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	Buddhist Philosophy Unit, Global-Critical Philosophy of Religion Unit, Hindu Philosophy Unit, Jain Studies Unit, Philosophy of Religion Unit, and Yogācāra Studies Unit Theme: Translation Workshop: Akalaṅka's Aṣṭaśatī and Its Non-Jain Interlocutors Anil Mundra, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, Presiding Translation Workshop: Akalaṅka's Aṣṭaśatī and Its Non-Jain Interlocutors Panelists Ana Bajzelj, University of California, Riverside Marie-Helene Gorisse, University of Birmingham Lynna Dhanani, University of California, Davis Jane Allred, University of Alberta Shree Nahata, University of Oxford Jinesh Sheth, University of Birmingham
	Hindu Philosophy Unit Theme: Kumārila's Critique of Yogācāra Charles Goodman, State University of New York, Binghamton, Presiding The Mīmāṃsā author Kumārila was one of the most formidable and determined critics of the Yogācāra philosophy and of the tradition of Buddhist epistemology that emerged within it. This session explores several aspects of his biting and brilliant critique and discusses what we can learn from it, both for our understanding of South Asian intellectual history and for philosophy today. Key topics to be discussed include the Buddhist concept of conventional truth, idealism, the dream argument, the "self-awareness" (svasaṃvedana) doctrine of Yogācāra and the memory argument for it, and whether an anti-realist, non-referential view of language can be internally consistent. Andrew Towers, Binghamton University (SUNY) Metaphysics and the Problem of Language: Ślokavārttika as a Guide for the Interpretation of Yogācāra Abstract In vv. 3 - 83 of the Nirālambanavāda chapter of the Commentary in Verses (Ślokavārttika), Kumārila mounts a powerful critique of Yogācāra in the form of a response to the dream argument. This critique engages at the level of both metaphysics and philosophy of language. Kumārila argues that a Yogācārin who denies that our concepts have external percepts, based on the analogy of a dream, can make sense neither of goal-oriented motivation nor of perceptual error. And he turns the dream argument against itself, deftly arguing that its rejection of referential views of language deprives the proponent of the argument of the ability to understand either the argument itself or any aspect of Sanskrit debate. Since participants in South Asian debates were held accountable for representing each other’s arguments accurately, Kumārila’s account of Yogācāra may shed light on scholarly conversations about how to interpret the meaning of key Yogācāra teachings. Malcolm Keating, Smith College Kumārila against Instrumental Falsehoods Abstract In a brief exchange with his Buddhist opponent in the Nirālambanavāda (vv. 154-59), Kumārila argues that (non-referring) expressions like “the horn of a hare” cannot bring about correct ideas. His commentator, Uṃveka, understands this as having implications for the Buddhist conception of upāya, skillful means, and of saṃvṛtisat, conventional reality. Keating's paper unpacks Kumārila’s reasoning and considers its implications for both Buddhist opponents and the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic project, which relies on arthavāda, motivating speech, that some have characterized as convenient fictions. Charles Goodman, State University of New York, Binghamton Computer Simulations and Conventional Truth: Responding to Kumārila's Double Critique Abstract This paper explores how defenders of Yogācāra might be able to respond to Kumārila’s critique by drawing on later developments in Buddhist philosophy and contemporary developments in technology. Examples of computer simulations, especially multiplayer games, show that environments in which everything that appears is an illusion can be characterized by both misperception and goal-oriented motivation, so long as they also exhibit intersubjectively robust causal regularities. Meanwhile, the spectacular self-destruction of the dream argument shows that a Yogācārin cannot afford to characterize conventional truth as false simpliciter. In this dialectical context, a key role could be played by the later distinction drawn by Buddhist epistemologists between a cognition’s being non-mistaken (abhrānta) and the distinct property of being non-deceptive (avisaṃvādaka). John Taber, University of New Mexico Does Cognition Illumine Itself? Abstract It is a central claim of Yogācāra philosophy, defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, that a cognition must apprehend itself in order to apprehend an object. Some believe this idea – known as the “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) doctrine – also to be central to certain European philosophical traditions (German idealism, Husserlian phenomenology). Building on previous work by Birgit Kellner and Alex Watson, this talk analyzes a key passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda chapter (vv. 179cd ff.), that critiques Dignāga’s so-called memory argument for this thesis – namely, that when one remembers something, one also remembers experiencing it. The passage reveals the complexity and sophistication of a Hindu-Buddhist controversy already at an early stage. Responding Birgit Kellner, Austrian Academy of Sciences
	Hindu Philosophy Unit Theme: The Nyāya Argument for God’s Existence: A Philosophical Roundtable Shankar Nair, University of Virginia, Presiding Followers of the Nyāya school famously held that the existence of God (īśvara) can be established through inference. Their best-known argument is deceptively simple: the world must have an intelligent maker (kartṛ) because it is an effect (kārya), like a pot. This roundtable will focus on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s formulation of the argument in the Nyāyamañjarī (āhnika 3; critical edition by Kataoka [2005]); Jayanta offers a relatively early (9th c.) defense of the inference from kāryatva (“being an effect”), written in characteristically lucid prose. The session will bring together several scholars to analyze and debate Jayanta’s argument. The goal of the format is to create a space for lively and rigorous discussion, rather than traditional paper presentations. A handout with the original Sanskrit and an English translation of selections from Jayanta’s text will be provided. Panelists Parimal G. Patil, Harvard University Rosanna Picascia, Swarthmore College Nilanjan Das, University College London Michael Allen, University of Virginia Business Meeting Michael Allen, University of Virginia, Presiding
	Hindu Philosophy Unit and Tantric Studies Unit Theme: *Book Panel on Loriliai Biernacki’s The Matter of Wonder: Abhinavagupta’s Panentheism and the New Materialism* (OUP, 2022)** Elaine Fisher, Stanford University, Presiding This roundtable brings together several scholars to discuss Loriliai Biernacki’s recent book The Matter of Wonder: Abhinavagupta’s Panentheism and the New Materialism (Oxford University Press, 2022) in the broader context of South Asian philosophies of materiality. What does it mean for a thing to be “material”? What is the relationship between matter and consciousness? What does it mean to speak of the divine as immanent within the material world? How might premodern thinkers like Abhinavagupta contribute to contemporary philosophies of materiality and the recovery of wonder? Participants will discuss these questions and engage with Biernacki’s book from a variety of perspectives, including Śaiva Tantra, Sāṃkhya, and Jainism, followed by a response from the author. Panelists Lynna Dhanani, University of California, Davis Sundari Johansen Hurwitt, California Institute of Integral Studies John Nemec, University of Virginia Sthaneshwar Timalsina, San Diego State University Responding Loriliai Biernacki, University of Colorado
	Jain Studies Unit Theme: Between Tradition and Modernity: 19th, 20th and 21st Century Jain Mendicant Leaders Anil Mundra, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, Presiding This panel focuses centrally on the seminal role that Jain mendicant leaders of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries have played in translating tradition into modernity, thereby transforming their notions of this binary altogether. It examines and compares four highly influential 20th- and 21st-century Jain Śvetāmbara and Digambara mendicant leaders, and their multiple methods of adapting Jain practices for the modern period which often depend upon an engaged Jain lay community. Despite having outsized influences on the transmission, translation, and adaptation of the Jain tradition into the modern period, no panel to date has taken a microscopic look at the actions and sensibilities of influential Jain mendicant leaders who have reshaped the Jain religious landscape as we know it today. By doing so, we come to appreciate the fluidity of the categories of “tradition” and the “modern,” and understand that both are at play and reconceptualized. Venu Mehta, Claremont School of Theology Fortifying the Tradition through the Icon: Ātmārāmajī Mahārāj’s Vision for Reforming Jainism in Modern India Abstract Ātmārāmajī Mahārāj (1837-1896) is the popular name of the Jain ācārya Vijayananda Surī, a Śvetāmbara Mūrtipūjaka Jain mendicant leader in the late 19th century. Ātmārāmajī saw the need for reforming Jainism in the western and northern parts of a colonized India in response to the growing influence of Hindu practices and ideals and to the aniconic sentiments of the Sthānakavāsīs (non-image worshipping Jains) and a contemporary Hindu reformation leader Dayānanda Sarasavatī (1824-1883) of the Ārya Samāj, a Hindu Indian reform movement. By exploring Ātmārāmajī’s The Chicago Praśnottara (1892-93) and Ajñānatimīra-bhāskara (1882) as well as his own autobiographical accounts found in various sources, this paper discusses how Ātmārāmajī navigated the tradition of the Jain mūrti-pūjā—practices associated with worshipping an icon that form the ritual praxis of particular Jain sects—through the modern period as part of his vision to reform Jainism in the modern period. Corinne Smith, SOAS University of London Kānjī Svāmī: The Transmission of the Adhyātmik Tradition in the Modern Era Abstract This paper discusses the role of technology in the dissemination and preservation of the teachings of Kānjī Svāmī (1890 – 1980). His religious career as an independent Jain leader began in the 1930s, delivering daily lectures on adhyātma, and most frequently on the Samayasāra of Kundakunda. I argue that the community’s use of technology and updating to the latest modes was significant in spreading these teachings into the modern age. Kānjī Svāmī was well-known for his oratory skills and never composed a single written work during his career. His followers certainly exploited the oral nature of Kānjī Svāmī’s teachings to great effect via audio recordings which began from the 1950s onwards using different analogue formats through to the digital age. Keeping pace with the latest technological trends and advancements allowed the preservation and transmission of oral content to audiences, which contributed to the successful growth of the movement. Pratibha Pragya, Mahāprajña’s Exegetical Approach in Ācārāṅga-bhāṣyam Abstract This paper investigates the exegetical approach of Śvetāmbara Terāpanthi leader Ācārya Mahāprajña (1920-2010) in order to illustrate how a learned Jain mendicant leader adapted his exegetical style for a modern context. Mahāprajña’s commentary on the canonical text of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra or his Ācārāṅga-bhāṣyam reinterprets ancient Jaina descriptions of ascetic practice and proposes a new format for understanding scripture tailored for a contemporary audience. He strongly believed that it is difficult to understand Jaina canonical literature without understanding Vedic, Buddhist and Āyurvedic sources. He was explicit about the sources and constructive method of his modern exegetical practices, divorcing himself from the traditional approach set by the oldest commentaries of the Niryukti, which the poetic compositions of older Jain commentators followed. I argue that his reliance on an “end-note” type of commentary (ṭippaṇa), rather than proposing a mere textual adaptation of the chosen text, redefined contemporary approaches to scriptural exegesis. Lynna Dhanani, University of California, Davis “Opening the Archive”: Jambūvijaya and his Manuscript Preservation Projects at the Jaisalmer Bhaṇḍār Abstract This paper will show how the learned Jain scholar-monk Jambūvijaya (1923-2009) opened the archives to the West while simultaneously revamping indigenous understandings of knowledge-preservation through his enormously successful cataloguing, scanning, copying, and digitizing efforts at the Jaisalmer bhaṇḍār or Jain manuscript libraries located at the Jaisalmer Fort in the Rajasthani desert. Western and Asian scholars, such as Daniel Ingalls, Paul Dundas, Nalini Balbir, Shin Fujinaga, John E. Cort, Maria Heim, and dozens of others, benefited from Jambūvijaya’s intellectual prowess, curiosity, and generosity from the 1950s onward. Jain studies, specifically, would not have advanced without his manuscript cataloguing work, critical editions, and independent writings. His willingness to use modern methods alongside traditional ones and engage local and international scholars opened the treasures of the Jaisalmer bhaṇḍār (and other Jain libraries) to the world. Despite such influence and output, there remain limited studies of his collective influence on Jain and Indological studies.
	Yogācāra Studies Unit Theme: Abhidharma and Yogācāra Laura Guerrero, The College of William & Mary, Presiding This panel will explore the relationships between Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions of Buddhism. In particular, this panel aims to examine the continuities and discontinuities between the two traditions either historically, philosophically, or both. Ching Keng, National Taiwan University Are Cognitive objects Pure or Impure? A Dispute from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra Abstract In the Buddhist path toward liberation, cognitive objects serve as a double-edged sword: on one hand, they prompt cognitive and emotional attachments that hinder sentient beings from attaining liberation; on the other hand, they are essential for guiding one toward the liberating knowledge that alone serves as the key to liberation. This paper draws from the Yogācāra theory of three natures (trisvabhāva-nirdeśa) outlined in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra to suggest that the key to resolving the above tension is the idea of pure dependent nature. When the dependent nature (i.e., cognitive objects) is detached from the imagined nature (i.e., concepts superimposed on cognitive objects), cognitive objects are perceived through non-conceptual perception. Only through non-conceptual perception of objects can further seeds of names and concepts be avoided in the storehouse consciousness. In essence, a proper mode of perceiving cognitive objects paves the way for their elimination. Chihying Wu, University of California, Berkeley Subjectivity from Abhidharma to Yogācāra Abstract This paper analyzes theories on subjectivity and how they changed from Abhidharma scholasticism to Yogācāra philosophy of mind. One of the most common and fundamental themes in Buddhist intellectual discourses is the denial of self (anātman). Throughout history, Buddhist thinkers have attempted to account for subjectivity, while rejecting self as the basis for perhaps the most intrinsic and ineradicable feature of our existence. The Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntikas maintain the reductionist approach to self and explain our sense of self through the function of the mental factor, the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi). However, under this Abhidharmic model subjectivity is at best episodic and sporadic. The Yogācāra thinkers then proposed the theory of the afflicted mentation (kliṣṭaṁ manas) which constantly ruminates and is responsible for the sense of self. This paper investigates the transition from the Abhidharma to the Yogācāra model and the intellectual context in which this transition emerged. Szilvia Szanyi, Oxford University Fundamental (dis)agreement: Sthiramati on the Abhidharmic view of the nature and objects of consciousness Abstract Sthiramati is a prominent commentator of the Yogācāra tradition, however his contributions to tackling key issues in Buddhist philosophy are often overlooked in scholarship. In his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, the Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya, Sthiramati claims that one of the purposes of Vasubandhu’s work is to reject the ‘extreme doctrine’ of the Ābhidharmikas that “just like consciousness, the object of consciousness also substantially (dravyatas) exists”. Although Sthiramati sides with the Ābhidharmikas (over the Mādhyamikas) in accepting that consciousness substantially exists, he denies the same status to the objects of consciousness. This talk investigates Sthiramati’s attempt to adhere to fundamental Abhidharmic presuppositions in philosophy of mind and perception while criticizing and reinterpreting the Ābhidharmikas’ view that the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) of consciousness is a mind-independent entity. With regard to his critique, I pay special attention to how Sthiramati combines various metaphysical and epistemological considerations used for a similar purpose in Vasubandhu’s and Dignāga’s works.

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