines the plausibility of reliabilist virtue epistemology and moral phenomenology in chapter 9 on perception in The Treasury of Valid Knowledge and Reasoning (tshad ma rigs gter) written by Sakya Paṇḍita (1182–1251). Buddhist epistemology seems to overlap with virtue reliabilism by emphasizing a faculty-based approach that requires reliable and stable cognitive competences. For example, yogic perception constitutes non-erroneous valid knowledge, while being unaffiliated with self-clinging and afflictions, promotes a form of intellectual virtue. Meanwhile, Buddhist moral phenomenology directs toward a cultivating pathway experiencing in the world, focusing on the input side and non-egocentricity. Reflecting on these, this paper argues that Buddhist epistemology and cognitive theory, at least in the tshad ma rigs gter, are intertwined with ethical, metaphysical, and soteriological dimensions concerning how one perceives and engages with oneself, others, and the world without a self.

Audiovisual Requirements

Resources

LCD Projector and Screen
Play Audio from Laptop Computer
Podium microphone

Full Papers Available

No
Program Unit Options

Session Length

90 Minutes